BOOK: Tbilisi - Archive of Transition. Klaus Neuburg, Sebastian Pranz, Wato Tseretelli et al. (eds.) (niggli.ch)

Source: niggli.ch
_The changing faces of Tbilisi
_Multiple dimension of urban Transformation
_Different perspectives by different protagonists
_Texts are accompanied by images and photo essays

The capital of Georgia practically presents a new face every day. Ambitious building projects and large foreign investments are constantly changing the cityscape of Tbilisi. This relentless development is the subject of much debate among the city's residents: What should be preserved and what may be subjected to change? What is available for sale and what is common property? What do we want to remember and what are our sources of inspiration?

Urban planners, architects, activists, clerics, and politicians recount what the changes mean to them and to life in the unknown city in the South Caucasus. The very diverse and impressively illustrated contributions give an immediate view of the multiple changes taking place between the desire for the preservation of the past and the dawn of a new era.

English, 192 pages, 220 illustrations, 21.5 x 32.5 cm, softcover ISBN 978-3-7212-0983-9 1 edition Release date: 05/2018

DOCUMENTARY: Paul Devlin's Power Trip - "Crazy Kiosk" in chaotic post-Soviet Tbilisi, Georgia

More movies & videos at DevlinPix.com!

The dangerous chaos of stolen electricity is vividly displayed in webs of tangled wires.

Paul Devlin's Power Trip, www.powertripthemovie.org is an emotional & dramatic study of traumatic transition from communism to capitalism. Corruption, assassination, street-rioting & absurd culture clash highlight the electricity crisis in chaotic post-Soviet Tbilisi,Georgia.

Trailer & DVD

POLITICS: The Dramatic Rise and Fall of Mikheil Saakashvili. By George Tarkhan-Mouravi, 18 October 2013

(tol.org) As he leaves the stage, many wonder how the passionate reformer gave way to the reviled megalomaniac.

The German sociologist Max Weber famously remarked almost a century ago, “The only man who has politics for a vocation is one who is certain that his spirit will not be broken if the world, when looked at from his point of view, proves too stupid or base to accept what he wishes to offer it, and who, when faced with all that obduracy, can still say ‘Nevertheless!’ despite everything.”

How better to describe Mikheil Saakashvili, whose stubborn optimism has taken him through 18 years in Georgian politics and nearly a decade as president?

On 27 October, presidential elections in Georgia will draw a curtain on Saakashvili’s tumultuous rule. As has so often been the case in Georgia, his ascent to power was coupled with excessive popularity, hopes, and expectations, and his exit is marred by massive disappointment, derision, even contempt.

Is such a dramatic political cycle simply the Damocletian sword that hangs over all Georgian politicians in power? Or is there some special reason why the euphoria caused by Saakashvili’s coming to power in 2004 morphed in just a few years into its opposite?

Against the backdrop of cyclical Georgian politics, Saakashvili’s rise and fall raises other, much older questions about the relative power of personality, as opposed to the currents of history, as an agent of reform and change. Indeed, there have been many attempts to link his policy successes and failures to his eccentric, outsized persona, often via supposed psychological problems revealed in his taste and manner: his extravagant projects and admiration for fountains, merry-go-rounds, and modern architecture; his impulsiveness, narcissism, and uncouth eating habits; his probable womanizing. But also his dogged, focused approach to politics; his charisma, brains, determination, and flexibility; his linguistic talents; his boundless ambition.

Those who dislike Saakashvili readily recall his many foibles, both widely rumored (his overactive sex drive) and well-documented (nervously chewing his tie; sudden paroxysms of rage; and panic attacks, as demonstrated by his sudden run from an imagined aerial attack in 2008 in Gori, in the presence of journalists and diplomats). Back in 2005 a group of international psychiatrists even diagnosed him as an expansive paranoid type who displayed signs of hysteria, although it was never clarified who had actually financed the evaluation, later reprinted in some Russian newspapers.

FAMILY TIES

At a 1987 Princeton University conference on the modern presidency, a gathering composed largely of distinguished political scientists and former presidential advisers exploded into laughter when Wilbur Cohen, who had worked for every American administration since that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, suddenly declared, “To be president, you need to have a good mother. The father doesn't matter. You need a good mother.”

It’s a funny statement, but it gets at the formative importance of the early life of a politician. And it rings true for Saakashvili, who was brought up by his historian mother after his parents divorced, in a family where intellectual discourse thrived alongside a sense of belonging to the Soviet elite linked to intelligence circles. The future president’s uncle, Soviet diplomat Temur Alasania, served for many years on the UN Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Alasania remained a strong influence during most of Mikheil’s adolescence, and by some accounts continued to influence his nephew’s career and policies throughout his political life.

It is only natural that the life story of a conspicuous political figure in a small country is surrounded by myths and rumors. These are as important to political image as facts, and equally difficult to corroborate with great certainty. Still, it is believed that Saakashvili was a fairly uncommunicative young person – gifted, but closed and insecure – who spent much of his time learning foreign languages and dreaming of future deeds. It is also alleged that during his school years he got involved in distributing pornographic films.

In the ensuing scandal, Saakashvili went abroad to study international relations at the Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. He was drafted into the army in the middle of his studies, although, presumably thanks to some string-pulling by relatives, he pulled easy duty for two years with the border troops (subordinated to the Soviet KGB), mainly at the Borispol airport in Kyiv. This put off his graduation until 1992, when he was 25.

After this slow start, Saakashvili’s career rapidly picked up speed. In 1993 he served briefly, and unexpectedly, in a rather high position at the Human Rights Committee of Georgia. After that he continued his studies as an Edmund S. Muskie graduate fellow at Columbia Law School, focusing on human rights law, and he held an internship at the New York law firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, where Constantine Sidamon-Eristoff, an acquaintance of his uncle, held an “of counsel” position.

In 1995 Saakashvili returned to Georgia and quickly became the fastest-rising figure on the country’s tumultuous political scene. That December he was elected to parliament with help from Zurab Zhvania, then-President Eduard Shevardnadze’s right hand and founder of the then-ruling Citizens’ Union of Georgia. In 2000, at the age of 33, Saakashvili was appointed justice minister and launched reforms of the judiciary that were highly commended by many Western politicians.

Saakashvili left the government a year later, however, having accused some influential ministers of corruption. He was soon a leader of a group of so-called “young reformers” who were gradually becoming the key opposition force. Even before the legislative elections of November 2003, he shared with parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze the title of the most popular politician in Georgia. They joined forces with Zhvania in a formidable alliance.

Those who hoped to take power after the aging Shevardnadze – already a lame duck in what seemed sure to be his last year in office – were scared enough of the possibility that these “young reformers” would win to engage in scandalous vote rigging, which caused a public outcry and the relatively peaceful change of power that would come to be called the Rose Revolution.

Thus did Georgia enter a “post-post-Soviet” era infused with a euphoric optimism. A new generation of politicians emerged, unburdened by the Soviet legacy and often more fluent in English than in Russian. On 4 January 2004 Saakashvili was elected president with more than 96 percent of the vote. In February the post of prime minister was restored and given to Zhvania. New parliamentary elections were held in March, and although observers reported more procedural violations than in the presidential election, along with other dubious approaches to the formation of the new parliament, Saakashvili and his small circle of allies strengthened their grip on power.

EARLY WARNING SIGNS

Several of the new leadership’s policies and practices caused serious questions: controversial changes to the constitution that strengthened presidential powers while dramatically weakening parliament and the judiciary; numerous human rights violations; ill-considered moves in South Ossetia that brought Tbilisi to the brink of war with Russia in August 2004; and abolishing the lowest echelon of self-governance.

However, there were striking achievements in many areas during the first few years, even if some of the success was built on previous progress. The corrupt traffic police force was replaced with a much “cleaner” patrol unit. The tax system was dramatically simplified and collection improved. Longtime electricity shortages in much of the country were finally ended. A massive influx of direct foreign investment secured impressive economic growth, and street crime went down. The new government launched an ambitious program of political and economic reforms and put Euro-Atlantic integration high on the national agenda.

But the concentration of power in the hands of the small circle of “revolutionaries,” and in Saakashvili’s hands in particular, came with a heavy price. For all of the achievements of their first years in power, the president and his coterie inherited many of the vices of the old government – intolerance of opposition, conceit, complacency, impulsive and irrational decision-making, imitation of democratic practices, little real dialogue with civil society and the people, and, ultimately, a loss of touch with reality.

These tendencies were aggravated by impatience and arrogance that fueled intimidation of the opposition and of citizens. Saakashvili initiated a bizarre sequence of grandiose projects: moving the parliament west from the capital to the town of Kutaisi; building a multimillion-dollar presidential palace in a country where half of the population lives on the brink of poverty; launching construction of a new city, Lazika, in the swamps of the Black Sea coast. But the worst and the most damaging for Georgia was probably Saakashvili’s personal contribution to starting the disastrous August 2008 war with Russia, when his actions, regardless of any misdeeds by his Russian counterparts, had no moral, political, or military justification.

This loss of touch with reality brought the shock of defeat to Saakashvili and his allies last year, when the united opposition overcame all the obstacles and administrative resources employed by the government and swept into power on the wings of a scandal about torture in Georgia’s prisons, previously lauded by the president as exemplary.

After admitting defeat, Saakashvili used many of his remaining resources to sabotage the new government during the one year of a chimerical “cohabitation,” but all in vain. On 27 October the new president, though with much-diminished powers, will be elected. He – and it will almost certainly be a man – will probably be the candidate of the Georgian Dream coalition, which toppled Saakashvili’s United National Movement last year.

There is speculation that with the end of his rule Saakashvili will flee the country, or end up in prison for a number of alleged misdeeds, including involvement in the 2005 death of former ally Zhvania, ruled by the coroner as accidental carbon monoxide poisoning. Still, Saakashvili seems to hope to recover, and just recently he was re-elected as leader of his party. At the end of the party conference, he declared, “This is the beginning of our comeback!”

This brings to mind an assessment by the distinguished American psychologist Vamik Volkan of another president with some similar personality traits. “When a narcissistic person is intelligent − as Nixon certainly was − and capable of finding or creating a ‘fit’ in the environment to match his internal demands, that person may respond to frustration and humiliation by collecting new sources to support his grandiose self, and engineering a comeback,” Volkan wrote.

It is difficult to imagine Saakashvili engineering a comeback. But one thing is clear, whatever his further fate: Saakashvili imposed his paradoxical and controversial personality on so many aspects of Georgian reality, from symbols such as the national flag and anthem to the concrete architectural images of many cities and towns, that his legacy will last for years.

George Tarkhan-Mouravi is co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies think tank in Tbilisi

CALL: The Caucasus and Central Asia, twenty years after independences (ocamagazine.com)

Call For Papers

The Caucasus and Central Asia, twenty years after independences:
Questioning the notion of "South countries"

International conference, Almaty, August 25-27, 2011

Twenty years ago, after the collapse of the USSR, the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) became independent. The Central Asian republics, created between 1924 and 1936, could then - unexpectedly - enjoy a sovereignty previously unknown to them, whereas in the Caucasian states, the strong national movements that had developed during perestroika were deeply rooted in the past. During the 20th century, these Soviet socialist republics had been integrated into the unified production and trade system set up on the scale of the USSR and the principles of socialist planning. In this framework, they could take advantage of the resources and development policy of the Soviet state. Thus, despite any lacks or shortcomings they might have, the Caucasian and Central Asian republics belonged to the developed world in the bi-polar geopolitical division. The Caucasus and Central Asia served as models, if not showcases, for some Third World countries, all the more so as the USSR provided assistance to developing countries struggling against imperialism.

Since the collapse of the USSR and the East-West division, the North-South opposition seems to have become one of the major reading grids of the international scene. Whereas during the Cold war, geopolitical analyses rested on the ideological and strategic confrontation between capitalist and socialist worlds, the North-South grid, for the most part, pointed to inequalities in development. Appearing in the 1970s, the notion of "South" in fact replaced the term "third world countries" or "developing countries, as opposed to the "North", the developed and industrialised countries. Then came the expression "South countries", referring to the diversity of this heterogeneous ensemble made up of both emerging and least advanced countries. In these new divisions of today's globalised and regionalised world, where do we situate the independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus?

Research on contemporary trends in Central Asia and the Caucasus contains few attempts at examining the analysis grids elaborated to study the South countries - despite the fact that after the crisis at the turn of the 1990s and the magnitude of its economic, political and social impact, the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian states were included, by international institutions as well as non-governmental organisations, in the "South countries". As a result, during the 1990s, international assistance destined for the Central Asian republics and, to a lesser extent, the Caucasian republics, tended to slip from "transition" to "development" aid. In this respect, according to some analysts, Central Asia and the Caucasus followed a very original post-soviet trajectory, having entered into the globalised world by means of what could be called "third worldisation". Thus they argue that the border between the "North" and the "South countries", formerly located on the border of the USSR, was from then on situated on the southern border of Russia.

Since it opposes a former metropolis and its former colonies, an approach in terms of "South countries" falls into a post-colonial pattern; as such, it leads us to examine the USSR's imperial dimension and to mobilise the theoretical approaches (theory of dependency, post colonial studies, etc) to which we owe the notion of "South countries".

The current trajectories of Central Asia and the Caucasus also suggest that development issues be examined in the context of globalisation. In particular, these issues require an analysis of the transition paradigm developed during the 1990s by international organisations, aimed at replacing the socialist model with a political system organised on a democratic basis, an economy based on liberal capitalist principles and a Euro-Atlantic geopolitical positioning. Economic and social dynamics have tended to invalidate this teleological notion, which conditioned development and oriented the insertion of Central Asian and Caucasian republics into the mechanisms of globalisation. However, it is essential to question transition policies in order to evaluate the slippage towards the "South" which has taken place since their independence.

The present period can be likened to a moment of diversification and individualisation of societies, economies and territories, on the basis of the Newly Independent States. In this respect, an examination of contemporary transformations in all their complexity not only means keeping a close watch on the diversity of political, economic and social actors, but also trying to identify the fault lines which tend to segment Central Asian and Caucasian territories and societies.

The aim of the conference "The Caucasus and Central Asia, twenty years after independences: an examination of the notion of 'South Countries'" - is to question the relevance of heuristic tools based on territories situated in the "South" but also, the very notion itself of "South countries", so as to gain insight into the southern peripheries of post-soviet space. Its purpose is to bring together researchers in all social science disciplines (sociology, history, political science, geography, anthropology, demography and economics). This diversity should favour a confrontation of approaches and further insight into the complexity of the itineraries followed by the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus in the past twenty years.


Themes

The formation of states: post-colonial problems?

- The formation of Republican territories: the history of borders, border policy and implementation, autonomous territories, political structuring of space;
- The structuring of political domains: creation of regional and local Republican state apparatuses at the time of incorporation into the Soviet Union; the ethnicising and confessionalising of political issues;
- The transformation of Soviet and post-Soviet elites, the emergence of new actors and new political resources (NGOs, etc.).

Inequality and poverty: societies thrust into third world status?

- Pauperisation and social differentiations; social and spatial segregation-aggregation; city-rural inequalities;
- Work migrations: socio-economic and political causes for mobility (poverty, conflicts, etc); implementation of public policies; life itineraries and strategies of migrants; social, demographic and economic consequences of migration in the country of origin and the host country;
- Questions on the definition of South countries from the point of view of demographic transition (fertility, mortality, life expectancy).

International geopolitical insertion: are the South countries being dominated?

- Global and regional power plays, in particular Russia, the former metropolis;
- The positioning of international organisations;
- The role of cross border enterprises;
- The international ambitions of certain Central Asian and Caucasian states;
- Regional alliances.

Economic globalisation: are the South countries being exploited?

- Re-orientation of economic and commercial exchanges;
- Government action in the economic sector and the role of national and international entrepreneurs: the appropriation and exploitation of Central Asian and Caucasian resources;
- Fashioning of a resource based economy and link with development;
- The informal sector and "globalisation from the bottom up".

Organisation:

The conference "The Caucasus and Central Asia, twenty years after independences: questioning the notion of 'South Countries'" will be held in Almaty on August 25th, 26th, and 27th, 2011.

Proposals for communications should be sent before January 15th, 2011 at the following address: colloque.sudsov@gmail.com. They may be written in French, English, or Russian. Please, send an abstract (about 2000 signs), and a short CV. Answers will be sent by the organisation committee before February 28th 2011.

Working languages will be English and Russian.

Organising Institutions:

Centre d'étude des mondes russe, caucasien et centre-européen (CERCEC)
(Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris
Institute for oriental studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty) ANR (French National Research Agency)
Program "Sudsov", Paris
IFEAC (French Institute for Central Asian Studies), Tashkent
Centre franco-russe de recherche en sciences humaines et sociales, Moscow.

Organisation committee:

Sophie Hohman, CNRS-CERCEC/ INED (National Institute for Demographic Studies), Paris,
Anne Le Huérou, CNRS-CERCEC, Paris,
Isabelle Ohayon, CNRS-CERCEC, Paris,
Amandine Regamey, Paris I University/CERCEC, Paris,
Nazigul Shajmardanova, Institute for Oriental Studies, Almaty,
Silvia Serrano, Université d'Auvergne, Clermont-Ferrand, CERCEC, Paris,
Julien Thorez, CNRS- Center "Mondes iranien et indien", Paris.

International scientific committee:

Sergey Abashin, Institute of ethnology and anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow,
Alexandre Iskanderyan, Caucasus Institute, Erevan,
Mohamed-Reza Djalili, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,
Sanat Kushkumbaev, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, Almaty,
Vladimir Mukomel, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Claire Mouradian, CNRS-CERCEC, Paris,
Ghia Nodia, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development/Ilya University, Tbilissi,
Saodat Olimova, Sharq Center, Duchanbe,
Jean Radvanyi, Centre franco-russe de recherche en sciences humaines et sociales, Moscow.

PROJEKT: Politische Transformation im postsowjetischen Aserbaidschan: eine historisch-institutionalistische Analyse (madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de)

Political Transition in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis
Babajew, Aser

pdf-Format: Dokument 1.pdf (12.389 KB)

Das Projekt versucht, im Rahmen des historisch-institutionalistischen Analyserasters die politische Transformation eines postsowjetischen Systems am Beispiel Aserbaidschan zu erklären, insbesondere die Persistenzlogik sowjetischer Institutionen weit über den Kollaps des Sowjetsystems hinweg.Die Fragestellung wurde vor allem durch verbale Datenerhebung, Beobachtung und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse untersucht. Das wichtigste Ergebnis dabei ist die Einsicht, dass es analytisch sinnvoll ist, beim politischen Transformationsprozess neben der Unterscheidung zwischen formellen und informellen Institutionen auch zwischen neuen und alten Akteuren, die vor allem Träger der informellen Institutionen sind, zu differenzieren. Hinzu kommt, dass die informellen Institutionen, die sich kurzfristigen Umwälzungen entziehen und vielmehr mit der gesellschaftlichen Gesamtentwicklung inkremental wandeln, für politische Transformations-Outcomes viel maßgeblicher sind als die formellen.

Kurzfassung in Englisch:
The project tries to explain within the historical-institutionalist analysis framework the transition of the post-Soviet political system in Azerbaijan, in particular the logic of the persistence of soviet institutions far beyond the collapse of the soviet system.The research question is examined mainly by verbal data collection, observation and qualitative content analysis. The most important result thereby is the insight that it makes analytically sense, to distinguish during periods of political transformation, in addition to the differentiation of formal and informal institutions, between new and old actors (as bearer of informal institutions) as well. Moreover, the informal institutions resisting short-term upheavals and changing rather incrementally with the societal overall development are much more decisive for political transition outcomes than the formal ones.

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