ARTICLE: Georgia Proposes to Unblock the Trans-Caucasus Railway Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 207, By: Giorgi Menabde

(jamestown.org) One of the closest associates of Georgia’s Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, State Minister for Reintegration Paata Zakareishvili, has unveiled the government’s idea to unblock the railway link that connected Russia with the South Caucasus republics in Soviet times.

In an interview with the Moscow paper Kommersant (kommersant.ru), Mr. Zakareishvili stated that this question had not been discussed officially by the government yet, but “preliminary consultations between members of the cabinet of ministers had taken place.”

The state minister’s statement appears to be an important message for Moscow by Ivanishvili that is signaling readiness to take into account Moscow’s interests in the region. This initiative comes from the package of “friendly gestures” that the new Georgian authorities devised to soften tensions in the relations with the neighboring country. Ivanishvili’s decision to renounce the Georgian boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi also comes from the same package (civil.ge). President Mikhail Saakashvili insists on boycotting the Sochi Olympics. Many observers in Tbilisi reckon that by rescinding the Olympics boycott, the government disavows the parliament’s decision on May 20, 2011 to recognize the events of the 19th century in the Northwestern Caucasus as the “Circassian Genocide.” Many Circassian organizations called for a boycott of the Olympic Games that will take place on the Red Meadow (Krasnaya Polyana), which has symbolic meaning for the Circassian people as the site of the final battle of the Russo-Circassian war.

Apart from that, Prime Minister Ivanishvili, having confirmed the impossibility of resuming diplomatic relations with Russia “until the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is over,” still appointed Zurab Abashidze as his representative for Georgian-Russian affairs. Abashidze was Georgia’s ambassador to Russia in 1998–2004 (dfwatch.net) and is considered to be one of the most pro-Russian diplomats in Georgia. Former Georgian representative to the UN, Irakly Alasania, became the minister of defense. Alasania was the only Georgian politician that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov met in person after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.

Will the Georgian authorities be able to implement the plan to restore a railway connection with Russia? Moscow and Yerevan have demanded that Tbilisi restore the railway link, which was cut on August 14, 1992, the very first day of the war in Abkhazia. However, the Georgian leadership under both Presidents Eduard Shevardnadze and Saakashvili tied the reopening of the railway with the issue of the Georgian refugees’ ability to return to Abkhazia. This issue became the main cause of a ruined agreement between Shevardnadze and Putin in the spring of 2003 (dossier.bymedia.net), during the leaders’ meeting in Sochi. Zakareishvili now states that he seeks “to depoliticize” this issue and stop tying economic and transportation topics with political and humanitarian ones. Georgian refugees’ leaders have lashed out at him for this. Former vice-speaker of the parliament of Georgia, Paata Davitaia, called the position of the state minister for reintegration “defeatist.”

The second problem with the reopening of the railway is the projected negative reaction of Azerbaijan. Restoration of the direct railway link between Russia and Armenia via Abkhazian and Georgian territory will decrease Armenia’s isolation and boost its positions in the Karabakh conflict. Public figures close to the Azerbaijani authorities have already signaled (news.day.az) that Baku could review its position on Georgian territorial integrity if Tbilisi continues its “double dealings.” Additionally, Azerbaijan is worried that the resumption of the Trans-Caucasian railway connection might have a negative impact on the construction of the railway that will soon connect Baku, Tbilisi, Akhalkalaki, Kars and Istanbul (turkishweekly.net). Furthermore, Ivanishvili’s government will have to take into account that the Azerbaijani state energy company SOCAR is a monopolistic supplier of natural gas to Georgia and holds a key role in the country’s petroleum market. After warnings from Azeri politicians and experts, Prime Minister Ivanishivili personally visited the local office of SOCAR in Georgia to express his respect for the Azerbaijani state company and reaffirm his commitment to the previously reached agreements (1in.am/eng).

The situation is further complicated by the fact that other important geopolitical players in the region are in no hurry to express their opinion about the reopening of the railway link. Both Moscow and Yerevan have kept silent on the issue. The de-facto authorities in Sukhumi have also not commented on the initiative. Yet, Abkhazia’s stance on the issue has probably not changed since the Shevardnadze-Putin meeting in Sochi in 2003. The Abkhazian de-facto authorities were not happy with the idea of restoring the railway link, since they feared it would lead to the return of Georgian refugees. Therefore, while agreeing to allow passage of goods via their territory, they have invariably been opposed to the resumption of passenger traffic. In fact, Abkhazia’s sector of the railway has never been well-suited for accommodating any significant cargo traffic. During Soviet times it was used mainly for ferrying passengers, while cargo traffic from Russia to the South Caucasus, including Armenia, was routed via Azerbaijan.

Ivanishivili’s government cannot provide an answer to another question as well—how will Georgia’s economy benefit from the railway’s unblocking without an end to the unofficial Russian embargo on Georgian goods to Russia? Will Moscow agree to allow in Georgian imports in exchange for the railway reopening, or will the Kremlin require even more concessions from Tbilisi, for example Georgia’s accession into the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan?

It appears that talks about these issues will start only after Moscow reacts in some way to Tbilisi’s “historic initiative” of the resumption of the railroad connection. This sector of railway has remained in absolute neglect for the past 20 years—it has been devastated by looting and natural decay. The railway will certainly need significant investments, even if all political obstacles are successfully removed. Therefore, the question of “who is going to pay” will remain topical even after resolution of political problems surrounding the question.

POLITIK: Vollwäsche in Tiflis. Von Markus Bey (derstandard.at)

(derstandard.at) Georgiens neue Regierung ist im Amt und säubert erst einmal. Kaukasusexperten wägen ab. Kleine Nachlese zu Georgien nach dem Machtwechsel.

Regierung gebildet, Premier gewählt, die Besen bereit für die große politische Säuberung in den Ministerien: In Georgien beginnt nach dem Machtwechsel bei den Parlamentswahlen am 1. Oktober der nächste Akt. Svante Cornell, Kaukasus-Experte an der Washingtoner Johns Hopkins-Universität, sieht das Land am Scheideweg. In einem Gastbeitrag für jamestown.org betont er, wie entscheidend nun die Zeit der Kohabitation zwischen dem "exzentrischen Milliardär" Bidsina Iwanischwili und Dauerrevolutionär Michail Saakaschwili bis zu den nächsten Präsidentenwahlen Ende 2013 für Georgiens Chancen in der NATO und der EU sein werden:

"If Georgia’s leading politicians succeed in taking the country forward in an orderly democratic process through and beyond the presidential election, it will be very difficult for anyone—whether in the West or, indeed, in Russia—to maintain roadblocks on Georgia’s path to European integration. Should they fail, however, and Georgia descends into Ukrainian-style chaos and recriminations, the critics arguing that Georgia is an immature country that does not really belong in Europe will be vindicated."

Keine der beiden Parteien im neuen Parlament habe eine Mehrheit, die Verfassungsänderungen im Alleingang oder Gesetze im Schnellverfahren erlaubt, "mit begrenzter Einbeziehung der Opposition, wie es die Vorgängerregierung tat", merkte Eric Rubin an, ein hochrangiger Diplomat der Europa- und Eurasien-Abteilung im US-Außenministerium, vergangene Woche in einer Rede über die US-georgischen Beziehungen an.

Noch bevor die Legislaturperiode wirklich losgegangen ist, verlor Saakaschwilis Nationale Bewegung (UNM) allerdings schon sechs Abgeordnete, denen eingefallen ist, dass sie eigentlich politisch unabhängig sind. Die Präsidentenpartei hält damit nur noch 59 der 150 Sitze im Parlament, wobei nicht ausgemacht ist, dass sie auf die Stimmen der unabhängigen Geister nicht doch hier und da zählen kann.

Rubin sah die strategische Funktion, die Georgien für die USA (und ebenso für die EU) spielen soll, durch die Parlamentswahlen und den Machtwechsel nur gestärkt. Freundlich verpackt und eisenhart gemeint: Georgien ist "eine führende demokratische Reformkraft in der Region", die in die NATO kommt, erklärte der Vize-Staatssekretär; die Grenzen zu den russischen Protektoraten Abchasien und Südossetien bleiben weiter nur "Verwaltungsgrenzen" innerhalb Georgiens, von denen sich die russische Armee zurückziehen muss, und ansonsten tut Washington wirklich alles, um die georgisch-russischen Beziehungen nach dem Krieg von 2008 zu reparieren.

Der WTO-Deal vom November 2011 war ein Beispiel dafür. Unter Schweizer Vermittlung und wohl mit US-amerikanischen Zusicherungen ließ Tiflis seinen jahrelangen Widerstand gegen den Beitritt Russlands zur Welthandelsorganisation fallen. Als Gegenleistung erhielten die Georgier einen komplizierten Kontrollmechanismus an den Grenzen zu Russland, der Raum für eine Präsenz internationaler Kräfte in Abchasien und Südossetien lässt und wieder Handelsbeziehungen über Land - wenn auch kostspielig - erlaubt. Saakaschwili ließ im vergangenen Februar auch den Visazwang für Russen aufheben. Sein politischer Gegner, Regierungschef Iwanischwili, steht nun vor der Aufgabe, die Beziehungen zum großen und bedrohlichen Nachbarn zu entspannen, so, wie er es im Wahlkampf angekündigt hatte. Ein konkretes Problem wird dabei schon einmal die Umsetzung des WTO-Deals sein: Der abchasische Präsident Alexander Ankwab sperrt sich zum Beispiel gegen den Bau des vereinbarten "Korridors" durch die Schwarzmeerprovinz, einer Transitstrecke für den Handel zwischen Georgien und Russland.

Die Unerfahrenheit des überwiegenden Teils der neuen Minister im Kabinett Iwanischwili könnte eine holprige, Wochen oder Monate dauernde Einarbeitungszeit mit sich bringen, Fehlentscheidungen inbegriffen: Vizepremier Khaki Khaladse hat Tore beim AC Mailand geschossen und soll sich nun als Minister mit Energiefragen beschäftigen (er war zuerst für das Ministerium für Regionalentwicklung nominiert). Finanzminister Nodar Khaduri kommt von der Uni, Wirtschaftsminister Giorgi Kwirikaschwili kennt sich in erster Linie mit der Kartu-Bank von Iwanischwili aus, deren Verwaltungsrat er angehörte, und Arbeits- und Sozialminister David Sergienko arbeitete bisher als Chefarzt im Iwanischwili-Krankenhaus auf dem Land in Chorwila, Iwanischwilis Geburtsort. Maia Pandschikidse war Botschafterin und soll nun das ganze Außenministerium führen (Salome Surabischwili war 2004 in einer ähnlichen Situation und stieß schnell auf erheblichen Widerstand unter den Diplomaten und Abgeordneten), Tea Tsulukiani war bisher Anwältin in Straßburg und ist nun mit der Leitung des Justizministeriums betraut. Die Gründe für die Niederlage von Saakaschwilis Partei - darunter die anhaltende soziale Misere - sind auch die Herausforderung für die neue Regierung, schreibt Giorgi Kldiaschwili in der jüngsten Ausgabe des CAD: Auch nach neun Jahren Reformen und Revolutionen leben Hunderttausende Georgier unter der Armutsgrenze.

Der Machtwechsel allein führt jetzt zu einer Auszeit in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. So hat der neue Generalstaatsanwalt Archil Kbilaschwili, ein gewählter Abgeordneter von Iwanischwilis Parteienkoalition Georgischer Traum (das Mandat gab er zurück), eine Woche Pause für Personalwechsel angekündigt und zwei Wochen für Verfahren, die von den Staatsanwälten in den verschiedenen Gerichten des Landes geführt werden. Auch Saakaschwilis Megaprojekte werden überprüft und möglicherweise eingedampft wie der Bau der Glitzer-Propagandastadt Lazika gleich an der Grenze zu Abchasien zur Beeindruckung der dortigen Bevölkerung. Vor allem aber hat der neue Regierungschef Iwanischwili noch ein Hühnchen mit dem Staatschef zu rupfen: Seine georgische Staatsbürgerschaft hat er zurückbekommen, die umgerechnet rund zehn Millionen Euro Strafe für angebliche Verstöße gegen Wahlkampfgesetze nicht. (Markus Bey, derStandard.at, 1.11.2012)

PUBLICATION: Tagliavini Commission Report Awakens an Extinct Protest Volcano in Georgia (jamestown.org)

By: Koba Liklikadze

The name of the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini may soon be used as a flagship for a new protest movement in Georgia. The implacable Georgian opposition, who previously ran three-month long protest rallies which commenced in April, have reiterated their calls for pre-term elections in the country (www.civil.ge, October 2). Nino Burjanadze, the former parliamentary speaker and leader of the Democratic Movement-United Georgia party asserted that President Mikheil Saakashvili should be held responsible for his policies and has attempted to rally opposition parties to consider how “to set Georgia free of Saakashvili’s regime, so that the people can elect a truly national, accountable and state-minded leadership” (Interpress News, October 2).

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ARTICLE: U.S.-Russia Moscow Summit Presents Last Opportunity to Avoid War in Georgia (jamestown.org)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 122
June 25, 2009 01:31 PM Age: 3 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, Russia, Georgia, Featured
By: Pavel Felgenhauer

During the summit between presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in London on April 1, it was decided in the words of Obama, "to prepare by the end of this year a legally binding and sufficiently bold" new nuclear arms control agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires in December. It was provisionally planned that during Obama's visit to Moscow beginning on July 6, a framework agreement outlining a new START treaty will be endorsed (EDM, April 9).

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BLOG: Georgian MP Identifies Expat Oligarch in Russia as a Financier of a Failed Coup (jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com)

An influential member of the Parliament of Georgia and the chairman of its Committee on Defense and Security, Givi Targamadze made a number of revelatory remarks during the weekly program Position on the Rustavi 2 television channel late on May 22. Targamadze claimed that the failed mutiny at the Mukhrovani military base on May 5 was sponsored by Alexander Ebralidze, an oligarch of Georgian descent, who has been living in Russia for the past three decades and who is also known to have personal ties to the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In particular, Targamadze noted >>>

NEW BLOG: Jamestown Foundation Blog (jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com)

Jamestown Foundation Blog
Timely analysis and commentary of geopolitical developments in Eurasia

ANALYSE: "Nashi" Foray into Georgia Stopped in Time (jamestown.org)

Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 74
April 17, 2009 02:12 PM Age: 3 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Vlad’s Corner, Georgia, Military/Security, Featured
By: Vladimir Socor

On April 16, Georgian authorities prevented the Kremlin-coordinated youth group, Nashi, from provoking incidents at the South Ossetia demarcation line and in Tbilisi. A convoy of five vehicles carrying 20 Nashi activists, the "Moscow-Tskhinvali-Tbilisi Motorcade," had set off from Moscow on April 10, reaching Tskhinvali (via the Roki Tunnel) on April 15, and planned to continue into Tbilisi or, alternatively, stage an incident at the demarcation line.Georgian Internal Affairs Minister personnel detained Nashi "commissar" Aleksandr Kuznetsov in a hotel in the city of Gori, situated in Georgia's interior near the demarcation line, during the night of April 15-16. Kuznetsov's video recorded statements, excerpted on Georgian television channels (Rustavi-2 TV, Imedi TV, April 16) overlap with Nashi spokesmen's statements in Moscow at the motorcade's start (Interfax, RIA Novosti, April 10).
Kuznetsov told Georgian interrogators that he was en route to Tbilisi for consultations with local contacts about the logistics of the group's crossing into Georgian-controlled territory, moving on to Tbilisi, finding accommodation in the city, and designating a venue for a public stunt by Nashi amid the anti-government demonstrations in Tbilisi. The convoy was to reach Tbilisi by the evening of April 16.

BLOG: The Tattered Sweater (robertamsterdam.com)

"What doesn't seem to be much appreciated is that the main problem isn't really Georgia. It's that Georgia is the thread hanging off the tattered sweater; you pull it, and the sweater falls apart."

This quote, from Steve LeVine in BusinessWeek, introduces a new Jamestown Foundation report on the strategic implications of the 2008 war in Georgia on the Black Sea/Caspian region, NATO, and the U.S. and Europe in general. The gist of the report is that "In the long run, Russia may face very serious problems of separatism on its own territory due to Russia's recognition of the breakaway provinces of Georgia. Given these uncertainties, it may be natural to expect that there will be stronger drive to get away from: 1) dependency on Russian energy in Europe; and 2) dependency on Russian transit infrastructure in Caspian /Central Asia region. In the long run, that may be reflected by Russia's weakened strategic position in Europe and Central Asia."

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REPORT: The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor (jamestown.org)

Publication: Volume: 0 Issue: 0
March 3, 2009 05:19 PM Age: 20 hrs
Category: Report, Georgia
By: Mamuka Tsereteli

*Click here to view the full PDF of this report

Executive Summary

The August 2008 war in the Caucasus revealed the new strategic realities that have emerged in the Black Sea / Caspian Region in recent years. These realities have been driven by overly ambitious Russian policies and have weakened Western strategic interests in the region. The conditions created immediately after the war appeared more favorable to Russia and less favorable to other nations in the region, most notably Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Ukraine.

But the world economic crisis and its impact on Russia, as well as the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009, have diminished Russia’s gains and further damaged Russia’s reputation as a reliable energy supplier to Europe. In the long run, Russia may face very serious problems of separatism on its own territory due to Russia’s recognition of the breakaway provinces of Georgia. Given these uncertainties, it may be natural to expect that there will be stronger drive to get away from: 1) dependency on Russian energy in Europe; and 2) dependency on Russian transit infrastructure in Caspian /Central Asia region. In the long run, that may be reflected by Russia’s weakened strategic position in Europe and Central Asia.

The August war in Georgia demonstrated some risks associated with the functioning of the transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. It also demonstrated the need for broader security guarantees for a region that is vital to European and global energy security. The most important finding of the paper is that while the corridor has a tremendous potential to augment its transit capabilities with new pipelines, railroads, marine and air ports, the security of the South Caucasus transportation corridor cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, Western countries will need to ensure stability and security in the region in order for the corridor to meet its full potential.

The Russian invasion of Georgia established new strategic realities in Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia. It was the culmination of Russia’s impressive comeback in Eastern-European and Central-Eurasian affairs that has occurred in response to high energy prices, a weak US strategic position, European division and uncertainty in Turkey’s strategies. The war made clear that Russia is willing to use force to deepen and promote its interests, while western powers are not. This fact was predictable, but not certain to some. The war in Georgia helped firmly establish this reality and may also indicate that even NATO members may not be fully protected by their commitment to that organization. As the Russia-Georgia conflict demonstrates, military force has once again become a major factor in Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, economic provisions and energy incentives are still the primary tools employed by Russia to further its foreign policy interests abroad.

At the same time, the weak Western response to Russia actions may send the wrong signal to the Russian leadership about the level of freedom it has to use force in what Russia considers its sphere of influence. Furthermore, the weak economy and the declining popularity of Russian leaders may create internal instability within Russia and tempt Russian leaders to once again utilize force to further their objectives. Europe and the United States need to carefully consider their policy response to such scenarios.

Another major finding of this paper is that energy is an important factor in the stability of any country and, in Georgia’s case, domestic energy security is also the foundation for stability of transit, and development of the entire regional infrastructure. The physical damage to the infrastructure and the environment in Georgia as a result of the war was tangible but not large. The damage to Georgia’s transportation system is repairable in a relatively short period of time. The pipelines are gradually approaching pre-conflict volumes of the oil and natural gas shipments although the shipments via railway, ports, and air have all shown signs of decline. Instead, the key problem emerged with the malfunctioning of the largest energy facility in the country - the Enguri hydro power plant.

The reservoir for the power plant is located on Georgian-controlled territory while the actual electricity production plant is located on Abkhaz/Russian controlled territory. The Georgian leadership had to make a very difficult political decision in accepting the offer of the Russian company Inter RAO (the subsidiary of the giant Russian state-owned energy monopoly Inter RAO United Energy Systems (UES)) on joint operation of the power plant. While there is a positive history of activities of the Inter RAO UES in Georgia, the Russian state-owned company’s control of a key electricity supplier for the entire country is not the best political and economic security outcome for Georgia.

Lastly, the paper argues that the initial damage that the war inflicted upon the political reliability of the transit corridor is gradually diminishing and that new opportunities are emerging. The complete reversal of this damage can be possible but will depend on U.S. and EU policy, the role of Turkey, internal stability in the Caucasus region, and Russian policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It is important to remember that when the initial decision to revitalize the energy corridor through Georgia and Azerbaijan was made in the mid 1990s, the security environment was extremely difficult and there was no infrastructure to support shipment of oil through the corridor, yet leadership of the United States and Turkey supported that decision and helped to implement it. Today’s environment is much more favorable considering the functioning infrastructure and greater demand for Caspian energy.

New natural gas discoveries in Turkmenistan and the next stage in oil and gas developments in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan will require additional export capacity and a tough battle is ahead between the different export options, each supported by state sponsors with competing interests. It is significant in this context that Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on November 14, 2008, to develop a Trans-Caspian oil transportation that will include onshore oil pipeline in Kazakhstan and a tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea to ship Kazakh oil to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and on to the world markets. As it was indicated at the Budapest summit devoted to the Nabucco pipeline project on January 27, significant progress has been made on the development of a natural gas link between the Caspian and Europe, and Georgia has an important role to play.

These developments indicate that the energy producing countries of the region are determined to seek the diversification of export options, but they need to be supported by the United States, and in particular European, NATO, or Turkish security guarantees. After all, Western Europe and Turkey are the major consumers and beneficiaries of Caspian energy resources.

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Files:

Full_Mamuka_RussiaGeorgia.pdf

BLOG: Russia's Coming War with Georgia

Stories with this headline are doing the rounds, mostly originating in remarks made by Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian military analyst who writes in Novaya Gazeta. He gave regular warnings about Russian troop build-ups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia before last year's August war, so perhaps his warnings should be headed.

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REPORT: The Changing Landscape of Islam in North Ossetia (jamestown.org)

Publication: North Caucasus Weekly Volume: 10 Issue: 7

February 20, 2009 04:10 PM Age: 4 days

Category: North Caucasus Weekly, The Caucasus, North Caucasus

By: Mikhail Roshchin

One of the militants who participated in the September 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis—Vladimir Khodov—was a resident of the North Ossetian village of Elkhotovo. He was an ethnic Russian who converted to Islam and later worked as a cook in the detachment of Chechen militants led by Ruslan Gelaev. Khodov moved to North Ossetia in his childhood in 1979, when his mother, a resident of the Ukrainian town of Berdyansk, married Anatoly Khodov, an Elkhotovo native and an Ossetian. Who Khodov’s real father was is unknown, but he was raised in an Ossetian village by an Ossetian stepfather. The village of Elkhotovo is predominantly Muslim. The local mosque was built in 1902. According to village residents, Anatoly Khodov was a former military man who was respected and whose family was relatively well-off.

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ARTICLE: Russia's Coming War with Georgia (jamestown.org)

Could this Obama's test that Biden predicted?

Six months after the French-brokered agreement ended the Russo-Georgia war on August 12, 2008 the ceasefire continues to be fragile with constant incidents that both sides describe as "provocations." Last month the Defense Ministry of the separatist South Ossetia said Georgia was moving troops towards its border (RIA-Novosti, January 9). This week the South Ossetian authorities again accused Georgia of "increasing preparations to begin an aggression" and firing two RPG-7 shells at the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali and accused EU observers that monitor the Georgian side of the ceasefire line of turning a blind eye to the alleged Georgian military buildup. On January 26, Tbilisi signed an agreement with the EU observer mission to limit its armed presence near South Ossetia and Abkhazia to one battalion (500 men) and exclude all heavy weapons. The South Ossetian authorities called this agreement a sham to cover "the preparation of an aggression" (Interfax, February 9).


The EU monitors in turn say they found no evidence of Georgian troop concentrations near South Ossetia or Abkhazia, or preparations for military action. The EU observer mission announced it would be willing to investigate Ossetian accusations of Georgia's shelling of Tskhinvali, if it is granted access to the city (Novosti-Gruzia, February 11). This week the South Ossetian police detained two OSCE observers for "illegally crossing into South Ossetian territory" and after three hours expelled them to Georgian-controlled territory. The OSCE protested that the incident had "violated the diplomatic status of the observers." Tbilisi called the incident a "provocation." The South Ossetian authorities accusing the OSCE and EU observers of siding with Georgia, said they were "systematically crossing into South Ossetia and increasing tension in the region." Since last August, foreign observers are not allowed to enter South Ossetia. The authorities in Tskhinvali say they may allow the OSCE back in only after its recognition of South Ossetia's sovereignty (Interfax, February 11).


After the war with the central authorities in Tbilisi in 1991-1992 during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, separatist South Ossetia continued to be geographically and economically part of Georgia. The borders were open and trade was brisk. Ossetians and the Georgians living in South Ossetia were earning a living on transit trade and contraband through Ossetia into Russia. Now the transit trade is dead and the depleted population of South Ossetia, from where the ethnic Georgians have been ethnically cleansed, is surviving on only limited aid. The only mountain road from South Ossetia to Russia, as always during winter, has been closed by snow for weeks (RIA-Novosti, January 7).


South Ossetia, isolated and with its "independence" unrecognized by the international community, is in crisis. This may explain the constant bellicose statements coming from Tskhinvali: renewed military confrontation may seem the only way to end the unacceptable status quo, established by the August 12 ceasefire.


The belligerence of the separatists is actively supported by Moscow, which has its own reasons to detest the status quo. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced, "Russia is concerned about Georgian troop concentrations near the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia" (RIA-Novosti, January 16). EU assurances that there is no "troop concentration" are not accepted. This week the Russian permanent representative in the OSCE, Anvar Azimov, announced, "The Georgians are concentrating troops and heavy weapons, building new bases and checkpoints." Azimov accused the EU observers of impotence and illegally trying to move their operations into Abkhazia and South Ossetia (RIA-Novosti, February 11).


The ceasefire last August has left the strategically important Russian base in Armenia cut off with no overland military transit connections. The number of Russian soldiers in Armenia is limited to some 4000, but during 2006 and 2007 large amounts of heavy weapons and supplies were moved in under an agreement with Tbilisi from bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki (Georgia). At present there are some 200 Russian tanks, over 300 combat armored vehicles, 250 heavy guns and lots of other military equipment in Armenia - enough to fully arm a battle force of over 20,000 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, August 20, 2004). Forces in Armenia can be swiftly expanded by bringing in manpower by air transport from Russia. Spares to maintain the armaments may also be shipped in by air, but if a credible overland military transit link is not established within a year or two, there will be no possibility to either replace or modernize equipment. The forces will consequently degrade, undermining Russia's commitment to defend its ally Armenia and Moscow's ambition to reestablish its dominance in the South Caucasus.


Azerbaijan has accused Russia of handing over to the Armenian military Russian armament holdings on Armenian territory: including 21 tanks, 44 CAVs, 30 guns, other military equipment and munitions (http://www.bakililar.az/, January 10). The Azeris have rejected Russian denials (Interfax, January 20). It is clear that Azerbaijan will not permit military transit into Armenia and Georgia will not do so without serious concessions from Russia on Abkhazia and South Ossetia.


While snow covers the Caucasian mountain passes until May, a renewed war with Georgia is impossible. There is hope in Moscow that the Georgian opposition may still overthrow Mikheil Saakashvili's regime or that the Obama administration will somehow remove him. However, if by May, Saakashvili remains in power, a military push by Russia to oust him may be seriously contemplated. The constant ceasefire violations could escalate to involve Russian servicemen - constituting a public casus belli. The desire by the West to "reset" relations with Moscow, putting the Georgia issue aside, may be interpreted as a tacit recognition of Russia's right to use military force.

—Pavel Felgenhauer

Source:
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34493&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=36bb337090

ARTICLE: Moscow Sends the West Friendly Signals While Relations with Georgia Worsen (jamestown.org)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 19

January 29, 2009 11:57 AM Age: 3 days

Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Russia, Military/Security, Home Page, Featured

By: Pavel Felgenhauer

On January 28 Interfax news agency quoted an unnamed official in the Russian Defense Ministry that plans to deploy Iskander SS-26 missiles in the Kaliningrad region, which borders NATO member nations Poland and Lithuania, have been halted. Last November President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to station the SS-26s in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. plans to deploy missile defense (MD) interceptors in Poland and MD radar in the Czech Republic. The row over the MD shield in Europe has helped drag down relations between Moscow and Washington to their lowest level since the end of the Cold War, but Russian officials have recently been sending signals that a positive shift in relations is possible with the new Barak Obama administration in the United States. Obama spoke to Medvedev by telephone on January 26, and the two are reported to have agreed to stop the "drift" in their bilateral relations. According to Interfax, "the implementation of plans to deploy the SS-26 in Kaliningrad has been halted in connection with the fact that the new U.S. administration is not rushing through plans to deploy [a missile defense system] in Poland and the Czech Republic" (Interfax, January 28).

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