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1. paper: "Outsourcing De Facto Statehood: Russia and the Secessionist Entities in Georgia and Moldova" [introduction]
Nicu Popescu
in Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe, Ed. Pamela Kilpadi, Budapest: OSI, pp. 87–100, 2007
http://www.policy.hu/ipf/policyperspectives/C09-NP-Statehood.pdf
Russia has been a player during and after the conflicts in the secessionist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Transnistrian region of Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. If before 2004 the Russian government was defensive about its role in these conflicts, by 2006 it has taken a more proactive position.
A 2000 assessment of the situation claimed that in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia’s objective is “to maintain rather than enlarge the Russian presence in the region. Moscow tries to save what it still has, rather than extend its political and military platzdarms in its southern neighborhood.” The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation stated that the top priority of its foreign policy was to “create favorable external conditions for steady development of Russia, for improving its economy.”
This is not the case anymore. In his 2005 annual address, President Vladimir Putin stated that it was “certain that Russia should continue its civilizing mission on the Eurasian continent.” In 2006 Dmitry Trenin argues that the Russian leadership “came to the conclusion that the withdrawal has ended, and it is time to counter-attack… it is time to re-establish a great power and that the CIS is the space where Russian economic, political, and informational dominance should be established.” Russian officialdom has decided that the international and domestic context is now ripe to start moving toward this goal. On the domestic front, authorities calculate that by building an image of a Russia under siege by Islamic terrorists and Western-inspired “orange” revolutionaries, the Russian public will rally around their policies.
The ‘new thinking’ of the Russian Federation was described in an essay for the Wall Street Journal by Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s minister of defence and deputy prime minister. He claimed that Russia’s two main challenges are “interference in Russia’s internal affairs by foreign states, either directly or through structures that they support... [and] violent assault on the constitutional order of some post-Soviet states.” No distinction is made between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and networks used to finance terrorist activities in Russia and Western-funded NGOs engaged in democracy promotion. Both are viewed as categories of foreign organizations that seek to destabilize Russia and its “allies.”
President Putin said in the aftermath of the Beslan siege that “the weak get beaten up.” This is the new prism through which Russia sees its international relations. International affairs are a fight, and in this fight Russia has to re-establish its regional dominance. Russian policies on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are indicators of this new trend and a means for testing a new foreign policy agenda. Quite logically, Russia’s new self-confidence has developed into a new activism that is clearly manifested in its policies towards the secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova.
In this essay, I attempt to map Russian policies addressing the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. Although these conflicts are not necessarily rooted in religion, their resolution would go a long way toward toning down the current level of overblown anti-Islamic official rhetoric in Russia, not to mention the growth of extremism in uncontrolled regions.
2. paper: "Conflict in Georgia: Religion and Ethnicity" [introduction]
Archil Gegeshidze
in Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe, Ed. Pamela Kilpadi, Budapest: OSI, pp. 62–69, 2007.
For over a decade Georgian authorities have attempted to characterize Georgia as a nation of extraordinary religious tolerance—a notion most vividly evidenced by Maidani, a patch of land in downtown Tbilisi where a Georgian Orthodox church stands nobly beside an Armenian Apostolic church, a synagogue and a mosque— a scene not uncommon elsewhere in the country. Nevertheless, Georgian modern history is riddled with ethnic conflict fueled by religious differences. Skeptics challenge the government’s assertion of a tolerant Georgia as a cynical, propagandistic trick of a central government striving to mold international public opinion in its favor, while at times pursuing ultra-nationalistic policies that infringe upon religious freedom. This is at least partially true. After losing two tug-of-wars with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, one of Georgia’s main policy objectives is to secure international support for the peaceful transfer of these territories back to Georgia. Furthermore, the country’s recent quest for a new identity has given rise to several dangerous popular convictions.
3. Smuggler’s Plot Highlights Fear Over Uranium
4. Russian Ambassador Returns To Georgia, But Sanctions Remain
5. Russian Ambassador Back in Tbilisi
6. Georgia ready for partnership, cooperation with Russia – PM
7. Georgian State Minister Visits Moscow
8. Action needed in Russia-Georgia ties normalisation-ambassador
9. Bezhuashvili: Tbilisi Wants More ‘Efficient Moves’ by Russia
10. Moving The Ambassador: Trying to get Saakashvili in the American trap
11. Georgia, Russia resume bilateral WTO talks
12.Talks Planned in Moscow on Resumption of Air Traffic
13. No signs yet Russia may let in Georgian products – Tbilisi
14. Georgia ready for partnership, cooperation with Russia – PM
15. Press Conference With National Strategy Institute Director Stanislav Belkovsky [excerpt]
16. Creaking Seats: Uncertain about their future, political elites enter into direct confrontation [excerpt]
17. Georgia prepares for talks with EU on trade, visa issues
18. Putin stresses Serbian integrity, reaffirms Kosovo precedent
19. Russia plays a devious game with Kosovo
20. Russia denies drawing up models for settlement of Georgia's separatist conflicts
21. Russia Denies Considering Status for S. Ossetia, Abkhazia
22. Georgian Foreign Minister Outlines Conflict Resolution Priorities
23. EU And Conflicts In Georgia
24. EU, OSCE to Cooperate ‘Intensively’ on Conflict Resolution
25. Saakashvili Comments on Secessionist Conflicts
26. Georgia will not stand rights violations in conflict zones – Saakashvili
27. Abkhaz Officials Denies ‘Tensions with Ethnic Armenians’
28. Abkhazia: Reaction of Solidarity
29. Increasing tensions but some progress in Abkhazia says Secretary General
30. UN Security Council Discusses Abkhazia
31. Abkhaz security officials: Georgian interior minister had meeting with warlords
32. Civilians in Gali District (Abkhazia) attacked again
33. Georgia says all UN resolutions on Abkhazia fulfilled
34. Russian officials in bid to end Georgian tuition in Abkhazia schools – TV
35. Georgian president rejects Abkhazia "status quo" ahead of UN debate
36. Separatist vice-president dismisses Georgian report of Abkhaz-Armenian rift
37. Duma hails Tbilisi's readiness to talk to Abkhazia
38. Georgia ready to return to talks, Abkhazia regards this a trick
39. Supporters of Ruling Party Trust Newscasts of Public Broadcasting and “Rustavi 2” Most of All
40. Tbilisi offers to host JCC session on Georgian-Ossetian settlement
41. State Minister Of Georgia Does Not Consider It Is Expedient To Hold Meeting Of Co- Chairmen Of JCC In Yerevan
42. Georgia, Czech company finalizing sale of energy facilities
43. Energo-pro poised to become the largest energy producer and distributor in Georgia
44. Ex-chief of Georgian gas corporation turns himself in
45. Kazakhstan signs oil export route memo
46. Georgia prepares for talks with EU on trade, visa issues
47. Georgia Prepares to Host PfP Air Maneuvers
48. Georgian Foreign Minister Visits Italy
49. New Mobile Operator Gears Up for Georgia Market
50. Georgia's war veterans, pensioners protest cancellation of benefits
51. Turkish ship detained in Georgian waters for alleged poaching
52. Tbilisi can sell Georgia Railway state's stake
53. Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs on Democracy and Development [excerpt]
54. New Construction Code to regulate building boom
55. Payback time for Georgia in 2007
56. Greece continues support for WFP's operations in Georgia
57. World Bank to take Georgia to account
58. Georgia moderately corrupt says Global Integrity
59. Missing National Library book recovered
60. Turnover in excise-less cigarettes decreases
Jonathan Kulick, Ph.D., Director of Studies, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 3a Chitadze, Tbilisi 0108, Georgia (Republic), jonathan.kulick@gfsis.org, office: +995 32 47 35 55, mobile: +995 95 33 33 40, USA voicemail: 310.928.6814
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