HEARING: The Caucasus: Frozen conflicts and closed borders

US House Foreign Affairs Committee, 18 June
Opening Statement by Chairman Howard L. Berman at hearing, “The Caucasus: Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders”

Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea lie the countries of the Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Due to disputes that have festered over the course of many years, there are enough compelling questions involving these three countries and their neighbors to occupy us all day long. During the course of this hearing I’d like to focus on the frozen conflicts affecting economic and political integration in the region, and how U.S. foreign policy is responding to them.
I’d like to start with one of the most puzzling and problematic matters: the Turkish land blockade of Armenia, in place since 1993. It’s a punishing policy that holds the Armenian economy back and enormously increases the cost of much of Armenia’s trade with other nations.
The land blockade is also, quite possibly, illegal, as it seems to breach Turkey’s undertaking in the 1922 Treaty of Kars to keep its border-crossings with Armenia open. And it violates the spirit of the World Trade Organization, of which both Turkey and Armenia are members.
It’s baffling why Ankara would want to pursue this land blockade, which also harms the economy of eastern Turkey, and is therefore clearly contrary to its own interests. It’s no secret that many Turkish businessmen, especially in the east, have been lobbying for lifting the land blockade.
It also seems manifestly contrary to the strategic interests of Turkey, which purports to be a solid member of the Western alliance. Without an outlet to Turkey or Azerbaijan, Armenia is forced to rely on its connections to two of Turkey’s historical rivals, Russia and Iran – and given how antithetical the Iranian regime is to the secular, modern Turkish government, it seems odd that Ankara would want to undertake any actions that will enhance Tehran’s influence in Yerevan.
Furthermore, the land blockade has done absolutely nothing to persuade Armenia to alter its policies on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue – the ostensible cause of the land blockade in the first place. Nor is there any prospect that it will do so. Armenia has demonstrated its resolve to support the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is more likely to win influence with the Armenian government if it pursues a policy of good-neighborliness than if it slams the border closed.
Why hasn’t the State Department – which opposes the land blockade – spoken out more forcefully on this matter? Certainly it’s in our interest to diminish Iran’s influence among its neighbors, not to enhance it. Ambassador Fried, I’m hoping you’ll lay out for us the steps our government has taken and is taking to convince our ally Turkey to end, once and for all, this counter-productive practice of closed borders.
And by no means is Turkey Armenia’s only problem in the region. I’m deeply concerned by the series of increasingly bellicose statements made over the past year about Nagorno-Karabakh by senior Azerbaijani officials, as well as the steady increase in Azerbaijan’s defense budget as that nation acquires more oil wealth. The serious breakdown earlier this year in the 14-year-old cease-fire has been widely blamed on Azerbaijani provocations. Mr. Ambassador, how do you see this situation, and what is the status of negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh?
Turning to Georgia, in recent weeks, we’ve seen increasingly aggressive Russian behavior toward the region of Abkhazia: Moscow has established official ties with the separatist government there, issued passports and citizenship to its residents, dispatched a Russian jet to down a Georgian reconnaissance craft, and deployed railway troops to the region under dubious pretenses.
It was dispiriting to hear the new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, dismiss offers of foreign mediation of this conflict during his first official meeting in early June with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvilli. Although the United States and the European Union expressed support for the Georgian President’s peace initiatives during their recent summit in Slovenia, follow-up efforts by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and your deputy Matt Bryza to encourage peace talks have garnered little traction. Mr. Ambassador, what steps will this Administration take in the coming months to help prevent further escalation of this conflict?
And do you support calls for the Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping force to be replaced by a neutral EU contingent as one means of mitigating the conflict? And finally, I’d like to address an issue with long-term implications for U.S. foreign policy throughout the region: the prospect of democratization and political development in the South Caucasus. Lately in the wake of elections in the region, there has been a worrying trend of large-scale protests and forceful police reaction. This explosive combination has the effect of silencing the opposition and strengthening ruling political regimes in a region that is still struggling to establish its democratic credentials.
Last fall, the Georgian government imposed a sweeping state of emergency following demonstrations by thousands of protesters over a government that appeared out of touch with the people. Armenia experienced violent clashes that left eight people dead following March presidential elections. And Azerbaijan could suffer a similar fate during its presidential elections in October, as the government is already cracking down on the media and opposition.
Mr. Ambassador, we would welcome your assessment of the democratic prospects of these countries, which are of such great strategic importance to the United States. Given unstable regimes and considerable political acrimony, what is the potential for fostering sustainable dialogue on a multi-party, parliamentary level? I would also be grateful if you could address the question of how the U.S. administration is holding these governments accountable for human rights abuses, while at the same time working to achieve lasting peace between them.
It’s a tall order; we don’t have all the time in the world to address all the matters we’d like to today, so I’m going to stop at this point and turn to my colleague and friend Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking member of the committee, for any comments she may wish to make.

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Testimony of Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the situation in the South Caucasus region of Europe.

Let me begin with a characterization of the overall historical context. In 1989, a wave of democracy began sweeping eastward from its origins in Central Europe. Starting that year, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe threw off the failed systems of the past and invested their hopes and energies in a future of democratic, free market societies well-integrated with the transatlantic community. The results were so astonishing and successful that it is hard today to recall the divided Europe of less than a generation past. Europe in its narrower definition, with the partial exception of the Balkans, is now united and integrated through either membership or close association with the European Union or NATO, or both. The question remains, however, about the reach of this wave of freedom and democracy. Will it, and can it, extend to the easternmost reaches of Wider Europe?
The issue of whether the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian, the south Caucasus, can in fact join Europe and its institutions is being contested as we speak.
The policy of the United States in this region is unambiguous: we want to help the nations of this region travel along the same path toward freedom, democracy and market-based economies that so many of their neighbors to the West have traveled. We believe that the ultimate place of these nations – which are, after all, a part of Wider Europe – ought to depend on their own choice and their own success, or lack of success, in meeting the standards of democracy, the rule of law, and responsible foreign and regional policies that the transatlantic community has established. We do not believe that any outside power – neither Russia nor any other – should have a sphere of influence over these countries; no outside power should be able to threaten, pressure, or block the sovereign choice of these nations to join with the institutions of Europe and the transatlantic family if they so choose and we so choose.
Georgia has made a choice to join NATO. The United States and the nations of NATO welcome this choice, and Georgia’s neighbors should respect it. Azerbaijan has chosen to develop its relations with NATO at a slower pace, and we respect its choice. Armenia’s situation is different, due to its history and currently complicated relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and we respect its choice as well.
To be sure, these nations and Russia need to have good neighborly relations, based on a regard for one another’s interests and just basic geographic proximity, but also based on respect for the sovereignty of the nations of the South Caucasus, and, in particular, their right to find their own way in the world. The United States does not see itself in some 19th century contest with Russia for “influence,” much less a sphere of influence in this region or any region. This is not zero-sum. All countries – the countries of the South Caucasus, Russia, and the transatlantic community – would benefit from a set of benign relations among all the players, great and small, in the South Caucasus. To be blunt: the United States does not seek to exclude Russia from this region. That would be neither wise nor possible.
In looking at the region as a whole, our strategic interests are focused on several issues: the advance of freedom and democracy; security, including counterterrorism and peaceful resolution of separatist conflicts; and energy. Our first strategic interest I have already described—the spread of freedom and democracy beyond the Black Sea and toward the Caspian. Each of the Caucasus countries has made important strides in this area, but each has further to go before we can say it has irrevocably chosen this path.
On the second interest, we are working with each of these governments to find peaceful ways of dealing with the separatist conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia that stem from the breakup of the Soviet Union. We are also cooperating with each government in the global fight against terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and biological.
On the third issue, we believe it is in the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community that Caspian gas and oil resources reach European and global markets expeditiously, free from monopolistic pressures and geographic chokepoints.
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are ancient nations, but they are still new as nation states. They are navigating a double transition: they must throw off the failed communist institutions of the past and build new ones to replace them, including in many cases entirely new systems – such as modern banking and financial systems to support their newly free economies – where none existed before. The legacy of Soviet communist institutions and poor governance is a burden; as are the historical issues of ethnic strife that were exacerbated by the Soviet experience. On top of this, these countries are building new identities as modern, sovereign nation-states.
Despite sharing some common challenges, each of these three countries has taken its own path in addressing these challenges, and the picture on the ground in each country is mixed.
I would like to discuss these three states in turn, both the challenges they face, and our efforts to support them.

Georgia
Before the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia was often described as a country near collapse – a “failed state.” Since the Rose Revolution, however, Georgia has enjoyed rapid growth and a marked decline in corruption. The World Bank named Georgia “the world’s leading economic reformer” in its 2007 “Doing Business” report, and Georgia is now rated by the World Bank as the 18th easiest country in the world in which to do business, placing it ahead of many EU member states. The Georgian government has initiated judicial reform, established fair standards of entrance into universities, and made exemplary progress in combating trafficking in persons.
Georgia’s challenge at home is to build strong democratic institutions and processes to match its commitment to economic and commercial reform. Notwithstanding progress on democratization since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has work to do, and the events this past fall marked a setback for democracy in Georgia. Large segments of the Georgian public expressed serious dissatisfaction during protest rallies in September, October, and November. This dissatisfaction stemmed from a combination of continuing poverty and unemployment, a sense the Georgian government had grown disconnected from certain segments of society, and anger over a political system that seemed to be structured to prevent the development of a vibrant opposition.
On November 7, Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs forcibly dispersed protestors camped out in the vicinity of Parliament and later that day the government imposed a State of Emergency. In several confrontations that day police clashed with protestors elsewhere in Tbilisi. The U.S. government condemned the imposition of a state of emergency, the closure of the independent Imedi television station, and what appeared to be the use of excessive force by the Georgian government against protestors.
President Saakashvili addressed the crisis by taking an unusual step, calling for a snap presidential election on January 5 that shortened his term by a year. The conduct of the presidential election, in which incumbent President Saakashvili narrowly won a first-round victory, was regarded by OSCE and other observers as an improvement over previous elections, but flawed, and thus did not fully restore Georgia’s democratic reputation. Georgian leaders and citizens will long argue over whether irregularities skewed the outcome of the election. Our assessment, after careful consideration by our Embassy, was that – absent evidence to the contrary – Mikheil Saakashvili had been legitimately re-elected, but that election irregularities had to be remedied prior to spring parliamentary elections if Georgia were to restore the faith of its voters and the international community in the country’s democratic trajectory.
While we have not yet seen the OSCE’s final report on the May 21 parliamentary elections, our assessment at this point is that they were a marked improvement over the January balloting. According to the preliminary assessment of international observers, including the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and NATO and the European Parliament, the election in Georgia offered the people an opportunity to choose their representatives from a wide array of choices. Georgian officials made efforts to conduct elections according to OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections.
Despite the improvements, international and domestic monitors identified a number of problems during the campaign and balloting. For example, before the elections there were allegations of voter intimidation and a lack of balance in the media, and questions about fair adjudication of complaints. We have urged the Georgian authorities to investigate all allegations of irregularities and to work with all sides to address the challenges and shortcomings identified by international and domestic observers. There are charges of violence against opposition members which we have encouraged the government to investigate expeditiously and to make the results of that investigation public.
The United Opposition has claimed that the elections were outright stolen. While we find this argument unconvincing, the Georgian body politic remains deeply polarized. As a result, Georgian democracy continues to lack a necessary element – a credible and viable opposition – and the United National Movement and the United Opposition share the blame for this shortcoming. Without a viable opposition, an empowered, independent parliament and strong, credible judiciary, and a reform process that respects dissenting voices, democracy will not be consolidated.
To sum up: Georgia’s young democracy has made progress, but Georgia needs to make more progress if it is to live up to the high standards that it has set for itself. The United States will help as it can to support democratic reform, urging the Georgian authorities to take seriously their ambition to reach European standards of democracy.
While Georgia’s domestic political development has proceeded, Georgia’s ability to find regional and international security is at risk. Georgia has expressed its desire to join NATO, part of its overall effort to join the European and transatlantic family. As it has done so, Georgia has been subjected to unremitting and dangerous pressure from Russia, including over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and, to a lesser degree, South Ossetia. Georgian political mistakes in the early 1990s led to conflicts in these regions, and the separatists, with Russian military support, won. The Abkhaz, who comprised only 17 percent of that region’s inhabitants before the war, drove out virtually all the ethnic Georgians, about 250,000 people, or nearly half of the pre-war population. The legacy of these wars has been a displaced persons problem that has placed heavy economic, social and political burdens on Georgia, and the unresolved nature of these conflicts is a major inhibitor of stability and security in Georgia.
Moscow has in recent years put economic and political pressure on Georgia: closing their common border; suspending air and ground transport links; and imposing embargoes against exports of Georgian wine, mineral water, and agricultural goods. This year, despite recently lifting some of the economic and transport embargoes, Moscow has intensified political pressure by taking a number of concrete steps toward a de facto official relationship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russian peacekeeping forces have been deployed since the early 1990s – up to 3,000 in Abkhazia, and 500 Russians plus 500 North Ossetians in South Ossetia. In March, Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia, which would allow Russia potentially to provide direct military assistance (though the Russian government has offered assurances that it will continue to adhere to military sanctions). On April 16, then-President Putin issued instructions calling for closer ties between Russian ministries and their Abkhaz and South Ossetian counterparts. Russian investors are known to be buying property in Abkhazia in disregard of Georgian law. Some of these properties may have belonged to displaced persons, making their eventual return even more difficult. Russian banks maintain correspondent relationships with unlicensed and virtually unregulated Abkhaz banks, an open invitation to money launderers.
Besides political pressure, Russia has also increased military pressure. Russian officials and military personnel have been seconded to serve in the separatist governments and armed forces. Two Russian officers were killed last September leading a unit of Abkhaz troops in a firefight with a Georgian unit. Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia are specifically mandated to facilitate the return of refugees, but there has been no net return of Georgians to Abkhazia in over a decade.
On April 20, a Russian fighter shot down a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia; a UN investigation confirmed that a Russian fighter was responsible. Russia also has increased its military posture in Abkhazia without consultation with the Government of Georgia. In April, without consulting Georgia, Russia sent highly-trained airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia as part of its peacekeeping force, and in May Russia dispatched construction troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.
We are very concerned about these actions, which challenge Georgia’s territorial integrity and have increased tensions in the separatist regions. They risk igniting a wider conflict and call into question Russia’s role as a peacekeeper and facilitator of negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively.
The United States has called on Moscow to reverse its unconstructive actions and actively facilitate with us and others a diplomatic process to resolve these conflicts. We could start from the peace plan proposed by President Saakashvili and that Prime Minister Putin has publicly supported. Georgia, for its part, must continue to resist the temptation of a military reaction or unwise political demands, even in the face of repeated provocations. President Saakashvili has wisely offered to negotiate with the Abkhaz leadership wide autonomy for Abkhazia, an offer that has support in many European capitals and from the United States. Europe and the United States are working together to support a peaceful approach to the Abkhaz problem. We continue to steadfastly support Georgia’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. We want to work with Russia in this effort, and Russia, if it chooses, could play a constructive role in a settlement that took account of both the parties’ interests.
The increase of Russian pressure against Georgia comes in the context of Georgia’s transatlantic aspirations, particularly its attempt to secure a Membership Action Plan (MAP) from NATO. The United States and most NATO members strongly supported a MAP for both Georgia and Ukraine at the April NATO Summit in Bucharest – and I wish to note appreciation for bipartisan support for this effort from many Members of Congress. Although there was no consensus at Bucharest for a MAP invitation, NATO’s leaders stated flatly in the final communiqué from the summit that Georgia and Ukraine will become members. NATO foreign ministers will review Georgia’s and Ukraine’s MAP applications at their December meeting, and they are empowered to take this decision at that time.
Having accepted the principle of membership for Georgia and Ukraine, the United States believes that NATO should proceed at its next Ministerial meeting next December to offer them MAP. MAP is not NATO membership. But it is a way to help aspiring countries meet NATO’s requirements. Georgia has work to do before it is ready for NATO membership. But Georgia has distinguished itself both by the thoroughness of its military reforms and the deployability of its troops as well as by the progress that I noted earlier. Today, Georgia is the third-largest troop contributor in Iraq, with over 2,000 soldiers on the ground in Baghdad and Wasit Province. Georgia has agreed to extend its deployment and will continue to stand with Coalition Forces in Iraq. The Alliance should base its MAP decision on these objective factors – holding Georgia to high standards, and not allowing Russia to exercise a veto over an Alliance decision.

Conclusion
The countries that I have described are diverse both in their histories and in the challenges that they face today. America’s policy toward them has been steady, steadfast and supportive. The United States has consistently sought to advance the frontiers of freedom in Europe. This has been a bipartisan policy of the last three presidents. We will continue this policy by working together with Russia and the nations of Europe toward the goal of peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and creating an environment that will allow the countries I have described to join the Euro-Atlantic community if they wish to do so, and if they meet NATO and European Union requirements.
We support an open world, without monopolies, spheres of influence, or great power domination, in all aspects of development, from the energy and economic sectors to political life. With a set of consistent polices designed to support that end, we will pass on to the next administration a solid platform on which to build in this region in the future.
At the beginning, I described how a wave of freedom and democracy swept eastward after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We believe that wave is still on the move, and it will continue to advance as long as we promote the cause of freedom, democracy, and prosperity.

Thank you. I look forward to responding to your questions.