ARTICLE: The lightness of history in the Caucasus. By Thomas de Waal (opendemocracy.net)

The Caucasus is often depicted as a region of peoples locked in enduring and invariant nationalist enmity. The reality is more complex and therefore more hopeful, says Thomas de Waal. (Thomas de Waal is a Senior Associate for the Caucasus at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.)

The south Caucasus is one of those places where people like to say that the “weight of history” lies heavily. Increasingly, I raise a dissenting voice. True, history lies all round you in this region, not least in its regular invocation by modern politicians. To name but one example: after his inauguration as president in January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili chose to travel to the tomb of the man widely regarded as Georgia’s greatest king, David the Builder, who reigned from 1089-1125.

But the idea that the call of history determines and drives the people of this region into intractable conflict must not be taken at face value. And sometimes history is only as weighty as you allow it to be. The more you look into the Caucasian past, the more it fractures into a mosaic of different narratives, many of them ones of cooperation as well as conflict. If we take a more sceptical - even postmodern - view of the history of this region, we will be doing it a service.

I have been writing about the Caucasus for years but when I started in 2009 to research a short book about the region - which became The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2010) - even I was surprised by how some of the historical facts I learned challenged many of today’s dominant political narratives. Three examples make the point.

First, in Russia’s wars of 1820s against the Ottomans, Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought side by side in the Tsarist army. At that historical juncture, the Shi’a-Sunni divide overrode any notions of Turkic brotherhood. Alexander Pushkin himself witnessed the “Karabakh regiment” composed of Azeri cavalry in action outside Kars, and wrote an admiring poem dedicated to one of its officers, Farhad-Bek. That should caution against making any instant assumption about an eternal Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance, which often fuel political attitudes over the Nagorny Karabakh conflict (and which the Armenian-Turkish normalisation process, albeit thus far unsuccessful, has also somewhat shaken).

Second, the way that the Abkhaz-Georgian-Russian interrelationship has reshuffled since the 1850s challenges conventional wisdom. In the decades after Georgia fell was annexed by Russia in 1801, and increasingly throughout the 19th century, the Russian authorities ensured that Georgian aristocrats became loyal servants of the Tsar by allowing them to ascend the imperial career-ladder while keeping their noble status. At the same time, the Russians regarded the Abkhaz as wild pro-Turkish tribesmen and implacable enemies.

In 1852 the Russian general Grigory Filipson complained that his soldiers could not step outside their Black Sea fortress without fear of being killed by Abkhaz malcontents: “In a word, we occupy Abkhazia but we do not rule it.” In the last quarter of the 19th century the Russians’ deportation of the Abkhaz from their homeland facilitated the immigration of Georgians into Abkhazia, redrawing the demographic map and seeding the ground for conflict in the 20th century. This history raises question marks about the durability of the Abkhaz-Russian relationship, and indeed of Russian-Georgian hostility.

A third surprise to me was to learn how Georgia’s first declaration of independence in the 20th century was, in geopolitical orientation, 180 degrees different from the second. In May 1918, in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and when Georgia was threatened by an imminent Turkish invasion, the head of the Tbilisi government, Noe Zhordania, reluctantly declared Georgia independent. Zhordania, whose Menshevik (social-democratic) party traced its roots to the split with the Bolsheviks in 1903-04, voiced his ambivalence over breaking the bond with Russia: “Our ancestors decided to turn away from the east and turn to the west. But the road to the west lay through Russia and consequently to go towards the west meant union with Russia.”

Zhordania’s independent republic lasted almost three years until Georgia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921. Amid the USSR’s slow disintegration seven decades on, Georgia embarked on a second and more successful attempt at independence. This time, Russia was called the colonialist enemy while Turkey became a newly discovered friendly neighbour. Again, this suggests that if Georgia’s striving for self-sufficiency can be regarded as a historical constant the nature of its alliances is not.

The power ledgers

“Why should we care?”, you may ask. “Aren’t these historical examples merely interesting but irrelevant anecdotes when set against the immediate tensions and problems of the region?” I don’t believe so, for two reasons.

First, these historical shifts suggest that there is nothing culturally determined about the smouldering conflicts of the Caucasus. It shows that they have nothing to do with “ethnic incompatibility” or “ancient hatreds”, but rather arise - and can fade - according to changes of interest or calculation; and it usefully refocuses our attention on the Soviet period and the two decades immediately preceding it.

For the roots of the Caucasian conflicts lie here (or so I believe): not in the distant past but in the way the Soviet system stored up problems by smothering the political grievances amongst its constituent peoples with bribes and the threat of force, rather than genuinely arbitrating between them (which might have led to a culture of accommodation and flexibility). When the policeman from Moscow abandoned his post, everyone was left in a chronic sense of insecurity - and some saw the opportunity to grasp hold of deadly historical narratives that Soviet Caucasian intellectuals had been nurturing for decades. Bad history became the ammunition for feuding regional elites.

But not everywhere - for some potential areas of tension proved the exception, showing that history can also be a resource that resists crude instrumentalisation. The Soviet crack-up reignited long-frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh, but another conflict with roots in the pre-Soviet era - the one in Adzharia, southwestern Georgia, once part of the Ottoman empire and whose inhabitants are largely Muslim - did not revive. A major reason for this, in my view, is that the absence of Turkey and Islam as identity-markers in any Soviet-era regional quarrels meant that these couldn’t now act as catalysts for conflict between Adzharians and other Georgians.

This openness of history to surprising directions is reflected too in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the enclave of Nagorny Karabakh. This is no primordial or civilisational clash, but better described as a clash between two emerging nation-states each of which saw this totemic territory as a cause to be mobilised and a crux of their new-old identity.

There is nothing ethnically incompatible about Armenians and Azeris. They had decent rates of intermarriage in Soviet times, and today trade and interact freely on the territory of Georgia and Russia. That makes me conclude that the challenge in the Karabakh dispute is not about reconciling ordinary people but about reconciling political narratives. It comes down to both security and symbolism: if a settlement can be designed which fulfils the security needs of each side and in which their proud attachment to Karabakh is honoured, most people should have no problem in supporting it - and everyone will be a long way towards a solution.

The other stories

If the first historical lesson is that the region’s conflicts are not predestined, the second is that the Caucasus is not as bloody as it looks. The locals fight when they have to, but also have sophisticated ways of not fighting. I am not of course saying that the Caucasus is a non-violent, vegetarian kind of place. Denmark it is not. There is a strong culture of violence and weapons here, but I would argue that this is often an expressive substitute for real killing.

The conflicts of the south Caucasus in the 1990s, great tragedies as they were, exemplify the point. Their most striking feature was the vast number of displaced people - a total of almost 1.5 million in three years - rather than numbers killed (the body-count was far smaller than in the contemporaneous war in Bosnia, for example). This was a grave regional humanitarian catastrophe. But it also points to the fact that in both Karabakh and Abkhazia, advancing soldiers generally preferred to terrify civilians into flight rather than to kill them. The exceptions, such as the massacre at Khojali in February 1992 and some of the atrocities in Abkhazia, were as a rule committed by more ruthless incomers not locals.

Again, as well as the people who did not die, there were the conflicts that did not happen. To the Adzharia example could be added the mixed Armenian-Georgian region of Javakheti (which saw a brief war in 1918) and the case of the Lezghins who live on either side of the Dagestan-Azerbaijan border, but who have chosen not to agitate for reunification. Likewise, Georgians and Ossetians on the ground in South Ossetia twice (after the fighting of 1991-92 and 2004) managed to carry on living and trading together despite political conflict, before their interaction was tragically cut short by the war of August 2008.

All this underlines a deep history of pragmatism in the south Caucasus which is there, just below the surface, if you care to look for it.

Caucasian political elites who find that exploiting regional tensions is a useful means of consolidating their power have no interest in telling these stories of unglamorous pragmatic coexistence, but foreign visitors and politicians are under no such obligation. They can narrate these alternative stories when they travel to the region and spread the message that history can be light cloak as well as heavy armour.

source: www.opendemocracy.net

ARTICLE: Independent Abkhazia one year on (opendemocracy.net)

By Inal Khashig, 18 - 08 - 2009

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's one-day visit to Sukhumi on 13 August effectively marked the end of Abkhazia's first year as an independent state. Inal Khashig looks back over the year and considers the state of Abkhaz-Russian relations.
It need hardly be said that little remains of the boundless euphoria experienced by Abkhaz people on 26 August 2008, the day President Dmitry Medvedev announced the recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At that time everyone believed that no fewer than 10 countries would soon follow suit, but this turned out to be a vain hope. At the moment of writing no one, apart from Nicaragua, has offered support to Abkhazia, and this has clearly affected the official rhetoric emanating from Sukhumi.
A year ago, before the August events in the Caucasus, President Bagapsh and foreign minister Sergei Shamba often put forward the idea of a multi-vector foreign policy, which clearly did not suit Moscow at all. Several months before Russia's recognition of Abkhazia, Mr Shamba had spelt out this policy, which was to involve Russia, the European Union and Turkey (where there is a population of up to 500,000 Abkhaz, who were forced to migrate there after the Caucasian war in the 19th century). However, these signals received no support from the West, and after the European Union and the USA had reacted extremely negatively to Russia's recognition of Abkhazia's independence, the "multi-vector" thesis quietly disappeared from the vocabulary of official Sukhumi altogether.
Nevertheless, the fact of recognition and Moscow's acceptance of responsibility for security in Abkhazia was sufficient for the issue of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to take a back seat for the Abkhaz themselves a year later.

full text >>>

ARTICLE: Russia’s statelets game (sofiaecho.com)

Leading Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev, in a brilliantly perceptive balance sheet on the political fallout of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war published on the openDemocracy website, said that the Kremlin’s revisionism is the outcome of Moscow’s growing insecurity.

"The Russia of Vladimir Putin fears at the same time territorial disintegration and the loss of global relevance. Both of these fears are legitimate," Krastev said."

The ultimate objective of the Kremlin’s current foreign policy is that if it cannot be strong, Russia should not look weak. In Putin’s words, ‘Russia will either be a great power or it will not be at all’," according to Krastev.

Full article >>>

ONE YEAR AFTER THE WAR: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a year on (opendemocracy.net)

By George Hewitt, 11 - 08 - 2009

The Georgia-Russia war of August 2008 has altered calculations about the future of the two territories that were central to the conflict. The scholar of Abkhazian linguistics and history, George Hewitt, offers an assessment from Sukhumi.

full article >>>

more articles:
A Year After Georgian War, Refugees Still Coping With Losses >>>
War in South Ossetia, One Year on - Interview with Professor Nicolai N. Petro >>>
Still Here >>>
A Year After War, S. Ossetia More Dependent on Russia >>>
Georgia: One Year Later >>>
What the Russian papers say >>>
Russian Public Opinion on the August 2008 Conflict -- A Year Later >>>
Russia and Ossetia: Divided Loyalties >>>
Russia and Georgia Battle Over Position in History >>>
A Year After Russia-Georgia War -- A New Reality, But Old Relations >>>
Abkhaz Opposition Resists Ethnic Georgian 'Citizens' >>>
Georgia: One Year After the August War >>>
One Year On, Could Russia and Georgia Fight Another War? >>>
A Year After The War, South Ossetia And Abkhazia Seek Different Paths >>>
Roundtable: Causes And Effects Of The Russia-Georgia War >>>
ESSAY: Ein Jahr nach dem Krieg Einige historische Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Georgien und Russland. >>>
Thomas Goltz: Georgia-Russia relations will remain as bleak as before >>>
Was geschah im Georgien-Krieg? >>>
Ein Jahr nach dem Krieg gegen Russland erholt sich Georgien wieder langsam. >>>
In den Trümmern lauert neuer Krieg. Ein Jahr nach dem Krieg ist Südossetien weiter Streitthema >>>
Ein Jahr nach dem Krieg sind die Südosseten froh, ohne die Georgier zu leben ... aber ... >>>
INTERVIEW: Staatsminister Gernot Erler (SPD) erläutert die Situation im Kaukasus >>>
SCIENCE: PUBL.-Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Summer 09 issue (cria-online.org) >>>
Hass und Propaganda: Im Gedenken an den Krieg geben sich Georgien wie Russland unversöhnlich >>> Der Kalte Frieden im Kaukasus >>>
Kaukasus-Krieg: Auf den Spuren der Opfer >>>
Georgien: Ein zerrissenes Land >>>
Säbelrasseln zum Jahrestag >>>
Georgien ein Jahr danach >>>
Year After Georgian War, Rage Has Only Hardened >>>
Tbilisi: Twenty Hours Before the War >>>
Georgia marks first anniversary of its conflict with Russia >>>
One Year On >>>
Slideshow: One Year Since the War >>>
Krieg in Georgien: Der Geostrategische Konflikt zwischen der USA, der EU und Russland >>>
Zum Krieg in Georgien August 08 >>>
Zum Krieg in Georgien August 08 (II. Teil) >>>
Aus dem russisch-georgischen Krieg im August ist Russland als Gewinner hervorgegangen >>>
Leitartikel: Ein Jahr nach dem Krieg im Kaukasus Der Westen muss zu Georgien stehen >>>
Jahrestag des russisch-georgischen Krieges um Süd-Ossetien und Abchasien >>>
Russia-Georgia conflict remains a year after war >>>

ANALYSIS: Georgia's pluralistic feudalism: a frontline report

By Ilia Roubanis, 3 - 07 - 2009

Georgia's leader-fixated politics lacks an institutional base and competing visions of the country's future. No wonder the gap between the rhetoric and reality of democracy is so sharp, finds Ilia Roubanis in Tbilisi.

full article >>>

ARTICLE: Georgia: between war and a future (opendemocracy.net)

By Vicken Cheterian, 8 - 07 - 2009

A year after the disastrous war with Russia, the political elite in Tbilisi remains uncertain about how to define a way forward for the country. Vicken Cheterian assesses its predicament.

new war in and over Georgia may be in the making. For over two decades, local conflicts have spiralled to make the south Caucasus region a new frontline of east-west proxy wars - most recently in the Georgia-Russia conflict of 8-12 August 2008. The confusion between local political dynamics and international intervention has been at the heart of this process; as long as it lasts, a bad situation will be made worse.

full article >>>

ARTICLE: ‘Wahhabi’ village in Dagestan (opendemocracy.net)

As human rights violations escalate in the North Caucasus, Tanya Lokshina of Human Rights Watch visits Dagestan, supposedly riven by the struggle between ‘Wahhabis' and the authorities. She visits the so-called ‘Wahhabi' village of Gudben.

full article >>>

CALL: A Georgian appeal: open letter to the west (opendemocracy.net)

Nino Burdzhanadze, 12 - 06 - 2009

The deep political tensions in Georgia have led to one of the country’s leading politicians, Nino Burdzhanadze, standing against the country’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili. She explains her thinking and appeals for engagement and understanding from the west. openDemocracy publishes the text as part of our longstanding and independent coverage of Georgia and the region.

Letter here >>>

LETTER: A Georgian chalk circle: open letter to the west (pendemocracy.net)

By Tedo Japaridze

An authoritarian president, an ineffective opposition, an unbalanced polity, and a country once again regarded in the west as a small component of the “Russia problem” - all this equals a political impasse in Tbilisi. Tedo Japaridze, the former foreign minister of Georgia, appeals to the country’s western friends to help resolve a problem that is theirs too.

(This article was first published on 12 May 2009)

The full article >>>

STATEMENT: Re-setting Georgia's relationship with Russia

by Erosi Kitsmarishvili

It is time to restore relations between Russia and Georgia, argues Ambassador Kitsmarishvili, Georgia's ambassador in Moscow until the war in August 2008.

I was the last ambassador of Georgia to Russia, though I was only in Moscow for a couple of months before the outbreak of war. Working with Russian colleagues, the main emphasis of my team was on creating the necessary conditions for "restarting" Georgian-Russian relations and developing a positive agenda for bilateral relations. The onset of military operations in August 2008 and other considerations meant that we were unable to reach a positive outcome.

more >>>

STATEMENT: Propaganda war: Russia- 0, Georgia-1

Boris Dolgin, 14 - 08 - 2008

Having isolated itself from the world, Russia has played the propaganda war badly, argues polit.ru's editor. Georgia has won it, but that does not make it an aspiring democracy

full text >>>

ARTICLE: Europe between past and future (opendemocracy.net)

Krzysztof Bobinski

The political responses to the financial crisis in the European Union’s east reveal a failure to understand the union's own history, says Krzysztof Bobinski.

An early sign of how the financial crisis in east-central Europe in February 2009 was being perceived in the west came in a major feature in the Financial Times. The story was not so much in the words as in the accompanying map, which showed the old Comecon countries as an undifferentiated mass. It was as if nothing had changed since the 1980s, when the Soviet Union's own "single market" still kept a swathe of states from the Baltics to the Balkans tightly in its orbit.

full article >>>

PERSONALITY: Sabine Freizer is Caucasus Project Director of the International Crisis Group

Sabine Freizer is Caucasus Project Director of the International Crisis Group, based in Tbilisi. She was awarded a doctorate from the London School of Economics for research on peacebuilding and civil society, and has worked with the OSCE, the UNHCR, the European Commission and Britain’s department for international development on political and human-rights issues in the Balkans, the Caucasus and central Asia.

Recent articles

Nagorno-Karabakh: between vote and reality

Nagorno-Karabakh has followed Transdniestria and South Ossetia in holding an independence referendum. But democracy in these "non-recognised entities" is not so simple, reports Sabine Freizer of the International Crisis Group.

Armenia's emptying democracy

Armenia’s constitutional referendum reveals a flawed political system ruling over disaffected citizens whose faith in western-sponsored democracy is being sorely tested, reports Sabine Freizer in Yerevan.

Azerbaijan's unfinished election

Ilham Aliev’s ruling party declared victory before the votes were counted, but the opposition can still challenge some of its fraudulent results, reports the International Crisis Group’s Sabine Freizer in Baku.

Midnight in Tashkent

A surge of anti-state violence in Uzbekistan suggests that the policies of the autocratic Tashkent regime and the attitude of its international sponsors are alike in urgent need of reform.

The pillars of Georgia's political transition

After the “rose revolution”, how will Georgia’s leaders cope with their difficult legacy – endemic corruption, internal schisms, geopolitical pressures? An experienced political analyst recently in Tbilisi maps the strategic options facing the south Caucasian state’s new president, Mikhail Saakashvili.

The Dynamics of Change in the South Caucasus: The Case of Armenia ...

Sabine Freizer

Europe Program Director
Brussels, Belgium

Crisis Group role:

Sabine Freizer is the Brussels-based Director of the Europe Program. She started with Crisis Group as Caucasus Project Director in July 2004. As Europe Program Director, Sabine Freizer oversees projects covering the Caucasus, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. She has a PhD from the London School of Economics, and a Masters from the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium) which she obtained as a Fulbright Scholar.

Areas of expertise:

• Balkans
• Caucasus
• Turkey
• Moldova
• Civil society and conflict prevention

Professional background:

• Caucasus Project Director (Tbilisi-based), International Crisis Group, 2004-2007
• Political Officer, OSCE Election Observation Missions Azerbaijan and Georgia, 2003-2004
• Human Dimensions/Legal Expert, OSCE Central Asia Liaison Office, Tashkent, 1999-2000
• Civil Society Coordinator, OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1996-1998

Publications and media:

Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle, regular analysis and commentary

• Kosovo: "Eyes on the Ball", Transitions Online, 14 October 2008
• "EU:n tarkkailijoiden päästävä myös kiistellyille alueille", Helsingen Sanomat, 10 October 2008
• "A Mission for All of Georgia", EU Observer, 7 October 2008
• "Reassuring Kosovo's Serbs", The Guardian, 20 March 2008
• "Combustible Caucasus", The Wall Street Journal, 13 March 2008
• "Nagorno-Karabakh – A Frozen Conflict That Could Boil Over", European Voice, 31 January 2008
• Nagorno-Karabakh: "Putting the Freeze on a Frozen Conflict",The Boston Globe, 25 December 2007
• "Kosovo's appointment in Samara", EU Observer, 16 May 2007
• "Why Kosovo's Independence is Necessary", IslamOnline.net, 14 May 2007
• "The EU’s Inexcusable Pardon for Serbia", with Andrew Stroehlein, European Voice, 29 March 2007
• "Nagorno-Karabakh: Between Vote and Reality", openDemocracy.net, 14 December 2006
• Interviews with local and international media outlets, including BBC, Deutsche Welle, RFL, AFP, among others

Languages:

• English (native)
• French (native)

Click here for a high-resolution photo of Sabine Freizer.

Click here for a one-page PDF document of this information with contact details.

ARTICLE: McCain & Obama Are Both Wrong on Georgia (opendemocracy.net)

Patrik Shirak, 30 - 09 - 2008

The next American president, together with the efforts from European allies, must address failed strategies of the past in order to prevent the West (and Georgia for that matter) from stumbling into an expanded war in the Caucasus.

After watching the first presidential debate between Sen. John McCain and Sen. Barack Obama, one of the only lasting thoughts on my mind was how over-simplified they present the ongoing conflicts in Georgia to the American public, and how dead wrong they both are in seeking to address them.

full article >>>

ARTICLE: Georgia and Russia, again. By Thomas de Waal (opendemocracy.net)

By Thomas de Waal

The career and testimony of a man who served both the Soviet Union and independent Georgia remain a guide to how embittered neighbours might repair their relationship, says Thomas de Waal.

Never again will a Georgian command the same international authority. The green walls of Eduard Shevardnadze's study in his residence outside Tbilisi are decked with portraits of world leaders: Ronald Reagan, the elder George Bush, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, George Schultz (and, bizarrely, the jazz singer Ray Charles). In his prime as foreign minister of the Soviet Union, he was fully equal to all these statesmen.

full text >>>

ANALYSIS: The Caucasus effect: Europe unblocked (opendemocracy.net)

By Krzysztof Bobinski

The aftershocks of the Caucasus war are provoking European governments into surprising and even imaginative reactions. Turkey and Ukraine are at the heart of the process, says Krzysztof Bobinski.

The headlines in Poland's main daily newspapers were unanimous. Nicolas Sarkozy's visit to Moscow and Tbilisi on 8 September 2008 to seek assurances from the Russians that they would withdraw their troops to the positions they held before the outbreak of war with Georgia on 7-8 August was a failure. "Sarkozy failed to take the Kremlin", declared one; "Russia dictates to Europe", proclaimed another; "Sarkozy defeated. Peace with Georgia possible only on Russia's terms", shouted a third.

The reaction ran counter to Mikheil Saakashvili's obvious relief at his press conference with Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso (president of the European commission) that evening at the result the French president had managed to achieve (see Paul Gillespie, "The European Union and Russia after Georgia", 10 September 2008). A pledge of withdrawal by 1 October and the insertion of observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) into the space between the Russians, their South Ossetian and Abkhazian supporters and the Georgians was obviously welcome to Georgia's pressurised president.

But just as attitudes throughout Europe towards Russia are beginning to stiffen, so stereotypes in Poland (and most probably throughout the new European Union member-states and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space) remain strong. Indeed they include more than a touch of Schadenfreude at the dilemmas Sarkozy faces. The local newspapers, the radio and the television talk-show hosts all almost palpably yearn for more evidence of western weakness and gullibility in the face of Russian might and brutal deception. They all seem to want the EU to fail to resolve the crisis, to be seen to be fragile and craven. "We knew all along what they, the Russians, are like and you are still unwilling to believe us", is the near-universal underlying sentiment.

A region moves

This reaction shows that there is still a gulf between the western European way of doing things and perceptions in new member-states such as Poland. But if truth be told, Poland's government (which is not to be confused with the country's president, Lech Kaczynski) has remained remarkably calm and indeed is ready - despite what has happened in Georgia - to continue a dialogue with the Russians.

Indeed, that is only one of the pigs which, quite unexpectedly, has flown across the skies in the five weeks since the end of the major hostilities in Georgia on 12 August. The aftermath of the brutal conflict promises both to be long and to bring significant changes to the EU's relationship with Russia. The most difficult question to answer is whether Moscow will decide that it wants a fruitful relationship with the west or choose a not-so-splendid isolation (see Ivan Krastev, "Russia and the Georgia war: the great-power trap", 19 August 2008).

The signals remain mixed. But there are at least four other developments since the Caucasus events which overturn settled views of what is occurring, and suggest that the Georgia crisis has jolted governments into becoming more imaginative in revising longstanding and seemingly intractable positions.

First, the visit by the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to Warsaw on 11 September 2008, so soon after the Russians had threatened to punish Poland for President Kaczynski's foray to Tbilisi and his public promise to fight for a free Georgia; and indeed, after growls by Russian military leaders that Poland would become a nuclear target if the American anti-missile base was installed there.

Second, who would have expected that Poland would be one of the first to call on the European Union to lift sanctions against Alexander Lukashenko's regime in Belarus? After all, it is Polish NGOs and members of the European parliament (MEPs) who have been most strident in their condemnation of one of Europe's last authoritarians. Not long ago, any mention of detente with Minsk brought instant criticism.

Third, the remarks made almost in passing by the Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb in a speech to Finnish ambassadors and an interview with Die Presse (Austria) to the effect that his country might consider joining Nato. True, Finland's president and prime minister almost immediately scorned the suggestion; but the fact is that Stubb (who played a significant mediating role alongside Sarkozy in the Georgia-Russia conflict) said it and thus challenged an enduring consensus in Helsinki on keeping an equal distance in military terms between Russia and the west.

Fourth, and most amazing of all, Turkey's President Abdullah Gul travelled to Yerevan on the occasion of an Armenia-Turkey football match and met his Armenia counterpart Serzh Sarkisian. The unprecedented visit to Armenia by a Turkish head of state, against the background of the bitter controversy over the issue of the 1915 genocide and the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, has great political as well as symbolic significance. It reflects how keen Turkey is to help stabilise the situation in the Black Sea, resolve the crisis in the Caucasus and keep Nato warships (its own excepted) at a safe distance in the Mediterranean.

The Turkish decision over Armenia was taken within the context of Istanbul's wider "Caucasus platform" initiative - which would bring Georgia, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey into an organisation promoting regional cooperation and reconciliation. If this were to succeed, it might help in the search for a solution to the problem of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

A time to look

The Turkish dimension of the Georgia-Russia fallout may have deeper reverberations. Turkey won credit for its bold gesture from both Nicolas Sarkozy (current holder of the European Union presidency) and Olli Rehn (the EU's enlargement commissioner). This raises the possibility that relations between Turkey and the EU might soon emerge from their present doldrums; indeed, given the above shifts in policy and attitude in the past five weeks, is it unthinkable that the French president might begin to reconsider his opposition to Turkey's membership of the EU?

The crisis has also brought Ukraine and its EU membership aspirations into the spotlight. Who would have expected even in early summer 2008 that a British foreign minister would fly urgently to Kyiv (Kiev) and deliver a strident call of support for Ukraine's right to chose its own path, as David Miliband did on 27 August? But the new concern that Russia might pose a risk to Ukraine's independence has seen the EU edging closer to a commitment to the country's eventual membership.

Here, the Turkey and Ukraine situations come together. For it is notable that Turkey's Caucasus platform does not include Ukraine. Since the early 1990s, Ankara has preferred to improve relations with Moscow (the devil the Turks know) rather than with Kyiv (which is more of an unknown quantity). But Turkey knows full well that Ukraine is a major potential source of tension in the Black Sea with its de facto dispute over the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, which erupted during the blessedly short Georgian war. The lease for the port runs out in 2017 when Ukraine looks set to ask the fleet to go.

There is undoubtedly a role for European Union policy in the Black Sea. Romania and Bulgaria are, after all, now EU members and a Black Sea regional-cooperation formula bringing in all the littoral states including Russia could be a useful complement to the Caucasus platform. The EU's regional neighbourhood initiative, the Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme, could offer a framework for shared action here (see Neal Ascherson, "After the war: recognising reality in Abkhazia and Georgia", 15 September 2008).

The crisis has also given a much needed lease of life to the search for a common EU energy policy. Here, if anywhere, Poland should be taking advantage of the apparent change of heart towards Russia by public opinion in France and Germany, and growing concern in Germany in particular over a dependency on Russian energy supplies.

Thus, the Georgian push into South Ossetia on the night of 7-8 August 2008 and the Russian military response has set in motion a number of processes in Europe, the Black Sea region and even central Asia. A number of long neglected problems (such as Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenia-Turkey dispute, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia themselves) have come into sharp focus.

Across Europe, attitudes towards Russia have hardened. Any further delays in the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia proper will compound tensions. The European Union foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 15 September 2008 who confirmed the despatch of 200 EU observers to Georgia under the terms of the 8 September agreement are well aware that this is a stage in a longer process.

But under the surface, the changes which have happened in the month since the height of the Georgia-Russia conflict have been missed by Polish newspapers editors at least. They may also be underestimating Nicolas Sarkozy or Angela Merkel's resolve in the face of Russian intransigence over Georgia. Europe since the armed confrontation of August 2008 ended become a more interesting place. Clear eyes and open minds will be needed if it is to become a safer place too. Clinging to stereotypes does the latter aim no good at all.

Source: opendemocracy.net

ARTICLE: The world after the Caucasus war, Rein Müllerson (opendemocracy.net)

The world after the Caucasus war, Rein Müllerson
"It is not a battle of good against evil. It's a war between forces that are fighting for the balance of power, and, when that type of battle begins, it lasts longer than others - because Allah is on both sides." - Paulo Coelho, The Alchemist

Rein Müllerson is professor and chair of international law at King's College, London. He has been a visiting professor at the LSE, a member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, and (in 1991-92) first deputy foreign... more »

ARTICLE: Moscow's victory toll , Ivan Sukhov. (opendemocracy.net)

Moscow's victory toll , Ivan Sukhov
Only a week ago, Russia's recognition Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence was regarded as unlikely by most observers. They hoped that the Kremlin today was too strongly integrated into the world of global finance to resort to a drastic escalation of antagonism with the West. Nonetheless, this took place.
Even after 25 August, when both chambers of the Russian parliament voted for recognition, it could still be hoped that this vote amounted to nothing more positioning at the... more »

ARTICLES: The Dream Of Independence? (opendemocracy.net)

Abkhazia Pawns its Independence, Zygmunt Dzieciolowski
openDemocracy's Russia editor reflects that Abkhazia has realised its dream of independence, but at the price of becoming Russia's pawn ... more »

The miscalculation of small nations , Fred Halliday
The brief and vicious war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia has killed an untold number of people and displaced and traumatised many thousands more; promised a lengthy and abrasive aftermath; postponed even further the prospects of a settlement over this and the region's other territory lost to Georgia's control in the early 1990s, Abkhazia; created new enmities as well as poisoning existing ones; and planted seeds of yet further conflict.
Among... more »

Sovereignty, status and the humanitarian perspective, Mary Kaldor
I first visited South Ossetia in the summer of 1995, just as the end-game in Bosnia-Herzegovina was being played out. I was ushered in to meet the so-called foreign minister of the enclave and, to my surprise, a large portrait of Radovan Karadzic was prominently displayed on the wall. When I asked him about it, he said that the portrait had been presented to him by the Bosnian Serb delegation at a meeting of Eastern Christians and that he greatly admired the Bosnian Serb independent stance.... more »

Georgia after war: the political landscape , Robert Parsons
As the dust from Russia's tank-tracks settles again over Georgia, the accounting inside the country has begun. For the moment, the accent is on damage- assessment and reconstruction but the focus is already slowly shifting to the role in starting the conflict of Mikheil Saakashvili. Georgia's young president will soon find himself in the spotlight again and it will not be a comfortable place.
Robert Parsons is international editor of France 24. He earned a doctorate at Glasgow... more »

openDemocracy.net/Russia reports, debates and blogs the Georgia war

OPEN-DEMOCRACY: Russia, Iran and the War in The Caucasus. (opendemocracy.net)

Russia and Iran: crisis of the west, rise of the rest, Paul Rogers
The military and political leaders of the United States and Europe could be forgiven in August 2008 for recalling the English phrase "it never rains, but it pours". For they are currently faced by a series of security problems in relation to Russia, Afghanistan and Iran, each of which is testing in its own right but which together strain their resources (and perhaps nerves) to the limit. These are only part of a chain of problems for strategists of the "west"
(a category... more »

Before and after war, Zygmunt Dzieciolowski
The Abkhaz capital Sukhumi never was just a Black Sea holiday resort, unlike the towns of Pitsunda and Gagra. It was always an administrative centre, capital of the region.
The Parliament, National Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs occupy a block of buildings looking out over the sea. Once, a statue of Lenin adorned the square. While Lenin has gone, this part of Sukhumi still looks like a Soviet theme park, separated from the outside world as it has been for years.
... more »

Russian war and Georgian democracy, Ghia Nodia
Russia says it has started pulling back from Georgian soil, but there are few if any signs that it means business. Therefore, the war is not over yet. Despite this, Neal Ascherson and Ivan Krastev have on openDemocracy already started taking stock of the possible results of the war. I will join them in these attempts - though all of us should understand that while Russia continues trying to change the situation on the ground through military means, any such assessments can only be rather... more »

openDemocracy.net/Russia reports, debates and blogs the Georgia war