Marcus Papadopoulos warns Western backing for Mikheil Saakashvili could mean further conflict in the Caucasus
THE great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin wrote in his poem The Fountain of Bakhchisarai: “I know how to use a dagger/I was born in the Caucasus.” The war in South Ossetia last year, together with the ongoing tension in the region, aggravated by the presence of great power rivalries, demonstrates that Pushkin’s observation of this part of the world is as pertinent now as it was when he was writing in 1823.
On the day of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics last summer, the world’s attention was distracted by Georgia’s invasion of its secessionist republic of South Ossetia. The fighting which followed, after Russia launched a military counter-offensive in support of Tbilisi’s rebel region and which resulted in Russian armoured units entering Georgia proper and destroying the country’s capacity for war, was portrayed by most Western governments and media outlets as evidence of “old-time Russian imperialism in action”. Historical comparisons were drawn with Moscow’s actions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
As was the case during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Western commentators adopted stances on a complex conflict the history of which few understood. Today, however, even Western governments which maintain close relations with Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili have conceded that, in the words of former American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Tbilisi “fired the first shots in the breakaway region of South Ossetia”. After having been shown evidence of war crimes committed by Georgian forces during their advance on Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband described Georgia’s actions as “reckless” – a mild criticism, but one which at least recognised that the Georgian government was not as innocent as it had been portrayed.
In the years of the Soviet Union, its power ensured that historic animosities inherited from Tsarist Russia between the various people of the Caucasus were suppressed by an iron fist and through constant surveillance by the state’s secret police. The existence of a Soviet national identity also helped to bind people together, albeit in a fragile manner. In 1922, the Bolshevik government made South Ossetia an autonomous region of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1931, Soviet leader Josef Stalin transferred Abkhazia to the jurisdiction of Tbilisi.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world was witness to a series of conflicts in parts of the Caucasus with which even some members of the foreign-policymaking elite in Western capitals were not well acquainted.
In 1992, Violence flared between the Georgian government and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, after the latter two regions unilaterally declared independence from Georgia and sought closer ties, including reunification, with Russia. Fighting between Georgian and South Ossetian troops ceased in 1992 following the introduction of Russian peacekeeping units, while peace only prevailed in Abkhazia after Georgian forces were driven out in 1993.
The decision by the Georgian government to resort to force last year to try and resolve the issue of South Ossetia was largely a result of President Saakashvili’s waning popularity and the precarious nature of Georgia’s economy. Just as Argentina’s Leopoldo Galtieri chose to invade the Falkland Islands as a way of attempting to rally domestic support for his unpopular regime, so the Georgian president opted for the same course in the hope that it would ensure the survival of the Rose Revolution of 2003, which propelled him to power in the former Soviet republic.
On taking over from one-time Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze as Georgian president, Saakashvili made integration into the West and re-establishment of Tbilisi’s control over the breakaway regions of Adjaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia key priorities for his government. The US, which played a crucial role in bringing Saakashvili to power through similar means it had employed in the Serbian presidential election of October 2000, began to forge close political and military relations with the government of the American-trained lawyer.
Saakashvili has failed to fulfil his objectives, with the exception of regaining control of Adjaria. This, it should be noted, only returned to Tbilisi’s jurisdiction in 2004 once the Russian government had withdrawn its support for the breakaway region’s government headed by Aslan Abashidze.
Saakashvili inherited an economy which was one of the poorest of the former Soviet Union, with its gross domestic product and industrial production having declined rapidly. However, instead of focusing on rebuilding his country’s economy, the Georgian leader began to spend vast sums of money on armaments. Under Saakashvili, Georgia has become a highly militarised state in one of the most volatile areas in the world. Military spending has increased by 30 times since 2003 and much of the weaponry purchased has been of an offensive nature. It is now apparent that the Georgian president was intent from the beginning on using force to bring the country’s secessionist regions to heel. The US has supplied most of this equipment, although Israel has also sold unmanned aerial vehicles to Tbilisi. The increase in military expenditure has worsened Georgia’s economy, which has led to increasing resentment among much of the Georgian population towards its leader.
Saakashvili’s reckless handling of the economy has been eclipsed only by the dangerous course of foreign policy which he pursues. The Georgian leader has ruined relations with Moscow and created feelings of bitterness between Russians and Georgians – historically, fraternal people.
Under Saakashvili, Georgia has acted obsequiously in its relations with the US. His administration strives for Nato membership at all costs and is, according to some of the country’s opposition politicians, engaged in talks with American officials on the creation of rent-free US military bases in the Caucasian country. For Washington, bringing Georgia into Nato – a move which President Barack Obama has pledged to support – would be an important step towards placing a cordon sanitaire around Russia. However, for it would place ordinary Georgians in the direct line of fire from a resurgent and angry Russian state.
Saakashvili has also provoked the ire of the Kremlin by pursuing and encouraging anti-Russian activities within the Commonwealth of Independent States through the GUAM alliance – consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
Georgia has become a US client, although an unstable one. Saakashvili’s disastrous policies have already led to one war and have turned his country into a theatre of confrontation between Russia and America. However, the Georgian leader could not have achieved this without the backing of Washington. The endeavours of US policy-makers to contain Moscow’s global power and influence by surrounding the Russian Federation with a belt of Nato states has grave implications, not just for peace and stability in the Caucasus, but also in the wider world.
source: www.tribunemagazine.co.uk
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