Showing posts with label Alexander Rondeli. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alexander Rondeli. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 10, 2009

POLITICS: Anatomy of Georgia’s current struggles (gbw.ge)

By Maia Edilashvili

With the Russian army still on Georgian territory and political forces becoming increasingly radical in their call for President Saakashvili’s resignation and early presidential and parliamentary elections, it is hard to predict which front will be harder for Georgia to tackle in 2009 – domestic or foreign.

Georgian Business Week spoke with Dr. Alexander Rondeli, President of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), to identify today’s key challenges and tasks for Georgia.


The lack of elite – major domestic concern

Ever since gaining independence [in 1991], Georgia has been struggling on two fronts – against its own mentality and a low political culture, and against external foes, which we all know well.

On the domestic front, our misery stems from the lack of a modern elite, capable to adapt to 21st century needs and help a small country survive. This is a legacy of lengthy Communist rule. Look at all the post-Soviet countries including Russia, and you will see we are not alone; luckily or unfortunately. Moreover, Georgia is a frontrunner in a struggle against that old mentality, and our state, I think, has come a long way compared with [what we had] in 1992 or even 2003 [at the time of the Rose Revolution].

Well, criticism is always helpful in making better decisions and I agree with the opposition in certain things, but the ways of opposing should certainly be more civilized. Both the government and opposition are sinning in this regard, and I would say that the [Saakashvili] government was more sinful at the beginning. It was the one that used to set rules alone, and in the end has found itself harmed.

Many of the independence years were spent in [separatist] wars and other domestic problems. This is too short a time for demythologization, for making realistic assessments, for building a new state and market economy, forming new social and cultural relations, and so on. Those thinking Georgia could have been better than it is now are wrong. Those thinking Georgia could have been a little bit better than it is now, I may agree with. But it’s still a matter of probability rather than a matter of possibility – it is difficult to say.


No early elections!

Why should the government quit? Is it because opposition leaders are unemployed and are in a hurry to get jobs? If you take a look at it from the perspective of statehood, it is urgently important to have a peaceful change of power in Georgia. None of our presidents have completed their terms. If we want to establish our name among civilized nations, we should start from learning patience and appreciating state interests and the constitution.

The president and parliament should complete their terms. And [the opposition] should carry on developing programs and winning over supporters. This hubbub [calling for early elections] has been enough and damages the Georgian state, both internally and internationally.

Though, I would say, the authorities should show better skills in communication and crisis management. Many [obsolete] structures have been destroyed by the authorities and it [Georgia] is no longer the Soviet Union or even post-Soviet. But I think there is a gap concerning communication, and, in some ways, authorities seem arrogant as well. This is mainly due to their [young] age maybe, but even more it is again because we still have no established elite, which needs two or three generations to achieve.

Trapped in the “vicious circle”

Very often we see that people in Georgia come to power in order to get rich and we have rich traditions in this [custom] inherited from the Communist rule.

Edward Mansfield, a researcher, studied a small community in southern Italy in the 50s and dubbed that society a “society of immoral families,” where people were expecting everything from the authorities, while scorning the government. They [the people] were doing nothing themselves but seeking to come to power in order to get material benefits, and when others came to power, the people assumed they [the newcomers] were only chasing private profits. It was unthinkable for them that people may come to power for the public good.

We too have this type of opportunistic thinking and clashes in Georgia. As long as this is a mainstream tendency, let’s be honest, we can’t go far. So we should build obstacles against this trend, such as transparency, free media, an independent judiciary, and so on; and make our best effort to find a way out of this “vicious circle.”

We should have stronger, more constructive, more rational opposition forces. Political disputes should not be focused on a policy of, “you go, I’ll do better.” Instead, they both [administration and opposition] should think about how to handle problems better, in cooperation, and with dialogue.

People in Georgia think cynically, that no one cares about them, and this is very alarming. So I think political forces should try to enjoy the respect and trust [they have gained] of the people. However, due to endless squabbles they risk losing it.


Westernization – only solution

Now, many speak of the idea of monarchism. I will say frankly, when at the start of the 21st century a country is afraid of a democracy, and sees survival in monarchy, it only suggests political impotency.

Georgia is a small country. Here, unless Russia invades us, it is impossible to impose a dictatorship as we are an open [nation]. The question is only about the quality of democracy.

For Georgia as a Christian country, which in fact lies in Europe, westernization is imminent, natural, and logical. This translates into more freedom for our citizens, more prosperity and wellbeing, as well as the viability of the nation as such.


Alpha and Omega of Russian reasoning

A simple thing is happening; though it is so important for the whole world that one can hardly dub it “simple,” and the fate of many countries, including Georgia, rely on that.

The fact is the U.S. remains the super power, but still fails to succeed in many regions – this is what happened in Georgia’s case. Russia has achieved what it wanted, maybe not completely, but for that very reason that there is now someone it has some respect for.

Against this background we see a new U.S. president assuming power. With Barack Obama coming from a social class from where no presidents can emerge in other societies, we witness a high flexibility in the U.S. This makes the U.S. attractive in the intentional arena, and many countries typically skeptical of Washington policy are now very enthusiastic. So the U.S. is likely to try taking advantage of this positive environment.

But China, also a big power, is becoming a challenger already, and it is clear we will see two dominant powers in the future either cooperating or clashing.

Russia’s role will be secondary, though it will remain very influential as a regional player with its huge nuclear capabilities.

Russia is doing its best to restore its mini imperia – the Soviet Union – with Belarus, Ukraine (or part of it), and the whole South Caucasus in mind. Once it seizes Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan will follow. Russia would not refuse capturing Kazakhstan either.

The Russian elite think that if this plan is achieved, they have a chance to regain or maintain first grade importance globally. To push this plan, Russia has no soft power, but it has money, and in Europe they spend quite generously, be it bribes, PR campaigns, or a well-tested “energy and pipeline policy.”

Russia thinks the west is a lazy impotent fat cat. So [Moscow] tries to gain benefits – like it did in the [August] war in the hope that [the West] would make some noise, but would then acquiesce to the situation. We see Russian authorities bluffing successfully to this end. They are trying to sell the war with Georgia to the West as “it happened, we couldn’t do anything” – but no one buys it today.

But we know that the Russian military elite is locked up in geopolitical ideas that were part of very popular thinking in the West at the beginning of the last century, especially in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and even in the Soviet Union, but no one would speak about this openly. In Russia, geopolitics is kind of a religion. But radical geopolitical reasoning is mixed with, I would call, religious fundamentalism and radical nationalism. These three components are Alpha and Omega for the Russian elite, intertwined with “energy and pipeline realism.” This cocktail is the key weapon of the modern Russian elite.

They seem successful. They had very far-reaching plans when waging war with Georgia. But the Georgian government pulled their army and police back in a timely manner, and Europe was quick – unusually quick – to interfere, and we prevented big geopolitical change.

Russia is now forced to stop, temporarily perhaps, on what they had achieved. It is hard to foresee if they will proceed, but it is worth it for them to try, because taking Georgia means taking the whole South Caucasus.

Yet, in the face of the financial crisis, I see Russia bargaining with the U.S. and Europe to get as many benefits as possible.


How far will the U.S. go to support Georgia?

U.S. politics is based both on values and interests, and the interests, I think, will be decisive – maintaining status quo in post-Soviet countries in the existing borders and not allowing Russia to restore imperia.

So here we and the U.S. share interests without any conspiracy theories. Georgia has an attractive location in this region wherein lies our hope for survival.

Let’s be realistic, the problem of restoring territorial integrity has been put off into the far future. But the key thing for us is to overcome the [financial] crisis without domestic cataclysms and retain the positive dynamism of development, as well as to ease the lives of that part of society that are suffering under hard social conditions.


Three strategic imperatives

In the meantime, our aspirations for NATO and the EU remain as two strategic imperatives. And there is one more element of our foreign policy as well – a partnership with the U.S. All political forces are unanimous in these three things and it is a very, very good sign.

Joining the EU has been a goal for the far future, even without the war and current circumstances. As for NATO, it may take longer but we will reach there. What is important is that those three key factors in our foreign policy work for the better future of Georgia.

source: Georgian Business Week

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

COMMENT: Schröder slams McCain on Georgia

By Kanishk Tharoor 19 - 08 - 08

The conventional wisdom has it that this month's eruption of violence between Russia and Georgia played squarely into the hands of John McCain. With pundits and hacks fulminating about a return to the Cold War, McCain has ratcheted up the rhetoric, supposedly sending a muscular to the Kremlin. He demanded that "Russia should immediately and unconditionally cease its military operations and withdraw all forces from sovereign Georgian territory." McCain, who has in the past called Vladimir Putin a "totalitarian dictator", went on to belittle the more cautious tone struck by the Obama campaign as "bizarrely in sync with Moscow." Such claims amount to preposterous misrepresentations of Obama's position and are calculated to appeal to the cruder, blustering passions of the American people. It's not just the benighted of the developing world, after all, that seek solace in their strongmen.

One of the many misfortunes of the flare up in the Caucasus is that an opportunity to probe more deeply into the roots of the conflict is being lost amidst the rhetoric of overheated Cold War nostalgists. For cooler, informed insight on the Russia-Georgia crisis, there are few better places to turn than to openDemocracy, which has long reported on Georgia's internal problems and the failures of Georgian nationalism on their own terms. Get up to speed with oD's Caucasus archive here.



The Georgia-Russia war of August 2008 carries a vital lesson: the small territories that broke from Georgia's control in the early 1990s have their own voice, identity, and interest. They must be active participants in deciding their own future, says George Hewitt, the leading scholar of Abkhazian linguistics and history.

The new Caucasus war exposes the problem of Georgia - and of western myths about the country

The Georgia-Russia war exposes some of the flaws in the idea of citizen journalism.

A messy conflict reflects collective forgetting. It's time to recall history, break the cycle, and build the future in Abkhazia and Georgia

Also on Abkhazia in openDemocracy:

Thomas de Waal & Zeyno Baran, "Abkhazia-Georgia, Kosovo-Serbia: parallel worlds?" (2 August 2006)

Thomas de Waal, "Abkhazia's archive: fire of war, ashes of history" (20 October 2006)

Nikolaj Nielsen, "A small bomb in Gali" (8 July 2008).

Among openDemocracy's articles on Georgian politics and the region:

Neal Ascherson, "Tbilisi, Georgia: the rose revolution's rocky road" (15 July 2005)

Donald Rayfield, "Georgia and Russia: with you, without you" (3 October 2006)

Robert Parsons, "Russia and Georgia: a lover's revenge" (6 October 2006)

Vicken Cheterian, "Georgia's arms race" (4 July 2007)

Donald Rayfield, "Russia and Georgia: a war of perceptions" (24 August 2007)

Alexander Rondeli, "Georgia: politics after revolution" (14 November 2007)

Robert Parsons, "Georgia's race to the summit" (4 January 2008)

Robert Parsons,"Mikheil Saakashvili's bitter victory" (11 January 2008)

Jonathan Wheatley, "Georgia's democratic stalemate" (14 April 2008)

Robert Parsons, "Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia: the war option" (13 May 2008)

Thomas de Waal, "The Russia-Georgia tinderbox" (16 May 2008)

Robert Parsons, "Georgia's dangerous gulf" (30 May 2008)

Alexander Rondeli, "Georgia's search for itself" (8 July 2008)

Thomas de Waal, "South Ossetia: the avoidable tragedy" (11 August 2008)

Ghia Nodia, "The war for Georgia: Russia, the west, the future" (12 August 2008)

Donald Rayfield, "The Georgia-Russia conflict: lost territory, found nation" (13 August 2008).

Thursday, November 15, 2007

ESSAY: Crisis Of Governance In Georgia

Georgia: politics after revolution, Alexander Rondeli

A series of events in Georgia in October-November 2007 - political infighting, mass demonstrations, the declaration of a state of emergency, and the announcement of presidential elections on 5 January 2008 (a year in advance of schedule) - has convulsed the country and earned it the kind of global media attention most of its citizens regret. Is this crisis part of the pain of a still-evolving democratic transition, or evidence of something more serious? An outline of the main contours of this...

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Alexander Rondeli is president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS)
Also by Alexander Rondeli openDemocracy:"Georgia: a rough road from the rose revolution" (4 December 2003

Among openDemocracy's many articles on Georgian politics:
Neal Ascherson, "Tbilisi, Georgia: the rose revolution's rocky road" (15 July 2005)
Donald Rayfield, "Georgia and Russia: with you, without you" (3 October 2006)
Robert Parsons, "Russia and Georgia: a lover's revenge" (6 October 2006)
George Hewitt, "Abkhazia: land in limbo" (10 October 2006)
Vicken Cheterian, "Georgia's arms race" (4 July 2007)
Donald Rayfield, "Russia and Georgia: a war of perceptions" (24 August 2007)

Ronald Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Indiana University Press, 1994)