Zehn Monate nach dem August-Krieg ist Südossetien ein geschundenes, armes und abhängiges Land
In Südossetien ist seit dem Krieg vom vergangenen August wenig geschehen. Die Spuren der Zerstörung prägen in Zchinwali das Bild. Politisch und wirtschaftlich hängt das Land am Tropf Russlands. Die Bevölkerung schwankt zwischen Resignation und Hoffnung.
Von unserem Korrespondenten Markus Ackeret
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Showing posts with label Tskhinvali. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tskhinvali. Show all posts
Friday, July 10, 2009
Saturday, June 13, 2009
NEWS: 5 Jun 09 | Caucasus Reporting Service 496 (iwpr.net)
Will Kokoity Deliver on Poll Pledges?
South Ossetian leader must improve living conditions for locals in wake of election or risk support switching to opposition, warn analysts. By Alan Tskhurbaev in Tskhinvali (CRS No. 496, 5-June-09)
Yerevan Election Condemned as “Amoral and Cynical”
International watchdog monitoring poll said it “witnessed the collapse of the Armenian electoral system as an institution”. By Sara Khojoian in Yerevan (CRS No. 496, 5-June-09)
South Ossetian leader must improve living conditions for locals in wake of election or risk support switching to opposition, warn analysts. By Alan Tskhurbaev in Tskhinvali (CRS No. 496, 5-June-09)
Yerevan Election Condemned as “Amoral and Cynical”
International watchdog monitoring poll said it “witnessed the collapse of the Armenian electoral system as an institution”. By Sara Khojoian in Yerevan (CRS No. 496, 5-June-09)
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
LEBENSSITUATION: "Humanitäre Katastrophe". Warten auf russisches Geld
In Südossetien, der abtrünnigen Region Georgiens im Südkaukasus, sind die Menschen nach dem Siegestaumel zum Ende des August-Kriegs und einem harten Winter zunehmend verzweifelt. Von den versprochenen russischen Hilfsgeldern ist kaum etwas zu sehen. Die zerstörte Hauptstadt Zchinwali sieht auch sieben Monate nach dem Angriff georgischer Truppen kaum anders aus. Hunderte Häuser liegen in Trümmern. Wie Narben zeugen die Einschlaglöcher der Munition vom Krieg, bei dem offiziell 441 Menschen starben. Von weitem leuchten neue Dächer. Doch auch sie sind einsturzgefährdet. Behörden beklagen Baupfusch windiger Unternehmen. Viele Menschen frieren. Mancher fragt sich, welchen Sinn der mit Hilfe Russlands gewonnene Krieg hatte.
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Saturday, November 15, 2008
HINWEIS: Veranstaltung: Süd-Ossetien: Leben nach dem Krieg, 17.11., 19.30 Uhr
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
wir haben heute Nachricht von nachfolgender Veranstaltung erhalten, auf die wir Sie – leider sehr kurzfristig – gern aufmerksam machen möchten.
Eine vorherige Anmeldung ist nicht notwendig.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Franca Brand
----
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde e.V.
German Association for East European Studies
Schaperstr. 30
D-10719 Berlin
Tel.: +49 (0) 30 / 21 47 84 12
Fax: +49 (0) 30 / 21 47 84 14
E-Mail: info@dgo-online.org
Homepage: www.dgo-online.org
----
Süd-Ossetien: Leben nach dem Krieg
Zeit: Montag, 17. November, 19:30 Uhr
Ort: taz-Cafe, Rudi-Dutschke Strasse, Berlin
Seit drei Monaten schweigen die Waffen zwischen Georgien und Russland im Kampf um Süd-Ossetien. Russland hat Süd-Ossetien anerkannt, EU-Beobachter überwachen seit Oktober den Waffenstillstand. Inzwischen scheint sich das während des Krieges angespannte Verhältnis zwischen Russland und der Europäischen Union wieder zu entspannen. Die EU wird in Kürze die Verhandlungen über eine strategische Partnerschaft mit Russland wieder aufnehmen. Wie sieht heute, drei Monate nach Kriegsende, das Leben in der international nicht anerkannten Republik Süd-Ossetien aus? Gibt es überhaupt noch die Perspektive einer Reintegration Süd-Ossetiens in den georgischen Staat? Welche Auswirkungen hat der Konflikt auf die Region?
Es diskutieren:
- Svetlana Gannuschkina vom "Menschenrechtszentrum Memorial".
Gannuschkina hatte in den vergangenen 20 Jahren mehrfach Konfliktgebiete in Georgien, Berg-Karabach, Tschetschenien und Inguschetien besucht. Im Oktober 2008 hatte sie Südossetien besucht.
Gannuschkina ist Mitglied im Rat für Zivilgesellschaft und Menschenrechte beim Russischen Präsidenten, Trägerin des Menschenrechtspreises von Amnesty International, Deutsche Sektion, 2003.
- Maria Kotajewa, Jahrgang 1986, ist Lehrerin für englische Sprache und Literatur an der allgemeinbildenden Oberschule Nr. 7 der Stadt Zchinwali. Zugleich ist sie aktives Mitglied des
Jugendparlaments der Republik Südossetien. Während des Krieges befand sie sich in Zchinwali.
- Mira Zchowrebowa, Jahrgang 1952, ist an der Südossetischen Staatlichen Universität tätig, wo sie einen Lehrstuhl für englische Sprache innehat. Sie war bereits als Augenzeugin des Konflikts zur Herbsttagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats in Straßburg eingeladen.
- Walter Kaufmann, eh. Leiter des Regionalbüros Südkaukasus der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Tbilissi/Tiflis/Georgien (2003 bis Juli 2008).
Der Osteuropahistoriker und Slavist war 1995-2002 Osteuropa-Referent der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, von 2003 bis Juli 2008 Leiter des Regionalbüros Südkaukasus der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Tbilisi/Tiflis/Georgien.
Moderation: Barbara Oertel, taz
wir haben heute Nachricht von nachfolgender Veranstaltung erhalten, auf die wir Sie – leider sehr kurzfristig – gern aufmerksam machen möchten.
Eine vorherige Anmeldung ist nicht notwendig.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Franca Brand
----
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde e.V.
German Association for East European Studies
Schaperstr. 30
D-10719 Berlin
Tel.: +49 (0) 30 / 21 47 84 12
Fax: +49 (0) 30 / 21 47 84 14
E-Mail: info@dgo-online.org
Homepage: www.dgo-online.org
----
Süd-Ossetien: Leben nach dem Krieg
Zeit: Montag, 17. November, 19:30 Uhr
Ort: taz-Cafe, Rudi-Dutschke Strasse, Berlin
Seit drei Monaten schweigen die Waffen zwischen Georgien und Russland im Kampf um Süd-Ossetien. Russland hat Süd-Ossetien anerkannt, EU-Beobachter überwachen seit Oktober den Waffenstillstand. Inzwischen scheint sich das während des Krieges angespannte Verhältnis zwischen Russland und der Europäischen Union wieder zu entspannen. Die EU wird in Kürze die Verhandlungen über eine strategische Partnerschaft mit Russland wieder aufnehmen. Wie sieht heute, drei Monate nach Kriegsende, das Leben in der international nicht anerkannten Republik Süd-Ossetien aus? Gibt es überhaupt noch die Perspektive einer Reintegration Süd-Ossetiens in den georgischen Staat? Welche Auswirkungen hat der Konflikt auf die Region?
Es diskutieren:
- Svetlana Gannuschkina vom "Menschenrechtszentrum Memorial".
Gannuschkina hatte in den vergangenen 20 Jahren mehrfach Konfliktgebiete in Georgien, Berg-Karabach, Tschetschenien und Inguschetien besucht. Im Oktober 2008 hatte sie Südossetien besucht.
Gannuschkina ist Mitglied im Rat für Zivilgesellschaft und Menschenrechte beim Russischen Präsidenten, Trägerin des Menschenrechtspreises von Amnesty International, Deutsche Sektion, 2003.
- Maria Kotajewa, Jahrgang 1986, ist Lehrerin für englische Sprache und Literatur an der allgemeinbildenden Oberschule Nr. 7 der Stadt Zchinwali. Zugleich ist sie aktives Mitglied des
Jugendparlaments der Republik Südossetien. Während des Krieges befand sie sich in Zchinwali.
- Mira Zchowrebowa, Jahrgang 1952, ist an der Südossetischen Staatlichen Universität tätig, wo sie einen Lehrstuhl für englische Sprache innehat. Sie war bereits als Augenzeugin des Konflikts zur Herbsttagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats in Straßburg eingeladen.
- Walter Kaufmann, eh. Leiter des Regionalbüros Südkaukasus der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Tbilissi/Tiflis/Georgien (2003 bis Juli 2008).
Der Osteuropahistoriker und Slavist war 1995-2002 Osteuropa-Referent der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, von 2003 bis Juli 2008 Leiter des Regionalbüros Südkaukasus der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Tbilisi/Tiflis/Georgien.
Moderation: Barbara Oertel, taz
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
KRIEG: Die Schuldfrage
11.11.2008
TBILISI/WASHINGTON/BERLIN
(Eigener Bericht) - Neue Berichte ehemaliger OSZE-Mitarbeiter in Georgien belasten die westlichen Staaten einschließlich Deutschlands wegen ihrer Rolle im jüngsten Kaukasuskrieg. Demnach war der Westen schon vor Kriegsbeginn über georgische Eskalationsabsichten informiert, hinderte die politisch abhängige Regierung in Tbilisi aber nicht am völkerrechtswidrigen Beschuss südossetischer Wohngebiete. Stattdessen nahmen die Regierungen in den USA und Europa den georgischen Aggressor, einen Bündnispartner, wider besseres Wissen in Schutz, um nach der Kriegsniederlage ihren eigenen politischen Schaden zu begrenzen. Berichte über georgische Kriegsverbrechen wurden auch in Berlin unterdrückt, die OSZE unterliegt bis heute einem Schweigegebot. Erste Medienberichte werden zu einem Zeitpunkt laut, da eine frühere Parteigängerin des georgischen Staatspräsidenten Saakaschwili Neuwahlen fordert und gegen den Amtsinhaber antreten will. Sie verhandelt schon seit September mit Washington und Berlin und wirft Saakaschwili vor, mit dem Angriff auf Südossetien die falsche Strategie verfolgt zu haben. In die Gespräche mit der möglichen Saakaschwili-Nachfolgerin ist auf deutscher Seite die Bertelsmann-Stiftung involviert.
Alarmsignale
Der ehemalige stellvertretende Leiter der OSZE-Mission in Georgien, Ryan Grist, hat vor Beginn der Kämpfe zwischen Georgien und Russland vor den Angriffsabsichten Tbilisis gewarnt. Er habe keinen Zweifel daran gelassen, dass im Konflikt um Südossetien eine "ernste Eskalation" bevorstehe, die dem Kreml einen Anlass zur Intervention bieten werde, berichtete er vor wenigen Tagen der BBC. Weil keine entschlossenen Maßnahmen des Westens zur Kriegsverhinderung folgten, vermutet Grist, dass seine Warnungen innerhalb der OSZE nicht an die Mitgliedstaaten, darunter auch Deutschland, weitergeleitet worden sind - eine Annahme, die der OSZE-Vorsitzende zurückweist.[1] Tatsächlich waren Grists Mitteilungen längst nicht die einzigen Alarmsignale. Tbilisi hatte bereits im Januar ein Konzept zur militärischen Rückeroberung Südossetiens erarbeitet und es mit US-Regierungsstellen erörtert.[2] Trotzdem schritten die westlichen Staaten nicht ernsthaft ein. Der deutsche Außenminister war noch im Juli zu einem letzten Vermittlungsversuch nach Georgien und Russland gereist, hatte aber nach dem Scheitern keine weiteren Maßnahmen ergriffen. Nach der georgischen Aggression in der Nacht vom 7. auf den 8. August stellte sich Berlin gänzlich auf die Seite des georgischen Staatspräsidenten, eines Parteigängers vor allem der USA.
Kriegsbeginn
Dies geschah, obwohl offenkundige Kriegsverbrechen des georgischen Aggressors dem Westen nicht verborgen geblieben sind. Wie Ryan Grist jetzt mitteilt, hat er schon kurz nach der Attacke der georgischen Armee auf Südossetien den in Tbilisi akkreditierten EU-Botschaftern Bericht erstattet. Demnach beobachtete die von ihm geleitete OSZE-Mission bereits am Nachmittag des 7. August, wie georgische Truppen Raketenwerfer südlich Südossetiens in Stellung brachten. In der Nacht erlebten die OSZE-Beobachter den Raketenbeschuss auf Wohngebiete der südossetischen Hauptstadt - alle 20 Sekunden eine Detonation.[3] Schutzbehauptungen, die der georgische Staatspräsident später vorbrachte - den georgischen Attacken soll der Beschuss georgischer Ortschaften durch russische Truppen vorangegangen sein -, kann die OSZE widerlegen: Ihre Beobachter verbrachten die Nacht in Hörweite der Hälfte dieser Orte, vernahmen aber von dort keine Explosionen. Grist berichtete dies alles den EU-Botschaftern, deren Regierungen jedoch auch weiterhin erklärten, sie könnten nicht herausfinden, wer den Krieg begonnen habe. Wenige Tage später trat Grist von seinem Amt zurück.
Militärische Lösung
Dass Berlin über die tatsächliche Entwicklung in Südossetien längst informiert gewesen ist, lässt nicht nur die Tatsache vermuten, dass der OSZE-Mission in Georgien Deutsche angehörten. Der Staatsminister im Auswärtigen Amt Gernot Erler hatte zudem unmittelbar nach Kriegsbeginn erklärt, Georgien habe mit der Attacke in der Nacht vom 7. auf den 8. August versucht, den Sezessionsstreit "militärisch zu lösen". Die - offenkundig zutreffende - Äußerung brachte Erler in Schwierigkeiten und wurde durch die Sprachregelung der Bundesregierung abgelöst, die Kriegsschuldfrage sei nicht zu klären und spiele ohnehin keine Rolle - eine Schutzmaßnahme für den US-Mann Saakaschwili. Auch die OSZE verweigert bis heute jede Stellungnahme, obwohl diese zur Klärung der Lage maßgeblich beitragen könnte. Im Ergebnis nützt die Weigerung, über die Kriegsschuld zu sprechen, dem Westen, der Russland besser unter Druck setzen kann, wenn die Aggressionen seines georgischen Verbündeten nicht näher spezifiziert werden.
Kriegsverbrechen
In den vergangenen Tagen haben britische und amerikanische Medien längere Berichte über die georgische Aggression veröffentlicht. Sie stützen sich mittlerweile auch auf eigene Recherchen vor Ort, die schwere Kriegsverbrechen der georgischen Armee belegen. So haben Nachforschungen der BBC ergeben, dass Georgiens Panzer gezielt in Wohnhäuser der südossetischen Hauptstadt feuerten, nach Augenzeugenberichten tagelang.[4] Human Rights Watch berichtet, für die Untersuchung des Geschehens sei die Annahme, es seien durch georgische Attacken 300 bis 400 Zivilisten zu Tode gekommen, "ein brauchbarer Ausgangspunkt".[5] Dies wären rund ein Prozent der Hauptstadt-Bevölkerung und ein halbes Prozent der Gesamteinwohnerzahl Südossetiens. BBC-Berichte, denen zufolge georgische Truppen fliehenden Südosseten an den zentralen Fluchtrouten auflauerten und sie dort beschossen - auch mit Panzern -, wurden noch nicht offiziell bestätigt. Human Rights Watch verfügt jedoch über Belege dafür, dass georgische Panzer ganz gezielt auf Kellergeschosse feuerten - "Orte, an denen Zivilisten typischerweise Schutz suchen". Beim gewollten Beschuss von Zivilisten handelt es sich ebenso um ein Kriegsverbrechen wie beim ungezielten Beschuss von Wohngebieten mit Raketenwerfern.
Neuwahlen
Die aktuellen Berichte über Kriegsverbrechen beim georgischen Angriff auf Südossetien belasten den Westen, der diesen Angriff trotz seiner Kenntnisse über die Aggressionspläne nicht verhinderte; wegen der Abhängigkeit Georgiens von Waffenlieferungen sowie von reichen Geberstaaten wäre dies sicherlich möglich gewesen, nicht zuletzt angesichts der Präsenz einer dreistelligen Zahl von US-Militärberatern innerhalb der georgischen Armee. Die Berichte belasten aber auch die Regierung Saakaschwili, die sich zur Zeit heftigen Angriffen innerhalb Georgiens ausgesetzt sieht - auch wegen ihres in Tbilisi höchst umstrittenen Kriegskurses. Vor einer Kriegseskalation hatte schon im Frühjahr die damalige Präsidentin des georgischen Parlaments und langjährige politische Weggefährtin des Staatspräsidenten, Nino Burjanadze, gewarnt. Burjanadze konnte sich mit ihren Warnungen nicht durchsetzen und beendete im Juni ihre Abgeordnetentätigkeit - zumindest vorläufig. Seit der Kriegsniederlage, die sie Saakaschwili und seinem aggressiven Kurs anlastet, tritt sie regelmäßig in der Öffentlichkeit auf, hat mittlerweile die Gründung einer Oppositionspartei angekündigt und fordert Neuwahlen.
Kräfteverschiebung
Verschiedene Beobachter sehen in Burjanadze die Nachfolgerin von Saakaschwili, zumal sie sich mit den westlichen Führungsmächten bereits abgestimmt hat. Wenige Wochen nach der georgischen Niederlage hielt sie sich zu ausführlichen Gesprächen in Washington auf und machte auf der Rückreise in Berlin Station. Ihr aktueller Aufstieg fällt mit Kräfteverschiebungen in der US-Außenpolitik zusammen. In Tbilisi hieß es schon im vergangenen Herbst, Saakaschwili könne sich im Washingtoner State Department vor allem auf den für Europa und Eurasien zuständigen Staatssekretär Daniel Fried stützen; daneben gebe es nur wenig verlässliche Hilfe im Außenministerium für ihn. Fried gilt in der US-Hauptstadt in Sachen Georgien als einer der Hardliner um Vizepräsident Cheney [6], die mit dem Regierungswechsel an Bedeutung verlieren. Für Burjanadze verbessern sich damit die Chancen, in Abstimmung mit Washington Saakaschwili ablösen zu können.
Einfluss
In die Gespräche, die in einen Wechsel an der georgischen Staatsspitze münden könnten, ist auf deutscher Seite die Bertelsmann-Stiftung eingeschaltet. In deren Repräsentanz in Berlin sprach Burjanadze Anfang September auf der Rückreise aus Washington vor. Sie befürworte eine Untersuchung des Kriegsbeginns durch eine internationale Kommission, um "innenpolitischen Diskussionen" in Georgien sowie der "verbreiteten Kritik" an Saakaschwili gerecht zu werden. Die damit verbundene Schwächung des Staatspräsidenten kommt der Konkurrentin zugute. Da Berlin ohnehin seit geraumer Zeit eine Alternative zu Saakaschwili sucht [7], findet Burjanadze Anklang. Auf Betreiben des deutschen Außenministers wird die EU jetzt eine Kommission finanzieren, die den Kriegsbeginn detailliert untersucht. An diesem Wochenende stellte Burjanadze dafür eine größere Kooperationsbereitschaft gegenüber der EU in Aussicht. "Europa hat einen großen Fehler gemacht, dass es sich nicht schon vor dem Krieg stärker eingemischt hat", sagte sie am Rande einer neuen Kaukasus-Tagung der Bertelsmann-Stiftung in Tbilisi: Brüssel solle jetzt seine Einflusspolitik in Georgien deutlich intensivieren.[8]
Lesen Sie zum Kaukasus-Konflikt auch unsere bisherige Berichterstattung: Interessierter Mittler, Aus dem Schatten, Operationskonzepte, Am Abgrund, Zwei Seiten einer Medaille, Kaukasische Rivalitäten, Kontrolleure und Kaukasische Rivalitäten (II).
[1] OSCE "failed" in Georgia warnings; BBC 08.11.2008
[2] U.S. Watched as a Squabble Turned Into a Showdown; The New York Times 17.08.2008
[3] Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question; The New York Times 07.11.2008
[4], [5] Georgia accused of targeting civilians; BBC 28.10.2008
[6] U.S. Watched as a Squabble Turned Into a Showdown; The New York Times 17.08.2008
[7] s. dazu Reformland des Jahres
[8] "Die Regierung belügt unser Volk über den Krieg"; Spiegel Online 09.11.2008
Source: http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/57388
TBILISI/WASHINGTON/BERLIN
(Eigener Bericht) - Neue Berichte ehemaliger OSZE-Mitarbeiter in Georgien belasten die westlichen Staaten einschließlich Deutschlands wegen ihrer Rolle im jüngsten Kaukasuskrieg. Demnach war der Westen schon vor Kriegsbeginn über georgische Eskalationsabsichten informiert, hinderte die politisch abhängige Regierung in Tbilisi aber nicht am völkerrechtswidrigen Beschuss südossetischer Wohngebiete. Stattdessen nahmen die Regierungen in den USA und Europa den georgischen Aggressor, einen Bündnispartner, wider besseres Wissen in Schutz, um nach der Kriegsniederlage ihren eigenen politischen Schaden zu begrenzen. Berichte über georgische Kriegsverbrechen wurden auch in Berlin unterdrückt, die OSZE unterliegt bis heute einem Schweigegebot. Erste Medienberichte werden zu einem Zeitpunkt laut, da eine frühere Parteigängerin des georgischen Staatspräsidenten Saakaschwili Neuwahlen fordert und gegen den Amtsinhaber antreten will. Sie verhandelt schon seit September mit Washington und Berlin und wirft Saakaschwili vor, mit dem Angriff auf Südossetien die falsche Strategie verfolgt zu haben. In die Gespräche mit der möglichen Saakaschwili-Nachfolgerin ist auf deutscher Seite die Bertelsmann-Stiftung involviert.
Alarmsignale
Der ehemalige stellvertretende Leiter der OSZE-Mission in Georgien, Ryan Grist, hat vor Beginn der Kämpfe zwischen Georgien und Russland vor den Angriffsabsichten Tbilisis gewarnt. Er habe keinen Zweifel daran gelassen, dass im Konflikt um Südossetien eine "ernste Eskalation" bevorstehe, die dem Kreml einen Anlass zur Intervention bieten werde, berichtete er vor wenigen Tagen der BBC. Weil keine entschlossenen Maßnahmen des Westens zur Kriegsverhinderung folgten, vermutet Grist, dass seine Warnungen innerhalb der OSZE nicht an die Mitgliedstaaten, darunter auch Deutschland, weitergeleitet worden sind - eine Annahme, die der OSZE-Vorsitzende zurückweist.[1] Tatsächlich waren Grists Mitteilungen längst nicht die einzigen Alarmsignale. Tbilisi hatte bereits im Januar ein Konzept zur militärischen Rückeroberung Südossetiens erarbeitet und es mit US-Regierungsstellen erörtert.[2] Trotzdem schritten die westlichen Staaten nicht ernsthaft ein. Der deutsche Außenminister war noch im Juli zu einem letzten Vermittlungsversuch nach Georgien und Russland gereist, hatte aber nach dem Scheitern keine weiteren Maßnahmen ergriffen. Nach der georgischen Aggression in der Nacht vom 7. auf den 8. August stellte sich Berlin gänzlich auf die Seite des georgischen Staatspräsidenten, eines Parteigängers vor allem der USA.
Kriegsbeginn
Dies geschah, obwohl offenkundige Kriegsverbrechen des georgischen Aggressors dem Westen nicht verborgen geblieben sind. Wie Ryan Grist jetzt mitteilt, hat er schon kurz nach der Attacke der georgischen Armee auf Südossetien den in Tbilisi akkreditierten EU-Botschaftern Bericht erstattet. Demnach beobachtete die von ihm geleitete OSZE-Mission bereits am Nachmittag des 7. August, wie georgische Truppen Raketenwerfer südlich Südossetiens in Stellung brachten. In der Nacht erlebten die OSZE-Beobachter den Raketenbeschuss auf Wohngebiete der südossetischen Hauptstadt - alle 20 Sekunden eine Detonation.[3] Schutzbehauptungen, die der georgische Staatspräsident später vorbrachte - den georgischen Attacken soll der Beschuss georgischer Ortschaften durch russische Truppen vorangegangen sein -, kann die OSZE widerlegen: Ihre Beobachter verbrachten die Nacht in Hörweite der Hälfte dieser Orte, vernahmen aber von dort keine Explosionen. Grist berichtete dies alles den EU-Botschaftern, deren Regierungen jedoch auch weiterhin erklärten, sie könnten nicht herausfinden, wer den Krieg begonnen habe. Wenige Tage später trat Grist von seinem Amt zurück.
Militärische Lösung
Dass Berlin über die tatsächliche Entwicklung in Südossetien längst informiert gewesen ist, lässt nicht nur die Tatsache vermuten, dass der OSZE-Mission in Georgien Deutsche angehörten. Der Staatsminister im Auswärtigen Amt Gernot Erler hatte zudem unmittelbar nach Kriegsbeginn erklärt, Georgien habe mit der Attacke in der Nacht vom 7. auf den 8. August versucht, den Sezessionsstreit "militärisch zu lösen". Die - offenkundig zutreffende - Äußerung brachte Erler in Schwierigkeiten und wurde durch die Sprachregelung der Bundesregierung abgelöst, die Kriegsschuldfrage sei nicht zu klären und spiele ohnehin keine Rolle - eine Schutzmaßnahme für den US-Mann Saakaschwili. Auch die OSZE verweigert bis heute jede Stellungnahme, obwohl diese zur Klärung der Lage maßgeblich beitragen könnte. Im Ergebnis nützt die Weigerung, über die Kriegsschuld zu sprechen, dem Westen, der Russland besser unter Druck setzen kann, wenn die Aggressionen seines georgischen Verbündeten nicht näher spezifiziert werden.
Kriegsverbrechen
In den vergangenen Tagen haben britische und amerikanische Medien längere Berichte über die georgische Aggression veröffentlicht. Sie stützen sich mittlerweile auch auf eigene Recherchen vor Ort, die schwere Kriegsverbrechen der georgischen Armee belegen. So haben Nachforschungen der BBC ergeben, dass Georgiens Panzer gezielt in Wohnhäuser der südossetischen Hauptstadt feuerten, nach Augenzeugenberichten tagelang.[4] Human Rights Watch berichtet, für die Untersuchung des Geschehens sei die Annahme, es seien durch georgische Attacken 300 bis 400 Zivilisten zu Tode gekommen, "ein brauchbarer Ausgangspunkt".[5] Dies wären rund ein Prozent der Hauptstadt-Bevölkerung und ein halbes Prozent der Gesamteinwohnerzahl Südossetiens. BBC-Berichte, denen zufolge georgische Truppen fliehenden Südosseten an den zentralen Fluchtrouten auflauerten und sie dort beschossen - auch mit Panzern -, wurden noch nicht offiziell bestätigt. Human Rights Watch verfügt jedoch über Belege dafür, dass georgische Panzer ganz gezielt auf Kellergeschosse feuerten - "Orte, an denen Zivilisten typischerweise Schutz suchen". Beim gewollten Beschuss von Zivilisten handelt es sich ebenso um ein Kriegsverbrechen wie beim ungezielten Beschuss von Wohngebieten mit Raketenwerfern.
Neuwahlen
Die aktuellen Berichte über Kriegsverbrechen beim georgischen Angriff auf Südossetien belasten den Westen, der diesen Angriff trotz seiner Kenntnisse über die Aggressionspläne nicht verhinderte; wegen der Abhängigkeit Georgiens von Waffenlieferungen sowie von reichen Geberstaaten wäre dies sicherlich möglich gewesen, nicht zuletzt angesichts der Präsenz einer dreistelligen Zahl von US-Militärberatern innerhalb der georgischen Armee. Die Berichte belasten aber auch die Regierung Saakaschwili, die sich zur Zeit heftigen Angriffen innerhalb Georgiens ausgesetzt sieht - auch wegen ihres in Tbilisi höchst umstrittenen Kriegskurses. Vor einer Kriegseskalation hatte schon im Frühjahr die damalige Präsidentin des georgischen Parlaments und langjährige politische Weggefährtin des Staatspräsidenten, Nino Burjanadze, gewarnt. Burjanadze konnte sich mit ihren Warnungen nicht durchsetzen und beendete im Juni ihre Abgeordnetentätigkeit - zumindest vorläufig. Seit der Kriegsniederlage, die sie Saakaschwili und seinem aggressiven Kurs anlastet, tritt sie regelmäßig in der Öffentlichkeit auf, hat mittlerweile die Gründung einer Oppositionspartei angekündigt und fordert Neuwahlen.
Kräfteverschiebung
Verschiedene Beobachter sehen in Burjanadze die Nachfolgerin von Saakaschwili, zumal sie sich mit den westlichen Führungsmächten bereits abgestimmt hat. Wenige Wochen nach der georgischen Niederlage hielt sie sich zu ausführlichen Gesprächen in Washington auf und machte auf der Rückreise in Berlin Station. Ihr aktueller Aufstieg fällt mit Kräfteverschiebungen in der US-Außenpolitik zusammen. In Tbilisi hieß es schon im vergangenen Herbst, Saakaschwili könne sich im Washingtoner State Department vor allem auf den für Europa und Eurasien zuständigen Staatssekretär Daniel Fried stützen; daneben gebe es nur wenig verlässliche Hilfe im Außenministerium für ihn. Fried gilt in der US-Hauptstadt in Sachen Georgien als einer der Hardliner um Vizepräsident Cheney [6], die mit dem Regierungswechsel an Bedeutung verlieren. Für Burjanadze verbessern sich damit die Chancen, in Abstimmung mit Washington Saakaschwili ablösen zu können.
Einfluss
In die Gespräche, die in einen Wechsel an der georgischen Staatsspitze münden könnten, ist auf deutscher Seite die Bertelsmann-Stiftung eingeschaltet. In deren Repräsentanz in Berlin sprach Burjanadze Anfang September auf der Rückreise aus Washington vor. Sie befürworte eine Untersuchung des Kriegsbeginns durch eine internationale Kommission, um "innenpolitischen Diskussionen" in Georgien sowie der "verbreiteten Kritik" an Saakaschwili gerecht zu werden. Die damit verbundene Schwächung des Staatspräsidenten kommt der Konkurrentin zugute. Da Berlin ohnehin seit geraumer Zeit eine Alternative zu Saakaschwili sucht [7], findet Burjanadze Anklang. Auf Betreiben des deutschen Außenministers wird die EU jetzt eine Kommission finanzieren, die den Kriegsbeginn detailliert untersucht. An diesem Wochenende stellte Burjanadze dafür eine größere Kooperationsbereitschaft gegenüber der EU in Aussicht. "Europa hat einen großen Fehler gemacht, dass es sich nicht schon vor dem Krieg stärker eingemischt hat", sagte sie am Rande einer neuen Kaukasus-Tagung der Bertelsmann-Stiftung in Tbilisi: Brüssel solle jetzt seine Einflusspolitik in Georgien deutlich intensivieren.[8]
Lesen Sie zum Kaukasus-Konflikt auch unsere bisherige Berichterstattung: Interessierter Mittler, Aus dem Schatten, Operationskonzepte, Am Abgrund, Zwei Seiten einer Medaille, Kaukasische Rivalitäten, Kontrolleure und Kaukasische Rivalitäten (II).
[1] OSCE "failed" in Georgia warnings; BBC 08.11.2008
[2] U.S. Watched as a Squabble Turned Into a Showdown; The New York Times 17.08.2008
[3] Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question; The New York Times 07.11.2008
[4], [5] Georgia accused of targeting civilians; BBC 28.10.2008
[6] U.S. Watched as a Squabble Turned Into a Showdown; The New York Times 17.08.2008
[7] s. dazu Reformland des Jahres
[8] "Die Regierung belügt unser Volk über den Krieg"; Spiegel Online 09.11.2008
Source: http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/57388
NYT: Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question
Georgian forces fired rockets at South Ossetia in August.
By C. J. CHIVERS and ELLEN BARRY
Published: November 6, 2008
TBILISI, Georgia — Newly available accounts by independent military observers of the beginning of the war between Georgia and Russia this summer call into question the longstanding Georgian assertion that it was acting defensively against separatist and Russian aggression.
Instead, the accounts suggest that Georgia’s inexperienced military attacked the isolated separatist capital of Tskhinvali on Aug. 7 with indiscriminate artillery and rocket fire, exposing civilians, Russian peacekeepers and unarmed monitors to harm.
The accounts are neither fully conclusive nor broad enough to settle the many lingering disputes over blame in a war that hardened relations between the Kremlin and the West. But they raise questions about the accuracy and honesty of Georgia’s insistence that its shelling of Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, was a precise operation. Georgia has variously defended the shelling as necessary to stop heavy Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages, bring order to the region or counter a Russian invasion.
Full Text >>>
Times Topics
Conflict in Georgia
Complete coverage of the military conflict between Russia and Georgia.
Blog: Analysis of the Regional Tensions
More Topics: South Ossetia Abkhazia
Related
Georgia Fired More Cluster Bombs Than Thought, Killing Civilians, Report Finds
(November 6, 2008)
C.J. Chivers reported from Tbilisi, Georgia, and Ellen Barry from Moscow. Olesya Vartanyan contributed reporting from Tbilisi, and Matt Siegel from Tskhinvali, Georgia.
By C. J. CHIVERS and ELLEN BARRY
Published: November 6, 2008
TBILISI, Georgia — Newly available accounts by independent military observers of the beginning of the war between Georgia and Russia this summer call into question the longstanding Georgian assertion that it was acting defensively against separatist and Russian aggression.
Instead, the accounts suggest that Georgia’s inexperienced military attacked the isolated separatist capital of Tskhinvali on Aug. 7 with indiscriminate artillery and rocket fire, exposing civilians, Russian peacekeepers and unarmed monitors to harm.
The accounts are neither fully conclusive nor broad enough to settle the many lingering disputes over blame in a war that hardened relations between the Kremlin and the West. But they raise questions about the accuracy and honesty of Georgia’s insistence that its shelling of Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, was a precise operation. Georgia has variously defended the shelling as necessary to stop heavy Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages, bring order to the region or counter a Russian invasion.
Full Text >>>
Times Topics
Conflict in Georgia
Complete coverage of the military conflict between Russia and Georgia.
Blog: Analysis of the Regional Tensions
More Topics: South Ossetia Abkhazia
Related
Georgia Fired More Cluster Bombs Than Thought, Killing Civilians, Report Finds
(November 6, 2008)
C.J. Chivers reported from Tbilisi, Georgia, and Ellen Barry from Moscow. Olesya Vartanyan contributed reporting from Tbilisi, and Matt Siegel from Tskhinvali, Georgia.
Friday, September 05, 2008
FEATURES: ‘Where Will We Go?’
by Leah Kohlenberg, 3 September 2008For many refugees of the Caucasus war, homelessness is an all-too-familiar story.
TBILISI Hunched over a makeshift ironing board crafted from a school teacher’s desk, 36-year-old Kristina Mysuradze experienced a frightening sense of déjà vu.
For nearly 15 years, she and her family lived in an abandoned school building in Gori, much like the kindergarten classroom she now occupies. In 1992, Mysuradze fled an Abkhaz village outside the capital, Sukhumi, where she lived when conflict erupted between Abkhazians and Georgians, ultimately chasing 250,000 ethnic Georgians from the separatist region. It was a nightmare she relived in August, when fighting between Russia and Georgia over the breakaway enclave of South Ossetia closed in on the central Georgian town of Gori.
Related article:
Building Homes, not Just Refuges It’s not too early to plan for the return and resettlement of those displaced by the latest Caucasus conflict. by Anneke Smit 21 August 2008
Out of Chaos, a Wary Calm In a city controlled by Russian soldiers, Georgians take stock. by Abdujalil Abdurasulov 20 August 2008
The Value of Property Ossetian refugees are slow to take up a Georgian offer that could allow them to reclaim their old homes. by Elizaveta Valieva 4 September 2007
A Refuge No More The several thousand Chechen refugees in Georgia have seen their post-revolutionary hopes shattered and are leaving in despair. by Daan van der Schriek 16 June 2004
An Impasse of Irresponsibility Everyone involved in Abkhazia’s frozen conflict--the governments in Tbilisi and Sukhumi, the government-in-exile, and the refugees--is failing to take responsibility for a solution. by Daan van der Schriek 23 October 2003
Azerbaijan: Off the Fence
The Russia-Georgia conflict, and the U.S. vice president’s visit, step up the pressure on Azerbaijan to take sides. From EurasiaNet. by Shahin Abbasov
4 September 2008
Tskhinvali: Back to Life
Residents of the war zone emerge from their hiding places and start to rebuild. by Liza Valieva
3 September 2008
more >>>
Friday, August 29, 2008
UNOSAT: satellite solutions for all - Georgia (unosat.web)
We hope these maps are useful to the humanitarian community. Please select your area of interest below and see what free products exist. These maps have been produced or facilitated by UNOSAT from public sources. We ask you to kindly credit UNOSAT and/or the original source if this information is used in a report, project etc.
Additional products including satellite images (for example from Ikonos, SPOT, LANDSAT or ENVISAT) and thematic maps (for example land cover, digital elevation models (DEMs) and environmental change analyzes) can be provided by UNOSAT on request.
* Overview of Satellite Damage Assessment for Gori, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Gori_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Lowres.pdf (1.1MB)
UNOSAT_GEO_Gori_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Highres.pdf (4.0MB)
* Hyperlinked Overview of Village Damage Atlas: Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_Overview_lowres.pdf (1.0MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_Overview_Highres.pdf (3.2MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 1-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_1TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_1TSK_Highres.pdf (4.1MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 2-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_2TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_2TSK_Highres.pdf (3.9MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 3-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_3TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_3TSK_Highres.pdf (3.9MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 4-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_4TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_4TSK_Highres.pdf (4.0MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 5-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_5TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.2MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_5TSK_Highres.pdf (3.8MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 6-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_6TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.2MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_6TSK_Highres.pdf (3.8MB)
* Satellite Damage Assessment for Kekhvi Area, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Kekhvi_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Lowres.pdf (1.6MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Kekhvi_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Highres.pdf (3.4MB)
* Update 2: Active Fire Locations for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_24Aug08_Lowres_v3.pdf (1.6MB),
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_24Aug08_Highres_v3.pdf (3.3MB)
* Satellite Damage Assessment for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Tskhinvali_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Lowres.pdf (1.4MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Tskhinvali_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Highres.pdf (3.3MB)
* Update 1: Active Fire Locations for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_20Aug08_Lowres_v2.pdf (1.4MB),
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_20Aug08_Highres_v2.pdf (3.3MB)
* Active Fire Locations for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_18Aug08_Lowres_v1.pdf (1.7MB),
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_18Aug08_Highres_v1.pdf (3.6MB)
* Review of Active Fire Locations Threatening Borjomi Nature Reserve, Georgia (15-20 August 2008)
UNOSAT_Georgia_Borjomi_Fires_20Aug2008_Lowres_v1.pdf (1.4MB),
UNOSAT_Georgia_Borjomi_Fires_20Aug2008_Highres_v1.pdf (3.0MB)
Source >>>
Additional products including satellite images (for example from Ikonos, SPOT, LANDSAT or ENVISAT) and thematic maps (for example land cover, digital elevation models (DEMs) and environmental change analyzes) can be provided by UNOSAT on request.
* Overview of Satellite Damage Assessment for Gori, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Gori_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Lowres.pdf (1.1MB)
UNOSAT_GEO_Gori_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Highres.pdf (4.0MB)
* Hyperlinked Overview of Village Damage Atlas: Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_Overview_lowres.pdf (1.0MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_Overview_Highres.pdf (3.2MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 1-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_1TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_1TSK_Highres.pdf (4.1MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 2-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_2TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_2TSK_Highres.pdf (3.9MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 3-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_3TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_3TSK_Highres.pdf (3.9MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 4-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_4TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.3MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_4TSK_Highres.pdf (4.0MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 5-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_5TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.2MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_5TSK_Highres.pdf (3.8MB)
* Village Damage Atlas: from Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia (Map Sheet: 6-TSK)
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_6TSK_Lowres.pdf (1.2MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Damage_Atlas_Tskhinvali_6TSK_Highres.pdf (3.8MB)
* Satellite Damage Assessment for Kekhvi Area, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Kekhvi_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Lowres.pdf (1.6MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Kekhvi_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Highres.pdf (3.4MB)
* Update 2: Active Fire Locations for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_24Aug08_Lowres_v3.pdf (1.6MB),
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_24Aug08_Highres_v3.pdf (3.3MB)
* Satellite Damage Assessment for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_GEO_Tskhinvali_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Lowres.pdf (1.4MB),
UNOSAT_GEO_Tskhinvali_Damage_Overview_19aug08_Highres.pdf (3.3MB)
* Update 1: Active Fire Locations for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_20Aug08_Lowres_v2.pdf (1.4MB),
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_20Aug08_Highres_v2.pdf (3.3MB)
* Active Fire Locations for Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_18Aug08_Lowres_v1.pdf (1.7MB),
UNOSAT_Tskhinvali_MOD_Fire_18Aug08_Highres_v1.pdf (3.6MB)
* Review of Active Fire Locations Threatening Borjomi Nature Reserve, Georgia (15-20 August 2008)
UNOSAT_Georgia_Borjomi_Fires_20Aug2008_Lowres_v1.pdf (1.4MB),
UNOSAT_Georgia_Borjomi_Fires_20Aug2008_Highres_v1.pdf (3.0MB)
Source >>>
Thursday, August 28, 2008
BLOG: A Critic. Why Bother Researching, Pt. II (registan.net)
or: How blogging failed the war in Georgia
Posted: 26 Aug 2008 12:10 PM CDT
Michael Totten fell for it. After asserting Georgia didn’t start nuthin’ because those mean South Ossetians were busy attacking those sweet innocent Georgians while those scary mean Russians were already advancing on the Georgian capital, Totten lets us know where he’s getting his information:
Yes, no one outside the region know much about it, save Christian missionaries who spoke at length of Azeri atrocities, and Kids in the Hall skits about how Armenians and Azeria hate each other.
Remarkably, Totten operates under the assumption that hearing a long presentation by a paid representative of Georgia, along with an escorted tour of a Georgian hospital with Georgian soldiers will tell him anything about the conflict. He doesn’t understand that Georgia’s spy drone which was shot down by a Russian plane was violating the terms of the cease-fire agreement in Abkhazia, nor does he seem to get that more South Ossetians died during the pre-war skirmish than Georgians. But what was this about?
That does not match with what other Georgian officials are saying about the conflict.
Western officials in and around South Ossetia also recorded the troop and armor movement, according to a Western diplomat who described in detail on-the-ground reports by monitors from the OSCE. The monitors recorded the movement of BM-21s in the late afternoon…
Complete text are here >>>
Posted: 26 Aug 2008 12:10 PM CDT
Michael Totten fell for it. After asserting Georgia didn’t start nuthin’ because those mean South Ossetians were busy attacking those sweet innocent Georgians while those scary mean Russians were already advancing on the Georgian capital, Totten lets us know where he’s getting his information:
Regional expert, German native, and former European Commission official Patrick Worms was recently hired by the Georgian government as a media advisor, and he explained to me exactly what happened when I met him in downtown Tbilisi. You should always be careful with the version of events told by someone on government payroll even when the government is friendly as democratic as Georgia’s. I was lucky, though, that another regional expert, author and academic Thomas Goltz, was present during Worms’ briefing to me and signed off on it as completely accurate aside from one tiny quibble.Oh God. He forgot “adventurer” and egomaniac. Well, let’s do this.
Yes, no one outside the region know much about it, save Christian missionaries who spoke at length of Azeri atrocities, and Kids in the Hall skits about how Armenians and Azeria hate each other.
A Two-Sided Descent Into Full-Scale War: Anyway, he goes on at length quoting this paid representative of Georgia, who manages to portray Georgia as a reactionary victim of Russian power politics. That is certainly true, to an extent, as this excellent look at the complicated start of the war shows (Matthew Bryza, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Region, surprisingly strongly decries Georgian attacks on civilian targets—the action that formed Russia’s casus belli to invade the rest of Georgia, though to Bryza’s credit, he also lambasts the Russians or not ratcheting down tensions beforehand).
But then Totten admits he had no idea there were skirmishes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces in the days leading up to the conflict—something that was obvious in the regular news coming from the region, but was curiously lacking from most people’s discussions of the conflict.
Critically missing from this paid flack’s explanation of the war’s origins is Saakashvili’s brinksmanship. Under Shevardnadze (who also seems disappointed with Saakashvili’s recklessness), Georgia had never pompously strutted itself along the border of its far larger and more powerful northern neighbor, blithely assuming the U.S. and Europe would help it out in any conflict that arose. Saakashvili was, in a word, reckless in assuming he could make a lightning strike into South Ossetia and cut off the Roki tunnel right when everyone knew Russia had already massed on the border. Yes, Russia played a role in provoking the conflict, but Saakashvili was just stupid in playing into it.
Remarkably, Totten operates under the assumption that hearing a long presentation by a paid representative of Georgia, along with an escorted tour of a Georgian hospital with Georgian soldiers will tell him anything about the conflict. He doesn’t understand that Georgia’s spy drone which was shot down by a Russian plane was violating the terms of the cease-fire agreement in Abkhazia, nor does he seem to get that more South Ossetians died during the pre-war skirmish than Georgians. But what was this about?
“On the evening of the 7th, the Ossetians launch an all-out barrage focused on Georgian villages, not on Georgian positions. Remember, these Georgian villages inside South Ossetia – the Georgians have mostly evacuated those villages, and three of them are completely pulverized. That evening, the 7th, the president gets information that a large Russian column is on the move. Later that evening, somebody sees those vehicles emerging from the Roki tunnel [into Georgia from Russia]. Then a little bit later, somebody else sees them. That’s three confirmations. It was time to act.
That does not match with what other Georgian officials are saying about the conflict.
Around 2 p.m. that day, Ossetian artillery fire resumed, targeting Georgian positions in the village of Avnevi in South Ossetia. The barrage continued for several hours. Two Georgian peacekeepers were killed, the first deaths among Georgians in South Ossetia since the 1990s, according to Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze, who spoke in a telephone briefing Aug. 14…But by evening, Kezerashvili said, the Georgian side had had enough.
“At 6, I gave the order to prepare everything, to go out from the bases,” he said in an interview Aug. 14 at a Georgian position along the Tbilisi-Gori highway. Kezerashvili described the movement of armor, which included tanks, 122mm howitzers and 203mm self-propelled artillery, as a show of force designed to deter the Ossetians from continuing to barrage the Georgian troops’ positions inside South Ossetia.
Western officials in and around South Ossetia also recorded the troop and armor movement, according to a Western diplomat who described in detail on-the-ground reports by monitors from the OSCE. The monitors recorded the movement of BM-21s in the late afternoon…
At 7 p.m., with troops on the march, Saakashvili went on national television and declared a unilateral cease-fire. “We offer all of you partnership and friendship,” he said to the South Ossetians. “We are ready for any sort of agreement in the interest of peace.”
About 9 p.m., the Ossetians complained to Western monitors about the military traffic, according to a diplomat in Tbilisi.
Totten is being fed disinformation. And he doesn’t know enough to say so, since by his own admission (of not even knowing the context of this war, to say nothing of the others) he went into the country—just like his colleague Brietbart in Baku—knowing absolutely nothing about the place beforehand. He does not understand enough about the hatred in the area that exists on both sides to parse through the endless dissembling (Goltz is an amazing writer, but he is also unabashedly anti-Russian). Nor does he seem to understand the right before president Saakashvili invaded the territory, he called for a unilateral cease-fire in an attempt to roll through Tskhinvali unopposed (Russian-sponsored teenagers reportedly hurled molotov cocktails at Georgian tanks).
For example, the Georgians were still incredibly brutal to the South Ossetians, which makes the complaints about Russian brutality ring a tiny bit hollow. Totten doesn’t get at any of this, because he didn’t do a single jot of homework before heading out to these places.
Which is a real shame. But it’s yet another way in which the “power of blogs” continues to utterly fail us.
Update: Well, Totten has demanded an apology for “lying about him in public.” And told me to get off his blog. I’m happy to oblige, but Totten doesn’t get off that easily. I haven’t misrepresented a thing he’s said, since it is painfully obvious that not only was he presenting an incredibly biased version of events, but that he did not know a thing about the conflict before he arrived. To quote his own entry ...
Complete text are here >>>
Saturday, August 23, 2008
DISKSSION: Wer ist schuld am Krieg? Um was geht es bei diesem Konflikt?
Zwei Artikel habe ich heute gelesen:
Der taz-Komentar von Andreas Fanizadeh beschränkt sich letztendlich auf die Beantwortung der Frage, wer denn der Agressor sei, als er eigentlich die NATO Frage aufwerfen wollte. Er beantwortet diese Frage zügig in seiner Gutgläubigkeit. Ansonsten spricht er irgendwie alles an, was die Debattte um den Krieg und den Konflikt umrankt. Dabei schlägt sein Herz irgendwie für Russland und ein wenig gegen Amerika und mit Europa ist er unzufrieden, weil die zu sehr auf den anglo-amerikanischen Block hören.
Beschränken wir uns mal auf seine Fragestellung, die auch die Propagandisten bewegt, wer denn nun der Agressor sei, dann ist das für den Resortleiter der taz unumwunden klar: Georgien ist der Agressor.
Zwar war der Angriff Saakashvilis - mit wem auch immer zusammen - auf Tskhinvali nicht besonders klug, aber wo sind militärische Auseinandersetzungen, als klug zu bezeichnen! Problematisch ist bei Konflikten, die sich zuspitzen, dass Aggression eben unterschiedlich wahrgenommen wird. Da gibt es gefährliche Interessen und ein Gefühlsleben der Bedrohung, (auch für Abchasen, Osseten, Georgier); und manchmal ist das ganze dann noch sehr instabil, unübersichtlich und die Halunken machen dort Geschäfte und anderes Klingelzeug.
Also: Angeheizt wird der Konflikt von mehreren Seiten und Akteuren. Auch Russland war sehr wohl mit seiner Übermacht vorbereitet, um kapital und exorbitant einzumarschieren und das Gebiet strategisch zu besetzen, um Zeichen zu setzen, ohne die Georgier zu fragen! Um letztere geht es Ihnen ja auch nicht, Herr Fanizadeh. Und hinsichtlich Russlands Sicht und Herangehensweise habe ich auch kein Verständnis!
Dann war das eben eine zweite Agression ..., so sehe ich das! Oder eine gleichzeitige? Moderne Konflikte und Kriegen beginnen eben nicht erst mit dem Kanonendonner über dünn besiedelte Berge und Täler. Das ist absurd genug!
Halten wir mal fest: Im Kaukasus gibt es eine agressive und explosive Gemengenlage! Nun verlegt sich Andreas Fanizadeh, um nicht ausdrücklich den Westen mit seiner bösartigen NATO zu diskreditieren und über Russland kein Wort weiter verlieren zu müssen, auf eine innenpolitische Problematik, mit der Russland auf einmal gar nichts mehr zu tun hat, und der Westen aufgrund seiner machtpolitischen und imperialen Ambitionen ein gefährlicher Partner ist, weil sich dann Russland bedrängt fühlt, mit ihrer Autokratie, bei der der Autor beiläufig erwähnt, dass er dafür nicht allzu große Sympathien hegt.
Die Frage ist, wie und warum ethnische Konflikte entstehen. Da geht es immerhin nicht nur um unmittelbare Machtpolitik. Die Geschichte redet da auch ein Wort mit, manchmal mental und psychisch (oder nennen wir es kulturell) und manchmal auch nationalistisch und ideologisch (nennen wir es politisch). Die Kriegsgefahr hatte sich angedeutet! Und dabei konnte man Georgien nun nicht als einzigen Agressor im Vorfeld bezeichnen.
Auch die Georgier haben keine Lust von der Landkarte zu verschwinden, wie die Kurden etwa ..., wer will das schon, einfach so ... Bevor eine Ideologie der Ethnie zu Handlungen motiviert, gibt es Anzeichnen, Vorbedingungen und auch Vorbehalte und Ängste, die dann zur Aggression führen, wenn sogenannte "eingefrorene Konflikt" plötzlich schmelzen, obwohl es schon bitter heiß ist. Bitte machen Sie es sich nicht zu einfach! Wenn man sich schon aufschwingt, den Krieg zu analysieren, dann sollte man nicht den Kleinsten zur Rechenschaft ziehen, obwohl auch ich nicht Saakashvili aus seiner Verantwortung entlassen möchte. Dass Saakashvili zu oft von ethnischer Integrität sprach, ist auch mir aufgefallen. Zusammenleben kann man auch anders, in einem Europa ohne Grenzen etwa, was die Nato auch sichert und zu garantieren verspricht! Die Nato ist ein Sicherheitsbündnis, dass als Organisation natürlich auch unter ziviler Beobachtung bleiben sollte. Was das russische Militär so anstellt, kann der Russe nun nicht gerade offenkundig in seinen Massenmedien nachvollziehen.
Josef Joffe versucht Rat zu geben, wie man politisch mit dem Thema umgehen sollte, und worauf man achten sollte. Das ist zumindestens in Form eines Artikels "Realpolitik", die andere dann umsetzen sollten. Erstmal sollten wir Georgien, Abchasien und Südossetien - aber auch Karabakh - ihre Nervosität nehmen! Russland macht gerade jetzt für mich nicht gerade einen vertrauenserweckenden Eindruck! Das unterstreichen auch andere Geschehnisse in der Vergangenheit. Sie sprechen eine andere Sprache: Zerschlageung, Einigung, Vertreibung, Polonium, Hahn abdrehen und Besetzung. Russland hat eine offensichtliches Pokerface! Wir werden sehen, wohin wir gemeinsam gehen. Zumindest kann ich es nachvollziehen, wenn Joffe titelt, dass wir den Bären an die lange Leine nehmen sollten, damit er mit seiner Tatze nicht überall hin- und hineintritt!
Der ganze Text: "Eine Leine für den Bären" >>>
Der taz-Komentar von Andreas Fanizadeh beschränkt sich letztendlich auf die Beantwortung der Frage, wer denn der Agressor sei, als er eigentlich die NATO Frage aufwerfen wollte. Er beantwortet diese Frage zügig in seiner Gutgläubigkeit. Ansonsten spricht er irgendwie alles an, was die Debattte um den Krieg und den Konflikt umrankt. Dabei schlägt sein Herz irgendwie für Russland und ein wenig gegen Amerika und mit Europa ist er unzufrieden, weil die zu sehr auf den anglo-amerikanischen Block hören.
Beschränken wir uns mal auf seine Fragestellung, die auch die Propagandisten bewegt, wer denn nun der Agressor sei, dann ist das für den Resortleiter der taz unumwunden klar: Georgien ist der Agressor.
Zwar war der Angriff Saakashvilis - mit wem auch immer zusammen - auf Tskhinvali nicht besonders klug, aber wo sind militärische Auseinandersetzungen, als klug zu bezeichnen! Problematisch ist bei Konflikten, die sich zuspitzen, dass Aggression eben unterschiedlich wahrgenommen wird. Da gibt es gefährliche Interessen und ein Gefühlsleben der Bedrohung, (auch für Abchasen, Osseten, Georgier); und manchmal ist das ganze dann noch sehr instabil, unübersichtlich und die Halunken machen dort Geschäfte und anderes Klingelzeug.
Also: Angeheizt wird der Konflikt von mehreren Seiten und Akteuren. Auch Russland war sehr wohl mit seiner Übermacht vorbereitet, um kapital und exorbitant einzumarschieren und das Gebiet strategisch zu besetzen, um Zeichen zu setzen, ohne die Georgier zu fragen! Um letztere geht es Ihnen ja auch nicht, Herr Fanizadeh. Und hinsichtlich Russlands Sicht und Herangehensweise habe ich auch kein Verständnis!
Dann war das eben eine zweite Agression ..., so sehe ich das! Oder eine gleichzeitige? Moderne Konflikte und Kriegen beginnen eben nicht erst mit dem Kanonendonner über dünn besiedelte Berge und Täler. Das ist absurd genug!
Halten wir mal fest: Im Kaukasus gibt es eine agressive und explosive Gemengenlage! Nun verlegt sich Andreas Fanizadeh, um nicht ausdrücklich den Westen mit seiner bösartigen NATO zu diskreditieren und über Russland kein Wort weiter verlieren zu müssen, auf eine innenpolitische Problematik, mit der Russland auf einmal gar nichts mehr zu tun hat, und der Westen aufgrund seiner machtpolitischen und imperialen Ambitionen ein gefährlicher Partner ist, weil sich dann Russland bedrängt fühlt, mit ihrer Autokratie, bei der der Autor beiläufig erwähnt, dass er dafür nicht allzu große Sympathien hegt.
Die Frage ist, wie und warum ethnische Konflikte entstehen. Da geht es immerhin nicht nur um unmittelbare Machtpolitik. Die Geschichte redet da auch ein Wort mit, manchmal mental und psychisch (oder nennen wir es kulturell) und manchmal auch nationalistisch und ideologisch (nennen wir es politisch). Die Kriegsgefahr hatte sich angedeutet! Und dabei konnte man Georgien nun nicht als einzigen Agressor im Vorfeld bezeichnen.
Auch die Georgier haben keine Lust von der Landkarte zu verschwinden, wie die Kurden etwa ..., wer will das schon, einfach so ... Bevor eine Ideologie der Ethnie zu Handlungen motiviert, gibt es Anzeichnen, Vorbedingungen und auch Vorbehalte und Ängste, die dann zur Aggression führen, wenn sogenannte "eingefrorene Konflikt" plötzlich schmelzen, obwohl es schon bitter heiß ist. Bitte machen Sie es sich nicht zu einfach! Wenn man sich schon aufschwingt, den Krieg zu analysieren, dann sollte man nicht den Kleinsten zur Rechenschaft ziehen, obwohl auch ich nicht Saakashvili aus seiner Verantwortung entlassen möchte. Dass Saakashvili zu oft von ethnischer Integrität sprach, ist auch mir aufgefallen. Zusammenleben kann man auch anders, in einem Europa ohne Grenzen etwa, was die Nato auch sichert und zu garantieren verspricht! Die Nato ist ein Sicherheitsbündnis, dass als Organisation natürlich auch unter ziviler Beobachtung bleiben sollte. Was das russische Militär so anstellt, kann der Russe nun nicht gerade offenkundig in seinen Massenmedien nachvollziehen.
Empfehlen kann ich dagegen den ZEIT-Artikel von Josef Joffe. Joffe beschreibt einen kleinen historischen Exkurs zur Entstehung diesen Konfliktes. Zudem macht er nicht ohne weiteres einen Schuldigen aus. Er besitzt zumindestens schreibend eine Konfliktkompetenz, die sich nicht ohne weiteres Reflexen hingibt. Er bleibt nüchtern und schaut sich das an, und er sieht auch die Unzulänglichkeit des Westens:Fanizadeh: Prinzipiell gilt: Wer die Ideologie der Ethnie sät, erntet völkische Kriege, Massaker und Vertreibung und am Ende zumeist ein Protektorat. Wie eine Niederlage im völkischen Krieg aussieht, mussten die Serben wegen angeblicher Hufeisenpläne im Kosovokrieg erfahren. Die Nato hat Serbiens Infrastruktur in Schutt und Asche gelegt. Und im Kosovo-Reservat geht bis heute nichts ohne die westliche Schutztruppe. Gleichzeitig zerstören nun russische Truppen Anlagen in Georgien. Überall Trümmerhaufen: So sehen sie aus, die humanitären Interventionen zum Wohle von Osseten und Kosovaren.
Die georgische Seite handelt aus dem gleichen Machtdenken heraus wie die russische. Und beides sind ehemalige Sowjetstaaten mit einem postkommunistischen Typus von Gesellschaft. Aber wahrscheinlich ist der Stalinismus einmal genauso wundersam über die Georgier gekommen wie einst die Hitlerei über Österreich. Geschichtsvergessenheit und nationale Eiferei: vielleicht ist es das, was gut zu dieser Nato passt.
Der Krieg gegen Georgien hat zwei Reflexe ausgelöst. Zugespitzt: Das Opfer ist schuld, der Täter verdient Verständnis. Beide Lesarten sind nicht ganz falsch. Doch selbst wenn ganz richtig, wären sie noch keine Strategie gegen ein Russland, das erstmals seit 1979 einen Nachbarn angegriffen hat. Das ist eine weltpolitische Zäsur, kein Blechschaden auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert.
Das Opfer ist schuld, gewiss doch. Hat nicht Michail Saakaschwili mit dem Vorstoß nach Südossetien die Russen provoziert? Das war nicht klug, aber verwechseln wir nicht Anlass und Ursache. Der Einmarsch in die abtrünnige Provinz war ebenfalls eine Antwort: auf die Gewalt eines Renegaten-Regimes, das Moskau untertan ist.
Die russische Journalistin Julia Latynina nennt Südossetien ein »Joint Venture von KGB-Generälen und einem ossetischen Gangster, die mit dem Geld arbeiten, das Moskau für den Kampf gegen Georgien überweist«. Doch ist »Wer hat angefangen?« eine müßige Frage, die ins Geschichtsseminar führt: ins späte 18. Jahrhundert, als Russland mit der Einverleibung Georgiens begann, ins späte 19., als sie komplett war. Entscheidend ist der größere Rahmen, und den hat Moskau im Juli mit dem Großmanöver »Kaukasus 2008« abgesteckt, der Generalprobe für die Invasion. Da niemand aus dem Stand eine ganze Panzerarmee vortreiben kann, musste Wladimir Putin den Krieg mit langer Hand vorbereiten. Dabei wurden Tausende russischer Pässe an Südosseten verteilt, um so »unsere« Bürger schützen zu können.
Josef Joffe versucht Rat zu geben, wie man politisch mit dem Thema umgehen sollte, und worauf man achten sollte. Das ist zumindestens in Form eines Artikels "Realpolitik", die andere dann umsetzen sollten. Erstmal sollten wir Georgien, Abchasien und Südossetien - aber auch Karabakh - ihre Nervosität nehmen! Russland macht gerade jetzt für mich nicht gerade einen vertrauenserweckenden Eindruck! Das unterstreichen auch andere Geschehnisse in der Vergangenheit. Sie sprechen eine andere Sprache: Zerschlageung, Einigung, Vertreibung, Polonium, Hahn abdrehen und Besetzung. Russland hat eine offensichtliches Pokerface! Wir werden sehen, wohin wir gemeinsam gehen. Zumindest kann ich es nachvollziehen, wenn Joffe titelt, dass wir den Bären an die lange Leine nehmen sollten, damit er mit seiner Tatze nicht überall hin- und hineintritt!
Der ganze Text: "Eine Leine für den Bären" >>>
Thursday, August 21, 2008
COMMENT: For Homeland, for Stalin. By Elena Kaluzhskaya
In the presence of information blockade the head is swollen with information - there are a lot of them. The consciousness is exhausted with the accumulation of drains and leaks, with their squeezing and understanding something about the reality by examining dry leftovers. Making a guess about the form and quality of different types of lies, about who and how has fired, what and by whom has been destroyed, how many casualties were there and which side has suffered the most and if the madness that started in Georgia last week has really finished.
Although with difficulties, but the picture of Georgia being "forced to peace" is emerging and looks disgusting, though customary. There is nothing new in it. Saakashvili does not look very original in his decision to "re-establish constitutional order" by installing bombarding system "GRAD" in the beak-away region of the country. As far as all remember, Russia "was putting order" in Chechnya far too long and in a more sophisticated manner and did not consider it indecent. In return, Russia condemned US for "forcing to peace" the Serbian government by means of bombing. At that time Russia considered such an action to be immoral while now he does not think so. Dual standards, which are not new as well, are imperial. It is not alien even to Georgia: when Georgia got separated from the USSR, it liked everything, but now it does not like an idea to part with a piece of its territory. It is not a puzzle as well.
Only two questions are left: who and why wanted this war? Everything is clear at first sight: the forces wanted it for a living. When a state is at war it is more or less clear for its citizens why does the army want our money and our children. If there is no war it is hard to answer the question - why do we need such a big army with such serious appetite. In Russia forces are lucky, they are in power and they themselves define the budget and report back to their own selves. So the matter depends on little: from time to time it is necessary to participate in armed conflicts on foreign territory as much as it is possible. Georgia is the best option, a country "lavishly fertilized" with Russian passports and headed with totally infuriated president.
While the circle of people who wished this war is not limited with forces only. Prime-minister Putin is evidently interested in this war but not as much in war in general, but in war against Georgia. This interest seems very irrational, but it is absolutely obvious. How did it start? It remains unclear whether it started because of disrespectful attitude of president Saakashvili towards the then president Putin, or because of the organic incompatibility of dull northern character with vivid Caucasian temperament. But it is absolutely clear that Putin has undertaken the leadership of "operation for the enforcement to peace" not because there was no-one who could have undertaken it, but because of his inner propensity for Georgian Government.
But this is not everything. After the operation started it became clear that our population was in great need of war. And this phenomenon is more interesting than individual propensity of the prime minister because it is possible to replace the prime minister in every week, while our nation is irreplaceable. The phenomenon is that only few are ashamed for Russian barbaric actions on the Georgian territory. The overwhelming majority was identified with our military forces and experienced different types of satisfactions that is evident in Russian blogs as well as in the information of the almighty interactive means of mass media.
The "simplest" persons have heavily hailed a triumphal victory of homeland over "Khachi". This part of population is not accustomed to going into details, thus the peacekeeping pathos of our mission has escaped their attention. They did not take good notice of Ossetians for whose sake our troops have intruded into the territory of an adjacent state. The voice of valiant bombarding of Georgian cities by us was pleasant to them as well as the fact that nothing can stop us. Under such circumstances Russian, i.e. their own roughness does not need to be reconfirmed.
The more intricate audience, on the contrary, has focused its attention on the object of protection – the Ossetian people – being mainly Russian citizens, who have suffered the aggression of Georgian military machine. Such types of people were also forced to neglect the involvement of Russia in the war for right of Ossetian people. For instance, no matter how great interest they showed in finding out why so many Russian citizens were living on the Georgian territory. Secondly, they could not have noticed that the "saviors" did not interfere in the conflict in the first two days, they were as if giving the Georgian army opportunity to do maximum damage to Ossetians. Thirdly, they did not pay attention to what Russian peacekeepers were doing in Georgian villages and to information about looting which militia and Kazaks, who have arrived to Georgia together with Russian troops, have actively occupied themselves with.
The more "advanced" patriots would admit that Russia is just using Ossetians and is pursing its aims, but they consider such an international activity to be the only right activity. "Politics is a dirty business, patriots would say – if we don't do it, then they will". These people sincerely consider that when and if Georgia becomes member of NATO, this treacherous block will immediately claim for our subsoil and pipelines in it. And they will claim them in the clear meaning of this word: he will arrive, will bomb and will take away. Thus there is the only right way for us – to be the first to bomb Georgia, to do it beforehand, to change the government there and to agree with a new "pro-Russian" leadership in order to discourage Georgia from its NATO aspirations.
The next fraction are those who sincerely consider that after shelling Tskhinvali by Grads Saakashvili put himself out of law which means that Russian "peacekeepers" on their part were automatically freed from observing the law.
But this is not everything. Literally, a new group of patriots have evolved in our country. Journalist Andrei Perla has formulated its ideology. He has explained to those who have not yet understood it that "oppositional ideology" is permissible to some extent during peaceful time, while during wartime it is considered to be treason. Such an approach makes life easier for those who are prone to worrying about the lawfulness of actions of a homeland during conflict. He counted on a person, who understands that our "peacekeepers" are not real because they don't have and have never had any UN mandate. And if they had had it, a relative decision must have been taken by the Security Council regarding a triumphal marching into Georgia with tanks. Without this the whole story starting from the entrance of tanks to Tskhinvali and the blocking of Poti port finished with bombing the Tbilisi airport and letting armed looters in Gori – is a whole sequence of military crimes. No agreement with Georgia about the presence of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia legitimizes the marching of Russian army into Georgia. Thus, a person who understands all these should remember that if there is a war he must change his opinion and should know that Russia is always right. Otherwise this is treason. And we all know how the traitors are treated by laws during wartime, even those who think low of Josef and his order. This is in blood.
Stalin, the father of soviet fear, has been hammering out the collective unconsciousness of Russians till these days. Fifty five years have passed since he died and instead of making ourselves free from his legacy we have fallen in love with this antiquity with a new force. Georgia, his homeland, is much freer from his legacy than Russia. There is something symbolic in the fact that exactly Gori, where Ioseb Jughashvili was born, has been heavily bombed by Russian aviation. That is the very unconscious thing that makes us commit the acts which we are not able to explain afterwards.
---------------------------
contact: georgiawar@gmail.com
Although with difficulties, but the picture of Georgia being "forced to peace" is emerging and looks disgusting, though customary. There is nothing new in it. Saakashvili does not look very original in his decision to "re-establish constitutional order" by installing bombarding system "GRAD" in the beak-away region of the country. As far as all remember, Russia "was putting order" in Chechnya far too long and in a more sophisticated manner and did not consider it indecent. In return, Russia condemned US for "forcing to peace" the Serbian government by means of bombing. At that time Russia considered such an action to be immoral while now he does not think so. Dual standards, which are not new as well, are imperial. It is not alien even to Georgia: when Georgia got separated from the USSR, it liked everything, but now it does not like an idea to part with a piece of its territory. It is not a puzzle as well.
Only two questions are left: who and why wanted this war? Everything is clear at first sight: the forces wanted it for a living. When a state is at war it is more or less clear for its citizens why does the army want our money and our children. If there is no war it is hard to answer the question - why do we need such a big army with such serious appetite. In Russia forces are lucky, they are in power and they themselves define the budget and report back to their own selves. So the matter depends on little: from time to time it is necessary to participate in armed conflicts on foreign territory as much as it is possible. Georgia is the best option, a country "lavishly fertilized" with Russian passports and headed with totally infuriated president.
While the circle of people who wished this war is not limited with forces only. Prime-minister Putin is evidently interested in this war but not as much in war in general, but in war against Georgia. This interest seems very irrational, but it is absolutely obvious. How did it start? It remains unclear whether it started because of disrespectful attitude of president Saakashvili towards the then president Putin, or because of the organic incompatibility of dull northern character with vivid Caucasian temperament. But it is absolutely clear that Putin has undertaken the leadership of "operation for the enforcement to peace" not because there was no-one who could have undertaken it, but because of his inner propensity for Georgian Government.
But this is not everything. After the operation started it became clear that our population was in great need of war. And this phenomenon is more interesting than individual propensity of the prime minister because it is possible to replace the prime minister in every week, while our nation is irreplaceable. The phenomenon is that only few are ashamed for Russian barbaric actions on the Georgian territory. The overwhelming majority was identified with our military forces and experienced different types of satisfactions that is evident in Russian blogs as well as in the information of the almighty interactive means of mass media.
The "simplest" persons have heavily hailed a triumphal victory of homeland over "Khachi". This part of population is not accustomed to going into details, thus the peacekeeping pathos of our mission has escaped their attention. They did not take good notice of Ossetians for whose sake our troops have intruded into the territory of an adjacent state. The voice of valiant bombarding of Georgian cities by us was pleasant to them as well as the fact that nothing can stop us. Under such circumstances Russian, i.e. their own roughness does not need to be reconfirmed.
The more intricate audience, on the contrary, has focused its attention on the object of protection – the Ossetian people – being mainly Russian citizens, who have suffered the aggression of Georgian military machine. Such types of people were also forced to neglect the involvement of Russia in the war for right of Ossetian people. For instance, no matter how great interest they showed in finding out why so many Russian citizens were living on the Georgian territory. Secondly, they could not have noticed that the "saviors" did not interfere in the conflict in the first two days, they were as if giving the Georgian army opportunity to do maximum damage to Ossetians. Thirdly, they did not pay attention to what Russian peacekeepers were doing in Georgian villages and to information about looting which militia and Kazaks, who have arrived to Georgia together with Russian troops, have actively occupied themselves with.
The more "advanced" patriots would admit that Russia is just using Ossetians and is pursing its aims, but they consider such an international activity to be the only right activity. "Politics is a dirty business, patriots would say – if we don't do it, then they will". These people sincerely consider that when and if Georgia becomes member of NATO, this treacherous block will immediately claim for our subsoil and pipelines in it. And they will claim them in the clear meaning of this word: he will arrive, will bomb and will take away. Thus there is the only right way for us – to be the first to bomb Georgia, to do it beforehand, to change the government there and to agree with a new "pro-Russian" leadership in order to discourage Georgia from its NATO aspirations.
The next fraction are those who sincerely consider that after shelling Tskhinvali by Grads Saakashvili put himself out of law which means that Russian "peacekeepers" on their part were automatically freed from observing the law.
But this is not everything. Literally, a new group of patriots have evolved in our country. Journalist Andrei Perla has formulated its ideology. He has explained to those who have not yet understood it that "oppositional ideology" is permissible to some extent during peaceful time, while during wartime it is considered to be treason. Such an approach makes life easier for those who are prone to worrying about the lawfulness of actions of a homeland during conflict. He counted on a person, who understands that our "peacekeepers" are not real because they don't have and have never had any UN mandate. And if they had had it, a relative decision must have been taken by the Security Council regarding a triumphal marching into Georgia with tanks. Without this the whole story starting from the entrance of tanks to Tskhinvali and the blocking of Poti port finished with bombing the Tbilisi airport and letting armed looters in Gori – is a whole sequence of military crimes. No agreement with Georgia about the presence of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia legitimizes the marching of Russian army into Georgia. Thus, a person who understands all these should remember that if there is a war he must change his opinion and should know that Russia is always right. Otherwise this is treason. And we all know how the traitors are treated by laws during wartime, even those who think low of Josef and his order. This is in blood.
Stalin, the father of soviet fear, has been hammering out the collective unconsciousness of Russians till these days. Fifty five years have passed since he died and instead of making ourselves free from his legacy we have fallen in love with this antiquity with a new force. Georgia, his homeland, is much freer from his legacy than Russia. There is something symbolic in the fact that exactly Gori, where Ioseb Jughashvili was born, has been heavily bombed by Russian aviation. That is the very unconscious thing that makes us commit the acts which we are not able to explain afterwards.
---------------------------
contact: georgiawar@gmail.com
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
ARTICLE: Letter from Sian in Tbilisi
From Tbilisi, Georgia.
Just over one week ago my life in Tbilisi was a whirl of project planning, NGO meetings and parties. By Monday 11th we were racing for the Armenian border, convinced that Russian forces would soon be bombing Tbilisi and taking control of the city. After a week of fear, confusion, panic, rumours and evacuations, back in Tbilisi we are starting to focus on the real challenge of the crisis, the displaced people. Depending whose estimates you read, internally displaced people number are at least 70,000, more likely over 100,000, because there are so many areas unreachable and the assessment process is barely begun. At the moment the priority is assessing where they are and how many, improving the facilities for them and providing basic goods. To a certain extent the government, well the MRA (Ministry of Refugees) is able to provide estimates and addresses because they directed groups of refugees to certain buildings and settlements.
But the UNHCR warehouse which is the main focus of humanitarian aid supplies is by no means overstocked and access to the warehouse is tightly controlled. It contains, as of yesterday, only basic emergency supplies, like blankets, saucepans, plates and water cans. Yesterday I spent the day giving these out to 1000 refugees, with an international NGO, one of the approved distributors. We visited 5 IDP centres, varying in size from 1000 people to 30. Though we were only giving them these basic things, they were often extremely grateful.
We are wondering when the promised aid from nations in Europe and the USA will arrive, and what it will contain. Basic goods are the priority of course but this is not sustainable. There are no mattresses or cooking stoves right now for example- in many IDP centres everyone is sleeping on hard floors. Those who are housed in public buildings, often building sites (including the disused hospital which was housing 1000 refugees when we visited) are at constant risk of disease and injury. Sanitation will continue to be a significant problem, despite the efforts of the UN group on sanitation who are overseeing water supplies being re-established, as we were glad to see they were doing so at this ‘hospital’ when we arrived.
However next door to the hospital, in a small building which was half destroyed, were living 9 families, sleeping on the floor in one room. Other rooms in the rubble-filled structure were being used as a toilet. Common features of all the IDP centres are that they are overcrowded and lack basic facilities. Schools, hospital buildings and offices are not designed to hold 500 refugees. There are few buildings which are secure or have windows, few have enough beds or any kind of sleeping arrangements. Some are well organised, with committees of volunteers from outside or inside the IDP community who are creating lists and keeping them updated daily, ensuring they maintain contact with outside help and the government to receive the aid when they can. Others are not and are seeing new arrivals every day.
This was true of one of the last collective centres we visited and it underscored how fragile the crisis was. This, a school building containing 450 refugees, a number which was rising by the hour, was clearly fraught with emotion and anger, there were some men drinking themselves into a stupor, there was also nearly a fight that erupted as we were handing out aid. Moreover as the current situation continues, and it becomes obvious their temporary refugee state is not ending soon, it is clear to us and to them that these living arrangements are going to become more unbearable. Frustration will rise, nerves will become frayed, tension may give way to violence and anger. If there are problems, then the IDPs will find themselves becoming very unwelcome, very quickly, by the local communities. This will only make the work of humanitarian aid distribution harder.
Some of the refugees we met yesterday have moved 5 or 6 times in the past week, starting with an exodus from Tskhinvali, constantly fleeing from each new round of fighting, and ending in a school building in Gldani, a suburb of Tbilisi. It is amazing to me that these stories are still told by eyes that are weary, but smiling, and they can still laugh, chat and carry on with a semblance of normal life. Were I in their place, I would not trust myself to be so resilient.
The worst is seeing the children. There are huge numbers of children caught up in this, many of whom have seen horrific sights they should not have been exposed to. Many have lost parents. How do they understand this situation now, I wonder, when just over a week ago they were happily playing football in their yards with their friends? They have nothing with them. Most people ran with whatever they could carry but some came with just the clothes on their backs. So although at the moment basic goods are what the people need the most, we also have to start thinking about how to get books, toys etc to these kids, who are currently filling their days playing in the dirt or fighting with each other.
In Tbilisi, the fears of the international aid workers are beginning to diverge even further from the attitudes of the Georgian authorities. It appears as though they are very much convinced that once Russia pulls back, out of Georgia proper, then the refugees will return and the IDP crisis will be resolved. They have demonstrated this point of view by insisting the schools and kindergartens, currently housing IDPs, will reopen as scheduled, in three weeks time. Of course it would be a blow to the education system in this country if the schools do not re-open, but even if we can trust the intention of the Russians to pull out, this optimism is ludicrous.
It is almost certain that any IDPs from south Ossetia cannot go back, because Russia and the South Ossetian government will not allow them to. Those from Gori, who make up most of the Tbilisi IDP population, may not have anything to return to. I have not been into Gori and few, if any, humanitarian workers have been allowed to pass the road-blocks, so we cannot really know how bad the situation is there, except for journalists reports. However we can make some educated guesses at this point. Even if the homes of IDPs are still standing, which many wont be, they will be emptied of anything of value as mass looting has occurred there. If they owned cars, they will be burnt out or stolen, if they had a shop that will probably be looted and destroyed. No businesses will function there, there will be no jobs. Yet the government will expect them to return... to what?
No, the IDP problem Tbilisi and the surrounding areas currently face is not at its worst point yet and I honestly can’t see how it is going to get better. Many will have to remain and make their lives here, just as IDPs from the last secessionist war, over 10 years ago, have had to start their lives again. And I fear that the authorities will not go to great efforts to help IDPs integrate and recover their lives. Perhaps that is because the government cannot afford to support these people in the long term but also because it has shown, along with other countries hosting IDPs, including Azerbaijan, that it is politically useful to maintain an IDP population as a political pawn.
This is only the situation in Tbilisi because I can see it. But I know elsewhere the situation is many times worse. In fact, Tbilisi is the only place we are able to keep track of refugee numbers, partly because in villages and rural areas, families have taken refugees in and are providing for them. An NGO we are in contact with in the region of Guria has informed us there are about 4000 refugees in 2 towns living in these circumstances. This is a facet of the famous Georgian hospitality I have been familiarised with when travelling in rural areas too. Although their living arrangements will be in many ways preferable to that of the collective centres, it means that the authorities and humanitarian organisations do not have any idea how many people are there and where they are staying, so help is less likely to reach them. Those families, who have taken in one or two refugee families and are providing all their food and support, cannot afford to do so indefinitely.
Despite hosting an estimated 30,000 to 70,000 refugees, in Tbilisi everything is fairly calm, almost oddly normal, although the city is a little emptier than usual. It is obvious that Georgians have been through this before, have hosted huge numbers of IDPs and life carries on. But the sense of sobriety and shock is palpable, and though young people still walk arm in arm eating ice cream on the main street running through the city, no one looks to be enjoying themselves very much. I think we all fear for the future here, not least because it doesn’t look as if Russian forces have any intention of pulling out, despite many promises to do so. We keep hearing reports they are bringing in more heavy artillery, and ‘digging in’, literally digging bunkers, in the areas surrounding Gori. So, they may be here for a long time to come.
I cannot emphasise to those who are unfamiliar with Georgian geography how important the road is from Batumi to Tbilisi which goes through Gori. It is really the only main highway and the only fast road. It’s the artery of the country’s cargo transport, from the ports to the capital. It is also a road usually buzzing with business and families travelling back and forth. I have travelled the road myself many times, visiting central and west Georgia. Without this artery nothing is moving in Georgia. The economy is frozen and will suffer immeasurably.
Of course this is the intention of the Russian government. Gori is close enough to south Ossetia that they can justify it as a legitimate holding point, but in reality the objective is to paralyse the country. They are succeeding. Two days ago they also bombed the railway line, again, the only main railway link. The country is essentially divided into two blocks, areas accessible from Tbilisi, and the rest. No one can get to western Georgia and we have very little idea of what’s happening there, except that Zugdidi seems calm and fortunately Georgian troops withdrew from Abkhazia without a fight so life was able to continue there without bloodshed. Occupying the port of Poti and destroying its infrastructure, including sinking ships, will ensure that no supplies can get through by sea. It is only a matter of time before shortages are visible.
Aside from critical infrastructure they have also attacked economic targets, factories and businesses. The international business community will not want to be in Georgia and the foreign investment market that was flourishing just over a week ago is now in ruins. Tourism has been destroyed as soon as the black sea area became a target. Every summer thousands of Armenians have been pouring into the black sea resorts of Batumi and Kobuleti, bringing valuable tourist income to businesses. The confidence this has inspired led to a huge reconstruction project in Batumi. That has now gone. And as of yesterday, the national park at Borjomi, another tourist attraction and one of the most beautiful, wildlife rich places you can imagine, was burning. Who knows why and how the fire started.
What we do know is that tactics which were applied very well in Chechnya are being used in Georgia and it’s hard not to draw comparisons. Information is sketchy but it appears that, rather than being responsible for terrorising the remaining population themselves, Russian forces are deliberately arming anyone with a grudge to bear, ensuring the countryside affected by the war is filled with armed rebels, not in uniform, marauding around and helping themselves to whatever they would like. The casualties who are still rolling into the barely functioning medical services in Gori have apparently encountered these irregular forces, or bandits, who have been peppering the few remaining civilians with bullets, at will. This means, that even if the Russians do pull out, many sections of the countryside are likely to be no-go areas for a long time to come and IDPs are even less likely to be returned to their homes. At this point I also have little faith in the Georgian authorities’ ability to face the challenge of armed militias and protect the civilian population, not least because our own armed forces have been totally decimated.
We also fear what will happen to Georgia politically now. It seemed sure a few days ago that Saakashvili would have to step down and we were optimistic of a bloodless transition. But he, like the Russians, has ‘dug in’ during the past week and his position looks stronger than ever. If the Russians are expecting to remove him from power by remaining threateningly close to Tbilisi they too have miscalculated. They have only made the population panic and rally behind their leader. National flags and posters now adorn the main roads and streets in the capital. Rallies which were held to show unity with the Georgian people and demonstrations against the Russian occupation became somehow synonymous with supporting the regime. With popular legitimacy comes the ability to do whatever he likes and the high likelihood that when protests do erupt, as I’m sure they will, they will be dealt with severely. Authoritarian rule is only a few steps away. What that will mean for Georgia is a very frightening thing.
Should Georgia take a turn down this route, it is likely that the support of the international community will begin to deflate. In every aspect of this crisis, and as the situation on all fronts worsens, NGO workers and humanitarian aid distributors are completely powerless to affect anything or anyone. This entire conflict began, a week ago last Thursday, as a very risky, very nasty political game, in which innocent people were caught up. Now it is up to us to clean up the mess that has been created, in what little ways we can.
Sian Davies
British EVS Volunteer, for YUPMMG (“Youth Union of Public Movement Multinational Georgia” a Georgian youth NGO)
About me: I have been in Georgia now for 5 months, half of my expected 10 month EVS project and thus far I have had a very enjoyable and productive time here, working with young people form ethnic minorities on non formal education projects and integration issues, as well as election monitoring in minority areas. This was the last thing any of us expected and I am still unable to process the events of the past week and compare what the reality is now, with what my life was just 2 weeks ago. The majority of my international friends and fellow volunteers have been evacuated to their home countries, some of us remain, and some want to return soon, to do whatever we can and to direct those motivated to help from outside in fundraising. My Georgian friend’s lives are all on hold, as the country is, and many have lost loved ones or are separated from them by the conflict. My youth projects, which included a multiethnic youth peace summer camp due to start last weekend, are also indefinitely postponed. Everyone is trying to help IDPs now, in any way possible.
Just over one week ago my life in Tbilisi was a whirl of project planning, NGO meetings and parties. By Monday 11th we were racing for the Armenian border, convinced that Russian forces would soon be bombing Tbilisi and taking control of the city. After a week of fear, confusion, panic, rumours and evacuations, back in Tbilisi we are starting to focus on the real challenge of the crisis, the displaced people. Depending whose estimates you read, internally displaced people number are at least 70,000, more likely over 100,000, because there are so many areas unreachable and the assessment process is barely begun. At the moment the priority is assessing where they are and how many, improving the facilities for them and providing basic goods. To a certain extent the government, well the MRA (Ministry of Refugees) is able to provide estimates and addresses because they directed groups of refugees to certain buildings and settlements.
But the UNHCR warehouse which is the main focus of humanitarian aid supplies is by no means overstocked and access to the warehouse is tightly controlled. It contains, as of yesterday, only basic emergency supplies, like blankets, saucepans, plates and water cans. Yesterday I spent the day giving these out to 1000 refugees, with an international NGO, one of the approved distributors. We visited 5 IDP centres, varying in size from 1000 people to 30. Though we were only giving them these basic things, they were often extremely grateful.
We are wondering when the promised aid from nations in Europe and the USA will arrive, and what it will contain. Basic goods are the priority of course but this is not sustainable. There are no mattresses or cooking stoves right now for example- in many IDP centres everyone is sleeping on hard floors. Those who are housed in public buildings, often building sites (including the disused hospital which was housing 1000 refugees when we visited) are at constant risk of disease and injury. Sanitation will continue to be a significant problem, despite the efforts of the UN group on sanitation who are overseeing water supplies being re-established, as we were glad to see they were doing so at this ‘hospital’ when we arrived.
However next door to the hospital, in a small building which was half destroyed, were living 9 families, sleeping on the floor in one room. Other rooms in the rubble-filled structure were being used as a toilet. Common features of all the IDP centres are that they are overcrowded and lack basic facilities. Schools, hospital buildings and offices are not designed to hold 500 refugees. There are few buildings which are secure or have windows, few have enough beds or any kind of sleeping arrangements. Some are well organised, with committees of volunteers from outside or inside the IDP community who are creating lists and keeping them updated daily, ensuring they maintain contact with outside help and the government to receive the aid when they can. Others are not and are seeing new arrivals every day.
This was true of one of the last collective centres we visited and it underscored how fragile the crisis was. This, a school building containing 450 refugees, a number which was rising by the hour, was clearly fraught with emotion and anger, there were some men drinking themselves into a stupor, there was also nearly a fight that erupted as we were handing out aid. Moreover as the current situation continues, and it becomes obvious their temporary refugee state is not ending soon, it is clear to us and to them that these living arrangements are going to become more unbearable. Frustration will rise, nerves will become frayed, tension may give way to violence and anger. If there are problems, then the IDPs will find themselves becoming very unwelcome, very quickly, by the local communities. This will only make the work of humanitarian aid distribution harder.
Some of the refugees we met yesterday have moved 5 or 6 times in the past week, starting with an exodus from Tskhinvali, constantly fleeing from each new round of fighting, and ending in a school building in Gldani, a suburb of Tbilisi. It is amazing to me that these stories are still told by eyes that are weary, but smiling, and they can still laugh, chat and carry on with a semblance of normal life. Were I in their place, I would not trust myself to be so resilient.
The worst is seeing the children. There are huge numbers of children caught up in this, many of whom have seen horrific sights they should not have been exposed to. Many have lost parents. How do they understand this situation now, I wonder, when just over a week ago they were happily playing football in their yards with their friends? They have nothing with them. Most people ran with whatever they could carry but some came with just the clothes on their backs. So although at the moment basic goods are what the people need the most, we also have to start thinking about how to get books, toys etc to these kids, who are currently filling their days playing in the dirt or fighting with each other.
In Tbilisi, the fears of the international aid workers are beginning to diverge even further from the attitudes of the Georgian authorities. It appears as though they are very much convinced that once Russia pulls back, out of Georgia proper, then the refugees will return and the IDP crisis will be resolved. They have demonstrated this point of view by insisting the schools and kindergartens, currently housing IDPs, will reopen as scheduled, in three weeks time. Of course it would be a blow to the education system in this country if the schools do not re-open, but even if we can trust the intention of the Russians to pull out, this optimism is ludicrous.
It is almost certain that any IDPs from south Ossetia cannot go back, because Russia and the South Ossetian government will not allow them to. Those from Gori, who make up most of the Tbilisi IDP population, may not have anything to return to. I have not been into Gori and few, if any, humanitarian workers have been allowed to pass the road-blocks, so we cannot really know how bad the situation is there, except for journalists reports. However we can make some educated guesses at this point. Even if the homes of IDPs are still standing, which many wont be, they will be emptied of anything of value as mass looting has occurred there. If they owned cars, they will be burnt out or stolen, if they had a shop that will probably be looted and destroyed. No businesses will function there, there will be no jobs. Yet the government will expect them to return... to what?
No, the IDP problem Tbilisi and the surrounding areas currently face is not at its worst point yet and I honestly can’t see how it is going to get better. Many will have to remain and make their lives here, just as IDPs from the last secessionist war, over 10 years ago, have had to start their lives again. And I fear that the authorities will not go to great efforts to help IDPs integrate and recover their lives. Perhaps that is because the government cannot afford to support these people in the long term but also because it has shown, along with other countries hosting IDPs, including Azerbaijan, that it is politically useful to maintain an IDP population as a political pawn.
This is only the situation in Tbilisi because I can see it. But I know elsewhere the situation is many times worse. In fact, Tbilisi is the only place we are able to keep track of refugee numbers, partly because in villages and rural areas, families have taken refugees in and are providing for them. An NGO we are in contact with in the region of Guria has informed us there are about 4000 refugees in 2 towns living in these circumstances. This is a facet of the famous Georgian hospitality I have been familiarised with when travelling in rural areas too. Although their living arrangements will be in many ways preferable to that of the collective centres, it means that the authorities and humanitarian organisations do not have any idea how many people are there and where they are staying, so help is less likely to reach them. Those families, who have taken in one or two refugee families and are providing all their food and support, cannot afford to do so indefinitely.
Despite hosting an estimated 30,000 to 70,000 refugees, in Tbilisi everything is fairly calm, almost oddly normal, although the city is a little emptier than usual. It is obvious that Georgians have been through this before, have hosted huge numbers of IDPs and life carries on. But the sense of sobriety and shock is palpable, and though young people still walk arm in arm eating ice cream on the main street running through the city, no one looks to be enjoying themselves very much. I think we all fear for the future here, not least because it doesn’t look as if Russian forces have any intention of pulling out, despite many promises to do so. We keep hearing reports they are bringing in more heavy artillery, and ‘digging in’, literally digging bunkers, in the areas surrounding Gori. So, they may be here for a long time to come.
I cannot emphasise to those who are unfamiliar with Georgian geography how important the road is from Batumi to Tbilisi which goes through Gori. It is really the only main highway and the only fast road. It’s the artery of the country’s cargo transport, from the ports to the capital. It is also a road usually buzzing with business and families travelling back and forth. I have travelled the road myself many times, visiting central and west Georgia. Without this artery nothing is moving in Georgia. The economy is frozen and will suffer immeasurably.
Of course this is the intention of the Russian government. Gori is close enough to south Ossetia that they can justify it as a legitimate holding point, but in reality the objective is to paralyse the country. They are succeeding. Two days ago they also bombed the railway line, again, the only main railway link. The country is essentially divided into two blocks, areas accessible from Tbilisi, and the rest. No one can get to western Georgia and we have very little idea of what’s happening there, except that Zugdidi seems calm and fortunately Georgian troops withdrew from Abkhazia without a fight so life was able to continue there without bloodshed. Occupying the port of Poti and destroying its infrastructure, including sinking ships, will ensure that no supplies can get through by sea. It is only a matter of time before shortages are visible.
Aside from critical infrastructure they have also attacked economic targets, factories and businesses. The international business community will not want to be in Georgia and the foreign investment market that was flourishing just over a week ago is now in ruins. Tourism has been destroyed as soon as the black sea area became a target. Every summer thousands of Armenians have been pouring into the black sea resorts of Batumi and Kobuleti, bringing valuable tourist income to businesses. The confidence this has inspired led to a huge reconstruction project in Batumi. That has now gone. And as of yesterday, the national park at Borjomi, another tourist attraction and one of the most beautiful, wildlife rich places you can imagine, was burning. Who knows why and how the fire started.
What we do know is that tactics which were applied very well in Chechnya are being used in Georgia and it’s hard not to draw comparisons. Information is sketchy but it appears that, rather than being responsible for terrorising the remaining population themselves, Russian forces are deliberately arming anyone with a grudge to bear, ensuring the countryside affected by the war is filled with armed rebels, not in uniform, marauding around and helping themselves to whatever they would like. The casualties who are still rolling into the barely functioning medical services in Gori have apparently encountered these irregular forces, or bandits, who have been peppering the few remaining civilians with bullets, at will. This means, that even if the Russians do pull out, many sections of the countryside are likely to be no-go areas for a long time to come and IDPs are even less likely to be returned to their homes. At this point I also have little faith in the Georgian authorities’ ability to face the challenge of armed militias and protect the civilian population, not least because our own armed forces have been totally decimated.
We also fear what will happen to Georgia politically now. It seemed sure a few days ago that Saakashvili would have to step down and we were optimistic of a bloodless transition. But he, like the Russians, has ‘dug in’ during the past week and his position looks stronger than ever. If the Russians are expecting to remove him from power by remaining threateningly close to Tbilisi they too have miscalculated. They have only made the population panic and rally behind their leader. National flags and posters now adorn the main roads and streets in the capital. Rallies which were held to show unity with the Georgian people and demonstrations against the Russian occupation became somehow synonymous with supporting the regime. With popular legitimacy comes the ability to do whatever he likes and the high likelihood that when protests do erupt, as I’m sure they will, they will be dealt with severely. Authoritarian rule is only a few steps away. What that will mean for Georgia is a very frightening thing.
Should Georgia take a turn down this route, it is likely that the support of the international community will begin to deflate. In every aspect of this crisis, and as the situation on all fronts worsens, NGO workers and humanitarian aid distributors are completely powerless to affect anything or anyone. This entire conflict began, a week ago last Thursday, as a very risky, very nasty political game, in which innocent people were caught up. Now it is up to us to clean up the mess that has been created, in what little ways we can.
Sian Davies
British EVS Volunteer, for YUPMMG (“Youth Union of Public Movement Multinational Georgia” a Georgian youth NGO)
About me: I have been in Georgia now for 5 months, half of my expected 10 month EVS project and thus far I have had a very enjoyable and productive time here, working with young people form ethnic minorities on non formal education projects and integration issues, as well as election monitoring in minority areas. This was the last thing any of us expected and I am still unable to process the events of the past week and compare what the reality is now, with what my life was just 2 weeks ago. The majority of my international friends and fellow volunteers have been evacuated to their home countries, some of us remain, and some want to return soon, to do whatever we can and to direct those motivated to help from outside in fundraising. My Georgian friend’s lives are all on hold, as the country is, and many have lost loved ones or are separated from them by the conflict. My youth projects, which included a multiethnic youth peace summer camp due to start last weekend, are also indefinitely postponed. Everyone is trying to help IDPs now, in any way possible.
Monday, August 18, 2008
COMMENT & PHOTOGRAPHY: IDP Stories, Letter and Voices from Georgians and other people. Part Nine.
Refugees from South Ossetia sheltering in an abandoned school building in Tbilisi.Photo am 18. August 2008 von s.o.s.georgia
Fotostream von s.o.s.georgia
35A Tsereteli St. , Refugee shelter, 13. August 2008
Mamisashvili Venera, 51, resident of Eredvi (village in S. Ossetia)
I left on 11th of August. At first they told us there would be terrible bombardments. That's why we left…we were hiding on the valleys at first, but they did not allow us to stay there either. So I decided to go back to the village, because, you know, my heart was pushing me there, I did not want to leave my house. They were urging me to leave, saying "go auntie (Georgian way of calling an unknown woman), go, leave", but I was insisting on entering my house. Finally, they forcefully took me out of the house. Bombs were being dropped in every corner, it was getting blurry, you would not be able to see anything in a few minutes… bombs destroyed everything, people were dying. Even though military base is far from the village, civilians were involved in the fight as well. They were tackling the civilians. Village is 5-6 kilometers away from the base. However, bombs were dropped right in the heart of it. One of the bombs was dropped on a bus getting civilians out of the gorge. Houses were burnt down along with the people in them. I got out; I am sitting here and crying now. We walked all the way here; I don't even remember how we got to this place.
We have not seen the troops. We were frightened because of the bombs. All the glasses in our houses shattered. If they got into the house, they would have broken everything, they would harm our cattle. It's true that the house is still there, but it is burnt down. I am here and I don't know exactly in what conditions it is, but people say the villages have been burnt down and destroyed.
At first there were a few gun shots, I don't know if Russians or Ossetians were shooting, but I guess they were Russian, because they were holding Russia's flags. Troops were definitely from Russia. They were shooting from what we call Russian spots.
We were not afraid of the shots, because we could hide in a lot of places, but bombs scared us to death. That's why everybody left the village. Airplanes and fighters were
bombing us. Houses were destroyed, cattle were killed, and people were dead.
Our relatives are still there. I have a sister in Vanati. Can you imagine? She is walking through the village during those bombardments, when everyone is shooting. She is hiding in the bushes sometimes. We need help to get people like my sister out of the village, they need help… How can we get them out of the village?
That's the trouble we are in. See how our country has been destroyed? My heart is aching…
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IDP story
We barely managed to get out; we left by Kamaz (truck). Two days ago we took our kids to Gori. Then when the situation in Gori was escalating they went back to the villages. And when situation in Gori was getting worse they met us with Kamaz truck on the road and we took it to Gori, where we transferred to doctors' bus and left by it.
While we were in the village it was constantly bombed. Since then, as we are here we hear rumors that they are going around and robbing houses, they even set houses on fire after they're done robbing.
I don't know what the situation is; I don't know anything so far. We have no contacts with the village. My relatives are probably devastated, but weather they are dead or wounded, I don't know. Before the army came, we witnessed bombing and my neighbors' house, I don't know weather it was a bomb or what, but six people was killed. This is what we witnessed.
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IDP stories
- I left when the first explosions happened, practically I fled.
I left by bus. We left during chaos and panic.
I don't know what happened to my house. My husband's parents are still in the village, the elderly, and I don't know what the situation is. We left them alone without any supervision.
- I am from Nokozi.
We left Nikozi, the shootings were intense. We came to Gori and then we went to my sister's and then we came here. There were non-stop shootings. Planes were bombing. My house is completely destroyed. I don't know if my relatives are dead or alive so far.
- I am from Achabeti. When the shooting already began they told us to take children and leave the village immediately. There was no transport and we walked. Sometimes we walked through woods and sometimes we walked and walked alongside the road, and finally, we barely made it to here. They were shooting in our village too, but I don't know now if it's destroyed. We have no contact, they are saying that Ossetians came in, but I don't know.
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IDP Story
- It was on TV, I saw it
– he said: Chechen fighters were coming through sewerage system. They know that survivors and wounded people are hiding in basements and wherever they meet them they shot them to death. It's impossible to transport dead bodies out of there. I was there for so long and they didn't let the ambulance in. And now can you imagine when they go in with tanks and everything, they probably drove all over everything. Now they are sending Chechens in sewerage pipes to see if someone is hiding there. To my mind, I am speaking from my own experience, what happened in Chechnya, I know a little. Now the whole city is occupied, where would one hide?! Even if you are healthy
– you can't get out, can you?! You go hide in basements when you see it. When they start to clean up basements you go to hide in ruins. Chechens even manage to find hidden people there. Well the last thing that the enemy will think to look is sewerage system. Well, you go to sewerage pipe to hide. Even there they lifted up the leads and sent in Chechens. That's what's happening as I think. God save those guys who get caught in their hands. They are in a terrible position. The first thing that should have been done is the corridor to let people out.
Photo 18. August 2008 von gstop@ymail.com Fotostream von gstop@ymail.com
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IDP, Lower Nikozi (Tskhinvali Region)
- We are from lower Nikozi. We left amidst cross-fire. During the shooting as we got very scared the village started to get deserted and people were leaving; every time it got a little bit quieter – we used to go back. Finally explosions became so violent that now children were in panic and we decided to leave. The next day the road was blocked. We left, reservists were taken and they were followed by bus, which we took.
I have no idea about the condition of my house. My in-laws (father-in-law and mother-in-law) stayed there and I don't even know how they are. We were able to contact them briefly only once and they said nothing is happening so far. There are lots of robberies. There are burglaries of houses. They are saying if the hose is descent (looks good from outside), they're going in and robbing it, but as for destroying, I think…well, I don't know. I was speaking on a cell phone, and the connection was bad. The only thing we ask "What is the situation, how are you?"- like that. They are saying they go out in a yard at night and staying at home during the day. When it's little bit quiet, we are coming – they said – because usually shootings used to occur at night, but I don't know now.
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Makvala Archvadze
I am scared of them... My husband is very sick, an invalid of the 1st class and we could not get him out, he remained there. I hope they did not kill him ... Sister and niece came from Tbilisi to take care of him and they also remained there, they are Georgians and have not heard anything from them yet. I am very worried about them too. Two of my brothers, niece and husband are all there, have no idea whether they are dead or still alive.
We used to Live in Tskhinvali. First, when we lost Tkhinvali we were forced to move and find a temporary shelter, my husband's family had a house in the village so we decided to settle there, renovated a house and started farming to support the family. Now we were forced to leave the village house too, we lost 2 homes, have neither village nor town house. I am here now at my sister's, she herself is in Tskhinvali and I am here with her husband... I am here sweltering with tears of whearabouts of my sister... It has been three days now since I lef the village, before I used to be with my husband all the time. My husband has a brain blood clot and he cannot move.
We left Tskhinvali many years ago when there were first signs of political unrest and moved to Eredvi village, where we used to have the family house. Our village was the largest village and we used to fortefy Gori. Now Eredvi is all aloof, every village is empty... they entered Gori.
Our village was heavily bombed... houses are destroyed, some are burnt, our house is also destroyed, we were inside the house when the first bomb fell. All our neghborhood is distructed to the carpet level. I togather with my brother in law walked all the way from Gori region, bombs were thrown over our heads many times, one of them wounded my brother in law and poor creature crawled wounded several killometers. Not only bombs were thrown, they also fired guns at us, they saw people in the streets and were targeting specifically on civilians.
Cannot distringuish weather they were Ossetians or Russians. Ossetians are backed by Russians and they tell them who lives there and here, this is one big gang. One never knows what is in their minds.
I had a very good relationship with Ossetians. I myself grew up in Tskhnivali and had many Ossetian neighbors.
As I said it is three days we left Eredvi... I stayed there and continued taking care of my husband, until military jets started firing at us, we hid in basements, until the heavy bomberdment, but then had to leave.
Eredvi village is all wiped out. Every single house is burnt, very few people remained. There was one mentally sick man, they could not get him out from the village, many elderly women stayed thought they would not be killed becuase of their age. I do not know what happened with them now. are they alive? I do not know what happaned to my husband either.
My husband is so sick he cannot even talk... Even if he was not bombed how would he remained alive not eating for all these days. One of the elderly women told me to leave and promised she'd take care of him. One thing I know is I left a full house and was forced to move.
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contact: georgiawar@gmail.com
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