REPORTAGE: Ans vergessene Erinnern - Patrick Chauvel (info.arte.tv)

(info.arte.tv) Ans vergessene Erinnern - Patrick Chauvel

Im Jahr 1994 antwortet der damalige russische Präsident Boris Jelzin mit einer Militär-Offensive auf die Revolte der Tschetschenen und ihren Wunsch nach Unabhängigkeit von der Russischen Föderation. Anhand seiner Fotos von damals erzählt Chauvel über diesen Krieg, seine Begegnungen mit den harten tschetschenischen Kämpfern, den jungen unerfahrenen russischen Soldaten, den Menschen in Grosny und auch mit seiner Kollegin, der Kriegsfotografin Heidi Bradner...

Die Schlacht um Grosny

Im Jahr 1994 antwortet der damalige russische Präsident Boris Jelzin mit einer Militär-Offensive auf die Revolte der Tschetschenen und ihren Wunsch nach Unabhängigkeit von der Russischen Föderation. Der Widerstand der tschetschenischen Kämpfer aber überrascht die russischen Soldaten, es gelingt ihnen nicht, den Aufstand schnell niederzuschlagen. Der Kriegsfotograf Patrick Chauvel ist in Grosny, als der Konflikt ausbricht und wird Zeuge der ungeheuren Grausamkeit mit der die Gegner sich gegenseitig massakrieren. Anhand seiner Fotos von damals erzählt Chauvel über diesen Krieg, seine Begegnungen mit den harten tschetschenischen Kämpfern, den jungen unerfahrenen russischen Soldaten, den Menschen in Grosny und auch mit seiner Kollegin, der Kriegsfotografin Heidi Bradner…

Von Patrick Chauvel, Louis-Pascal Couvelaire und Ophélie Lerouge – ARTE GEIE / Actarus Films – Frankreich 2014


patrick-chauvel.com

VORTRAG: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in Georgien – Film und Diskussion (orient-gesellschaft.at)

(orient-gesellschaft.at) Mag. David Kakabadze, Journalist, Redakteur und Übersetzer,
Leiter der georgischen Redaktion von Radio Free Europe

Mo, 23. Juni 2014, 18.30 Uhr
Klubsaal
Eintritt: € 4,- (erm. € 2,-), für Mitglieder der ÖOG gratis

ÖSTERREICHISCHE ORIENT-GESELLSCHAFT HAMMER-PURGSTALL
1010 Wien, Dominikanerbastei 6/6
Tel.: 01 5128936
www.orient-gesellschaft.at

LITERARISCHE REPORAGE: Arkadi Babtschenko: "Ein Tag wie ein Leben. Vom Krieg". Von Gregor Ziolkowski (deutschlandradiokultur.de)

(deutschlandradiokultur.de) Seinen Militärdienst leistete Arkadi Babtschenko in Tschetschenien. Die Kriegserfahrung hat den russischen Journalisten nicht mehr losgelassen. "Ein Tag wie im Leben" ist sein drittes Buch darüber.

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Kriegszerstörung in der tschetschenischen Hauptstadt Grosny (AP Archiv)

Arkadi Babtschenko ist vom Krieg geradezu besessen. Mit "Ein Tag wie ein Leben" legt er sein drittes Buch vor, das sich diesem Thema zuwendet, und erneut ist die eigene Erfahrung dieses Autors, seine Erlebnisse in den zwei Tschetschenien-Kriegen, ein wichtiger Pfeiler seiner Erzählungen. Allerdings erweitert der Autor in diesem Buch sein Blickfeld erheblich und dies sowohl in geographischer als auch in zeitlicher Hinsicht, ein Umstand, der auch auf der reflexiven Ebene Folgen hat.

Denn wenn die vorherigen Bücher Babtschenkos klar auf die Individualisierung des Phänomens Krieg abzielten, auf die Unmittelbarkeit des Erlebens. Auf die Heranführung des Lesers bis zum Leib des einfachen Soldaten, der sein Fleisch und sein Hirn der härtesten Gefährdung aussetzen muss. So geht es auch hier darum, aber eben auch um mehr.

Die Erfahrungen des Kriegsreporters fließen da ein, der etwa an die Schauplätze des russisch-georgischen Konflikts gereist ist und diese noch glühenden Brandherde, diese Landschaften nach der Schlacht, mit der Eindringlichkeit eines Augenzeugen beschreibt, auch ohne selbst Beteiligter gewesen zu sein. Die geopolitische Dimension dieses Konflikts, der da zwischen NATO-Gelüsten auf georgischer Seite und russischen Interessen zu verorten ist, gerät dabei in den Blick, ohne dass die Geschehnisse eine letzte Erklärung finden würden.

Zwielichtige Begegnungen

Begegnungen mit durchaus zwielichtigen "Geschäftsleuten", die offenkundig in der Grauzone des privatwirtschaftlichen Söldnertums ihr Auskommen finden. Leuchten hinein in die Merkwürdigkeiten einer konfliktiven Gegenwart, die unter dem Stichwort "Krieg" nicht mehr ausschließlich nationalstaatliche Konfrontationen versteht. Sondern einen globalisierten, dabei lokal eingegrenzten Wirtschaftsfaktor, der in gewisser Weise auch "Arbeitsplätze" und "Märkte" bereithält, die vielleicht Irak oder Afghanistan heißen.

Immer wieder treibt den Kriegsphänomen-Besessenen die Sinnfrage um. Wozu tut man das? Wer unter den unmittelbar Beteiligten versteht eigentlich die Motive für das Kämpfen? Unter welchen Bannern werden diese Auseinandersetzungen geführt? Heimat, Patriotismus, Religion, Pflicht - Begriffe, die Babtschenko unaufdringlich in die Debatte wirft, weil er sie an konkreten Personen und ihren Lebensläufen entlang verhandelt. Aus der jeweiligen Geschichte selbst ergeben sich diese Fragestellungen, die nach Werten fragen, wobei die Antworten eher verhalten ausfallen.

Verarmte Kriegsveteranen

Als schlichtweg desaströs beschreibt er die Situation jener – inzwischen uralten – Generation von Kriegsveteranen, die im Zweiten Weltkrieg gekämpft haben und im heutigen Russland ein Bettlerdasein führen müssen. Die thematische Linie – Wie geht das Land mit seinen Kriegsveteranen um? - wird aber auch am Beispiel der Afghanistan- und Tschetschenien-Veteranen verfolgt, auch dies ein nicht allzu rühmliches Kapitel.

"Vom Krieg", das ist ein gut gewählter Untertitel für dieses Buch. Zwischen literarischer Reportage, historischem Exkurs und sozialpsychologischer Reflexion sondiert es am jeweiligen Beispiel jenes beunruhigende Terrain, das für uns seit langer Zeit woanders liegt, ohne dass es den Anspruch erheben würde, die jeweilige Situation erschöpfend zu erklären. Dieses "Woanders" ist hier nichts anderes als ein Schlachtfeld des Menschlichen, im Zweifelsfall gar nicht so weit entfernt.

Arkadi Babtschenko: EinTag wie ein Leben. Vom KriegAus dem Russischen von Olaf Kühl
Rowohlt Verlag, Berlin 2014
272 Seiten, 19,95 Euro

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Literarische Sichten auf Krieg von Remarque bis zu Babtschenko

AmazonShop: Books, Maps, Videos, Music & Gifts About The Caucasus

BLOG: Occupation Continuum – New Berlin Wall in Georgia. By Tamar Lobjanidze (adjapsandali.wordpress.com)

“A good neighbor is a fellow who smiles at you over the back fence, but doesn’t climb over it”, Arthur Baer.
 

(adjapsandali.wordpress.com) Post-Soviet conflicts are mostly referred to as “Frozen Conflicts”, but since the August war broke out in 08.08.08 we can no longer consider the unresolved dispute in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region “frozen”, as the dramatic events continue to occur ever since the active armed conflict has been brought to an end by the Cease-fire Agreement on August 12th, 2008.

To follow the Michael S. Lund’s Curve of Conflict theory, after the peace enforcement, conflicts are mitigated, therefore peacekeeping is launched to terminate and engage in post-conflict peace building process, that finally brings parties to the conflict stabilization and further resolution.

In the case of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, the August heat completely melted the stagnant situation, and dramatically changed the dynamics of the ethnic conflict, first broken out in the years of 1988-1989. As a result, the inhabitants of the region witnessed a second wave of ethnic cleansing, expulsion, torture, captivity, destruction and degradation of their property and many more of the physical and moral damage a human brain could imagine. Consequently, the war resulted in the occupation of 127 Georgian villages; most of which have been entirely obliterated (Tamarasheni, Avnevi, Ergneti, Kekhvi, Dzartsemi etc.), while the neighboring villages left under the control of Georgia, continually witnessed cruelty and oppression from Russian-Ossetian militias.

Particularly, during the last five years, Georgians living around the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL), have been systematically exposed to arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions and abductions, resulting in physical abuse and other inhumane treatments. The de facto authorities, together with Russian military forces, massively discriminated the ethnic Georgians – intimidation, harassment, humiliation and other acts of ill-treatment were designed to terrorize or to push Georgians to flee from their native territories. More precisely, during last five years, due to the mass militarization of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (build up of military bases, deploying around 3500 Russian troops), the local population tremendously suffered from the violation of their basic rights – freedom of movement and the adverse impact on their livelihood, destruction and plunder of their property belongings, etc. and continue to suffer, as of the so called process of building new border with Georgia.

As a matter of fact, in the post war period, efforts are made to end the hostilities and switch to peacemaking and/or conflict management process, where the outside parties engaged in peace enforcement and conflict mitigation. In the case of the Russia-Georgia war, the Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement had been reached to end hostilities and an outside party, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), was set up to seek stabilization, normalization, confidence building amongst the relevant authorities and “help make sure that the local people are living in a safe and secure environment”. The efforts to keep the conflict from re-escalation succeeded, as the fighting subsided and military conflict terminated. Therefore, post-war activities helped to reduce tensions, moving the conflict from a state of war to a state of crisis. However, the efforts at peacemaking failed, as peace enforcement never actually happened.

One of the main reason, why a state of crisis constantly fluctuates and sends signals to re-escalation, is directly related to continual land appropriation. Instead of fulfilling the obligation as stated in the principle five of the Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement: “Russian armed forces to withdraw to the positions held before hostilities began in South Ossetia.”, The Russian Authorities continue to penetrate and seize Georgian territories along the ABL. Therefore, Russia plays its own game in the Caucasus and has no interest in managing conflicts and making peace. On the contrary, it deliberately continues to destabilize the situation and create chaos that seems to suit Russia’s interests.

Therefore, the process is, fairly, called the Crawling/Creeping Occupation, as for its character of jutting about 1000 meters south, further into Georgia – drawing a new border between Georgia and its breakaway province of South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, by installing a new Berlin Wall – metal border fences unilaterally – impeding the freedom of movement of ethnic Georgians and the appropriation of their belongings.

The installation of barbed wires and fences started after the August War and was in progress during 2009-2012 around the villages of Gori, Kareli and Kaspi region. The process intensively continues currently in 2013, and rapidly covers the villages belonging Gori, Kareli, Akhalgori regions, which raises tensions locally and internationally.

In September, the situation turned even more dramatic. Russians and Ossetians claimed the border is in fact deeper into villages of Ditsi and Dvani, and continue to build actual fences. While local Georgian civilians, together with Georgian armed forces, have no plans to resist. As a result, residents are currently forced to evict, as their houses are crossed by the Occupation line, Russian and Ossetian forces claim to be the new borderline. Sadly, three families – Mekarishvili, Makhachashvili and Korashvili living in Dvani, were pressured to abandon their homes. Consequently, families dismantled their property, took their belongings and fled.

The fact demonstrates, that Russia will never agree to stable peace in the region. Instead of following the Six-Point Ceasefire Plan, where Russian armed forces were to pull back on the line, preceding the start of hostilities, it purposely penetrates deeply in Georgia, to tease the new government, demoralize, raise tensions and finally break the country. Moreover, instead of finding solutions for peaceful co-existence, or building confidence and reconciliation, the Russian authorities decided to build a Berlin Wall of barbed wire entanglements and, whilst,  impeding the right of return of the displaced people.

In the meantime, the Georgian society has mobilized and has been planning to take  action against the occupation of their country. During the last week of September, civil society members, journalists and students organized protests against the crawling occupation, visiting the ABL and the local population to show their support. In total around 35 foreign journalists and analysts, high profile officials, Embassy representatives in Georgia arrived in Ditsi and Dvani to evaluate situation on the ground. Also 28 Ambassadors of the EU Member States went on patrol to Ditsi, Ergneti and Zardiantkari to witness the situation along the ABL. Activism in the region significantly raised interest and concerns on local and international levels.

“We note with concern the continued and increasing activities by Russian security forces to erect fences and other physical barriers along the administrative boundary lines of the occupied territories in Georgia,” U.S. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said.

“It has a negative impact on the situation on the ground, and it affects the lives of those citizens of Georgia who live on either side of the administrative boundary lines,” Rasmussen stated. “I call for the removal of these barriers.” He also called upon Russia “to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states.”

Catherine Ashton, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, called on the barriers to be removed and expressed “profound concern” over “the continued and increasing activities by Russian security forces to erect fences and other obstacles along administrative boundary lines in Georgia.”

After the strong signals and statements were voiced towards Russia, on October 3, 2013, Dvani residents noticed how Russian border forces temporarily terminated the installation of fences and took all the equipment away. Hence, international involvement and peaceful activism appears to be helpful so far, although nobody assures, Russia is going to stop building a new Berlin Wall in Georgia in the future.

Nevertheless, it is a fact, that strong international support and on time engagement could have a positive impact to prevent conflicts and keep peace. Even though, on a longer perspective, due to Russia’s irrational politics and realism in the region, it will be hard to predict, whether Georgians should wait for 30 more years to “TEAR DOWN THIS WALL”.

GEOPOLITIC: Georgia: Is Moscow Building Another Berlin Wall? By Molly Corso (isnblog.ethz.ch)

Russian soldiers pullout of Gori city 18 Aug 2008. Image by Bohan Shen/Flickr.

(isnblog.ethz.ch) Whenever Ilya Beruashvili hears his dog bark, he knows the Russians are at the gate.

For the past five years, Beruashvili, 53, who lives on the outskirts of the Georgian village of Ditsi, has watched from his windows as Russian soldiers stationed in the neighboring separatist territory of South Ossetia have patrolled the fields he used to farm.

They are coming ever closer. A few months ago, soldiers started building a fence just a stone’s throw from his shed, a structure that will leave Beruashvili’s house and fields outside of Georgian jurisdiction and inside Russian-guarded, breakaway South Ossetia.

Under the terms of the 2008 cease-fire agreement between Georgia and Russia, the area, just a few kilometers east of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, lies in territory where Russian troops should not be. But that hasn’t stopped the Russians from building a barrier there.

Zigzagging through 15 Georgian villages, the 27-kilometer-long fence has divided families and cut people off from their livelihoods, separating farmers from their fields and orchards. It cuts off access to cemeteries and water supplies for ethnic Georgians, as well as health services and pensions for some ethnic Ossetian families.

In Ditsi, the fence is made of green plastic material. In other villages, like Khurvaleti, a tiny farming hamlet about 69 kilometers west from the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, it is barbed wire.

Wherever it stretches, it stands as a reminder of Russia’s failure to abide by the terms of the 2008 cease-fire – and of the inability of Tbilisi and the international community to hold Moscow to account.

The structure, though, is nothing new. In 2010, Beruashvili recounted, Russian troops tried to set up markers to extend South Ossetia’s frontier into his front yard. He was able to keep them out then – allegedly, by yelling at them that they were frightening his mother.

Russian soldiers first started putting up fences in this area, in the Georgian region of Shida Kartli, after the August 8-12, 2008 war, according to Ann Vaessen, a spokesperson for the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), the lone international body observing the cease-fire line.

But despite protests by Tbilisi, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States that the fences constituted a violation of international law, construction is continuing.

The process has even “intensified” over the past several months, Vaessen said.
“Villages are divided, people can’t talk to each other anymore, can’t go and visit their relatives. They can’t go to the funeral of one of their close relatives,” she said.

For Hans Schneider, the German chief of the EUMM’s field office in Gori, the closest Georgian-controlled town to the conflict zone, the structure brings to mind the Berlin Wall, which divided the German city from 1961-1989.

“I saw my mother crying when she received a letter from my sister living on the other side of the barbed wire,” Schneider said, speaking in a personal capacity not intended to reflect the EUMM’s official position. “I know that we cannot completely compare the situation with Georgia. But I have seen so many mixed ethnic Ossetians and Georgian families where the mother is crying for their daughter too.”

Locals like Beruashvili see the wall as a clear restriction on freedom of movement. “They have already gated the high road. … Now they have turned back and moved in this direction and it seems they want these houses as well,” he said of houses on the outskirts of Ditsi.

Kakhaber Kemoklidze, the head of the Analytical Department at the Ministry of Interior Affairs in Tbilisi, told EurasiaNet.org that the Georgian government has repeatedly raised the topic of Russia’s fence during peace talks in Geneva and monthly meetings with Russian and South-Ossetian envoys. So far, the Kremlin has been impervious to Georgian efforts to bring about a halt in construction.
“We have to keep updating our partners and every country that has relations with Russia,” Kemoklidze said. “Russia right now does not care about the borders [between separatist South Ossetia and Tbilisi-controlled territory], but next week, next month, next year there might be an issue that they need [a] compromise on.”

In the end, he said, Georgia has to have “strategic patience.” Yet, to date, “strategic patience” has not produced any tangible benefits.

Insisting that the fence runs inside South-Ossetian territory, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin has refused to address the issue at Geneva. Georgian State Minister of Reintegration Paata Zakareishvili, the head of Tbilisi’s efforts to normalize relations with the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians, admits that the Geneva process has hit a snag.

Zakareishvili claimed that while Tbilisi has demonstrated its readiness for constructive dialogue with Moscow, the fences show that Russia is not ready to respond in kind. “But we will step over those fences,” he said, without elaboration. “The Berlin Wall was destroyed, so, fences … that is just comical.”
Georgia, he added, is betting on patience and “pragmatically looking at the situation.”

Locals living near the conflict line, however, have little reason for patience. Since the war, security concerns have prompted Beruashvili to move his three children out of his house. Alone with his mother, he tends to the few acres of orchards he can reach without risking arrest by the Russians. He waits for Georgian police to patrol the area before venturing to see his father’s grave, or to gather greens, close to land now patrolled regularly by Russian soldiers.
“The women are afraid, the elderly are afraid, we cannot bring the children here,” Beruashvili said. Russian soldiers have become more verbally aggressive of late, he claimed. “They want to take this territory,” he added.

Beruashvili, like scores of other locals, remains determined to make a stand and do everything he can to prevent his house and land from becoming, de facto, part of Russian-guarded, separatist South Ossetia. “I have set my mind to not allowing them in,” he said.

Whether such determination can succeed where international measures have failed remains to be seen.

This article was originally published by EurasiaNet.org.  Molly Corso is a freelance journalist who also works as editor of Investor.ge, a monthly publication by the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia.

VIDEO: Years After Russia-Georgia War, Fences And Fears Remain (youtube.com)

(youtube.com) Five years after Georgia and Russia fought a brief war over the breakaway region of South Ossetia, Russia troops remain in control of the territory, and continue to tighten the region's borders. For Georgians living in the Shida Kartli region, near the administrative border with South Ossetia, the presence of Russian troops and new barbed-wire fences has meant restricted movement and a constant fear of detention. But many say that there is no resentment between them and the civilians on the other side. Video by RFE/RL's Georgian Service

RÜCKBLICK: Nur ein kleiner Krieg am Rande Europas? Krieg zwischen Georgien und Russland. Von Silvia Stöber (tagesspiegel.de)

(tagesspiegel.de) Vor fünf Jahren begann der Krieg zwischen Georgien und Russland. Es ging um das kleine Gebiet Südossetien - aber in den USA fühlten sich Beobachter an die Lage vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg erinnert. Und Georgiens Präsident verschärfte mit falschen Behauptungen über die US-Unterstützung für sein Land die Spannungen.

Foto: dpa

"Die georgischen Häfen und Flughäfen werden unter Kontrolle des Verteidigungsministeriums der USA gestellt, um humanitäre und andere Missionen auszuführen. Das ist eine sehr wichtige Aussage, um die Spannungen zu verringern", verkündete Georgiens Präsident Michail Saakaschwili am 13. August 2008 in einer Fernsehansprache. Doch Saakaschwilis Worte waren alles andere als hilfreich, um die Lage zu beruhigen.

Fünf Tage zuvor war der eskalierende Konflikt um das abtrünnige Gebiet Südossetien in einen Krieg zwischen Georgien und Russland umgeschlagen. Die russischen Truppen brachten nicht nur Südossetien und das zweite abtrünnige Gebiet Abchasien unter ihre Kontrolle, sondern auch die Stadt Gori, die Ost-West-Route Georgiens sowie den Schwarzmeer-Hafen in Poti.

Die verbliebenen georgischen Streitkräfte hatten sich an den Rand der Hauptstadt Tiflis zurückgezogen. Die Informationslage war diffus. Trotz Erklärung eines Waffenstillstandes gab es Meldungen, die russischen Truppen würden in Richtung Tiflis vorrücken. Dies versetzte viele Menschen in der georgischen Hauptstadt in panische Angst.

Die Führung um Saakaschwili war in Endzeitstimmung. Der damalige Reintegrationsminister Temuri Jakobaschwili erinnert sich: "Es gab das Angebot, die Regierung in Sicherheit zu bringen. Wir lehnten ab. Wir entschieden: Wenn wir sterben, dann sterben wir in unseren Büros. Wir weichen nicht zurück." Saakaschwili glaubte, die Russen seien nur durch ein militärisches Eingreifen der Amerikaner zu stoppen. Als dies aber nicht geschah, behauptete er einfach, die US-Armee werde Häfen und Flughäfen Georgiens unter Kontrolle nehmen. USA wollten Konfrontation mit Russland vermeiden

Denn Saakaschwilis Behauptung war gelinde gesagt übertrieben. US-Präsident George W. Bush hatte lediglich humanitäre Hilfe an Bord von Schiffen und Flugzeugen der US-Armee angekündigt. Dies war geplant als fein austariertes Signal an die russische Regierung. Zwar hatte Bush mit einigen Kabinettsmitgliedern über die Option militärischer Hilfe für Georgien beraten. Doch war klar, dass dies auf eine direkte Konfrontation mit Russland hinauslaufen konnte. Dies wollte die US-Regierung verhindern. So beschrieb es der inzwischen verstorbene US-Diplomat Ron Asmus. Der damalige Chefberater für Europa im Nationalen Sicherheitsrat, Damon Wilson, bestätigt diese Version. Wilson zufolge hatten die US-Fregatten im Schwarzen Meer nur die übliche Bewaffnung an Bord. Saakaschwili behauptet bis heute, es hätten sich darauf auch schwere Raketenwerfer befunden.

Auf die Widersprüche in den Aussagen Saakaschwilis und der US-Regierung angesprochen, antwortet Jakobaschwili: "Details machen manchmal einen großen Unterschied." So habe zu der Zeit auf dem Flughafen von Tiflis ein amerikanisches Militärtransportflugzeug vom Typ C-17 gestanden. Die Russen hätten gefordert, es von dort zu entfernen, weil sie zwar den Flughafen angreifen, aber kein US-Flugzeug treffen wollten. Mit anderen Worten: Jakobaschwili sieht Saakaschwilis Behauptungen als legitim an, weil sie die Russen von einem weiteren Vormarsch abhalten sollten.

Doch dies hätte die Lage weiter eskalieren können, die nach Einschätzung von Fiona Hill bereits brandgefährlich war. Hill war von 2006 bis 2009 Russland-Beraterin des obersten US-Geheimdienstchefs. "Als ich die Ereignisse von Washington aus verfolgte, dachte ich an die Lage vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Als Studentin habe ich mich immer gefragt, wie eine solche Situation entstehen kann. In diesem Moment dachte ich: So passiert es."

Entstanden war die Situation aus einer schrittweisen Eskalation, die nicht Tage und Monate, sondern bereits Jahre zuvor begonnen hatte. Zu den eigentlichen Konflikten der Georgier mit den nach Unabhängigkeit strebenden Südosseten und Abchasen kamen wachsende Spannungen zwischen Tiflis und Moskau, bedingt durch sich widersprechende Einfluss- und Sicherheitsinteressen. Ein weiteres Element ist die tiefe persönliche Abneigung zwischen Wladimir Putin und Saakaschwili. Verschärft durch internationale Entwicklungen wie die Anerkennung des Kosovo und den NATO-Gipfel in Bukarest nahm die Eskalation Anfang 2008 ihren Lauf.

Bereits im Mai 2008 drohte ein Ausbruch offener Kampfhandlungen um die georgische Teilrepublik Abchasien. Direkte Verhandlungen zwischen Abchasen und Georgiern, teils unter Vermittlung Schwedens und der USA halfen, die Lage zu beruhigen, aber nicht zu klären. Auch der damalige deutsche Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier schaltete sich in Absprache mit den Amerikanern ein. Doch gab es Abstimmungsschwierigkeiten mit Washington. Die US-Regierung drängte auf ein Engagement der EU mit Beobachtern und Polizeiausbildern. Darauf ließ Brüssel sich aber nicht ein. Die Georgier misstrauten Steinmeier

Auch war das Misstrauen der Georgier gegenüber Steinmeier enorm. Jakobaschwili erzählt, Steinmeier habe bereits im Juli bei einem Treffen in Batumi das Szenario beschrieben, das sich Wochen später in Südossetien abspielen würde. Was als Warnung gemeint war, interpretierte die georgische Führung als Hinweis auf verdächtig enge Beziehungen Steinmeiers zu Moskau.

Auch Warnungen der US-Regierung kamen nicht an. US-Diplomaten wie Matthew Bryza beschwören, sie hätten Saakaschwili einerseits gewarnt, nicht in die russische Falle zu tappen. Andererseits hätten sie wiederholt in aller Deutlichkeit erklärt, dass die USA keine militärische Unterstützung leisten würden. Fiona Hill bestätigt indes, dass manche Personen Saakaschwili ermutigten, Namen und Herkunft will sie aber nicht nennen. So gab der georgische Präsident am 7. August den Befehl zum Angriff auf Südossetien, die russische Kriegsmaschinerie setzte sich in Gang.

Am 11. August forderte Russlands Außenminister Sergej Lawrow in einem Telefongespräch mit US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice nicht nur, dass die georgischen Truppen in die Kasernen zurückkehren und die Regierung in Tiflis einen Gewaltverzicht erklärt. Er verlangte auch, dass Saakaschwili zurücktritt. Rice beschreibt dies in ihren Memoiren als einen schweren Affront. In Washington rechnete man auch damit, dass die russische Armee in Tiflis einmarschieren und womöglich auch auf der ukrainischen Halbinsel Krim aktiv werden könnte. So fiel die Entscheidung für ein deutliches, aber begrenztes Signal an Russland: humanitäre Hilfe für Georgien an Bord von US-Militärschiffen und -flugzeugen.

Hill erzählt, dass es zu der Zeit praktisch nur noch einen Kommunikationskanal nach Moskau gegeben habe. Missverständnisse, widersprüchliche Informationen über die Lage im Konfliktgebiet und Fehlkalkulationen hätten die Lage erschwert. Dass aus dem kleinen Krieg am Rande Europas kein Flächenbrand wurde, sei letztlich einigen wenigen Personen mit klarem und nüchternen Kopf zu verdanken, sagt Hill. Frankreichs Präsident Nicholas Sarkozy habe mit seinem beherzten Eingreifen die Lage gerettet, auch wenn er für seine Vorgehensweise und die Vereinbarungen im ausgehandelten Waffenstillstand viel kritisiert worden sei. Am Ende führte Sarkozy herbei, was die EU zuvor immer abgelehnt hatte: Seit Oktober 2008 ist sie mit einer Beobachtersituation vor Ort. Die Beobachter tragen seither dazu bei, dass die Lage relativ ruhig geblieben ist.

PODCAST: Verhärtete Fronten im Kaukasus - Fünf Jahre nach dem Krieg um Südossetien. Von Gesine Dornblüth (dradio.de)

Podcast hören: Verhärtete Fronten im Kaukasus
Fünf Jahre nach dem Krieg um Südossetien
Von Gesine Dornblüth

(dradio.de) Am Abend des 7. August 2008 feuerte die georgische Armee Granaten auf die abtrünnige Teilrepublik Südossetien. Russland kam mit seiner Militärmacht den Südosseten zu Hilfe - und erkannte die Region als Staat an. Hoffnung auf eine Annäherung von Georgien und Russland gibt es derzeit kaum.

In Südossetien legen die Menschen Kränze zum Gedenken an die Opfer des Krieges vor fünf Jahren nieder. Es ist ein Trauertag. Dabei haben der Krieg und vor allem die dann folgende Anerkennung Südossetiens durch Russland den Menschen das Gefühl von Sicherheit gebracht. Das sagt jeder, mit dem man in Südossetien spricht. Auch Inal Plijew, der ausländische Journalisten betreut.

"Ich habe meine Angst verloren. Dass Russland uns von der Angst befreit hat, ist eine große Tat. Zwanzig Jahre lang musste jeder damit rechnen, von irgendeinem durchgeknallten georgischen Heckenschützen erschossen zu werden. Jeden Tag. Oder, dass sein Haus beschossen wird."

Immer schon hätten die Georgier versucht, die Südosseten zu vernichten. So wird im Nachhinein die Geschichte schwarz-weiß gefärbt. In Wirklichkeit hatten Südosseten und Georgier über Jahrzehnte, auch noch in den 90ern und Anfang der 2000er-Jahre, weitgehend in guter Nachbarschaft gelebt.

Dazu, dass es im August 2008 zur Gewalt kam, hatte eine Reihe Provokationen von russischer Seite beigetragen. Russland hatte zum Beispiel völkerrechtswidrig russische Pässe an die Bewohner Südossetiens ausgegeben. Den ersten entscheidenden Schritt tat aber Georgien, als es Südossetien am Abend des 7. August mit Granaten befeuerte. Das hat eine Kommission der EU unter Leitung der Schweizer Diplomatin Heidi Tagliavini herausgefunden.

In Georgien wurde diese georgische Schuld lange bestritten. Georgien sah sich als Opfer eines russischen Überfalls. Präsident Saakaschwili hat oft behauptet, zuerst hätten russische Panzer die Grenze überquert. Mittlerweile hat das Land eine neue Regierung. Sie will die Augustereignisse aufarbeiten. Paata Tsakareischwili, der Minister Georgiens für Reintegration:

"Der Tagliavini-Bericht ist einzigartig. Niemand hat vor, ihn umzudeuten. Wir wollen aber der damaligen Regierung unter Saakaschwili Fragen stellen, die noch offen sind. Zum Beispiel hat der Krieg am 7. August begonnen, aber Saakaschwili hat erst am Abend des 9. August den Kriegszustand verhängt. An dem Abend hat er nicht erwähnt, dass die Russen bereits am 7. August einmarschiert seien. Das hat er erst später immer wieder gesagt. Wir wollen wissen, wann er gelogen hat."

Der Tagliavini-Report der EU kam auch zu dem Ergebnis, Russland habe im August 2008 überreagiert. Das russische Militär kam damals nicht nur den Südosseten zu Hilfe, sondern rückte weiter in georgisches Kernland vor, bombardiert die Städte Gori, Poti, Kutaissi. Premierminister Dmitrij Medwedew, vor fünf Jahren Staatspräsident und Oberbefehlshaber der Truppen, wies diese Vorwürfe vor wenigen Tagen in einem Interview mit dem Staatssender Russia Today zurück.

"Krieg ist Krieg. Da muss man die militärischen Objekte des Gegners zerstören. Sie hätten die Russische Armee und Zivilisten in Südossetien und Abchasien, russische Bürger, verletzen können. Wir haben keine zivilen Ziele angegriffen, auch wenn Saakaschwilis Propaganda das sagt. Das war eine rein militärische Entscheidung."

Zumindest in Gori fielen Bomben aber auch auf Wohnhäuser. Angesichts so widersprüchlicher Positionen besteht kaum Hoffnung auf Annäherung zwischen Georgien und Russland. Georgien beharrt darauf, dass Südossetien zu Georgien gehört, ebenso wie das zweite Separationsgebiet Abchasien. Russland hat Fakten geschaffen und will die Anerkennung Südossetiens und Abchasiens nicht rückgängig machen. Der russische Außenpolitiker Andrej Klimow schlägt deshalb vor:

"Wenn wir mit Georgien verhandeln, müssen wir Abchasien und Südossetien ausklammern. Denn dort finden wir erst mal sowieso keinen Kompromiss. Stattdessen sollten wir über wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit reden, über Kooperation in der Wissenschaft oder im Verkehr. Da gibt es vieles."

Seit einigen Wochen ist georgisches Mineralwasser wieder auf dem russischen Markt. Russland hat dabei langfristige Ziele im Blick. Es will Georgien in den postsowjetischen Wirtschaftsraum zwingen, genauer, in die Eurasische Union - eine Art Gegenstück zur EU und strategisches Projekt von Präsident Wladimir Putin. Für Georgien kommt das bisher nicht infrage. Die beiden großen politischen Lager dort sehen Georgiens Zukunft in der EU.

PHOTOESSAY: The Unrecognized Islands of Caucasus (motherjones.com)

(motherjones.com) Civilians and soldiers alike navigate a region torn apart by years of war.


19 Photos by Karen Mirzoyan/Magnum Foundation 
Text by Hannah Levintova


magnumfoundation.org


Five months ago, the people of South Ossetia, a Georgian breakaway province, cast votes for their next president. Russia—the territory's controlling nation—had endorsed a candidate, but the majority went instead to former education minister (and anti-corruption advocate) Alla Dzhioeva. But her presidency was short-lived: The Supreme Court declared the election invalid, citing polling violations, and set a do-over election date—from which Dzhioeva was barred from participating. This week, Leonid Tibilov, a former KGB agent, won the new election.

South Ossetia is one of three contested republics in the Caucasus region. Its election chaos illustrates the impasse faced by these territories: All are trying to form autonomous nations, yet they can't build government without a stamp of approval from one of the only countries in the world that recognizes their nationhood. Their independence depends on Russia's support.

The Caucasus region, which straddles the Europe/Asia border, houses a medley of religions and ethnicities, from the Indo-European Ossetians to the Christian Armenians and the Muslim Azerbaijanis. During the USSR era, all that barely mattered; the Soviet identity subsumed regional and sectarian differences. But since the Soviet Union's fall in 1991, rival factions, finally able to assert their singularity, have clashed over competing claims to overlapping homelands.

The first to rise up was Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani territory, which is populated largely by Armenians, declared its independence in the thick of the USSR's December 1991 dissolution. A few months later, South Ossetia—where several Indo-Iranian dialects are spoken—won partial autonomy from Georgia in a bloody war. And they prevailed mostly because Georgia was distracted by the separatist movement in Abkhazia, another breakaway province, which gained independence in a 1992 conflict that claimed nearly 10,000 lives and displaced a quarter million people.

Today, these territories exist in a legal no-man's land, largely unrecognized by other nations, and often dependent on neighboring states, primarily Russia, for survival. Over two decades, they've balanced self-protection with haphazard nation-building. Armed clashes with anti-secessionist forces are frequent, though rarely publicized in Western media.

Photographer Karen Mirzoyan spent three years exploring these territories, to expose and understand their singular struggles.

"My aim was to document the transitional state of these unrecognized republics in the region," he explains. "In the beginning, my task seemed simple. What I did not take into account was that over a period of three years, not only my story, but my way of seeing, was subject to transformation." He continues:

Most frequently I was simply sitting with people over a table, drinking, sharing food and the stories of our lives. I often told them about my family, my aspirations, of my upcoming wedding…in return, they loved and understood me as much as I'd come to love and understand them.

I did not want to compromise a single detail, the smallest nuance of the stories shared for the privilege of turning on a microphone, reaching for my camera or even taking out a pen. So, I was not working, I was not acting as a photojournalist…because when interaction is so warm and intimate, I feel it would be unfair to just take these heart-told stories and package them for retail.

Nevertheless, Mirzoyan did take occasional photographs. But he didn't depend on them: Mirzoyan also recorded sounds, wrote in notebooks, or sketched subjects who didn't want to be photographed. "I confess to photography being my excuse, my rationalization for these repeated trips," he explains. "[But] my aim is not to document. I just wanted to see for myself, to listen and understand."

This slideshow presents an excerpt of Mirzoyan's attempt at understanding life in the Caucasus' transitional pockets.

CALL FOR PAPERS: Chechnya: rationales of violence and war experiences. Paris, 22-23 October 2012

Chechnya: rationales of violence and war experiences

Link: russiaviolence.hypotheses.org

Since 1994, the Chechen war has been qualified in diverse ways by actors and observers - colonial war, counter-terrorist operation, restoration of constitutional order, war of extermination. This profusion - or perhaps confusion of qualifiers reveals a multitude of explanations for the causes, aims and consequences of the war, and often hints at the exceptionality of the conflict. The aim of this conference will be not only to sum up, renew and enrich existing research on the Chechen war, but also to put the phenomena of violence at work there in a comparative perspective that takes into account the renewal of the historiography of 20th century wars.

The Chechen war, which broke out in 1994 and began again in 1999 after a 3-year cease-fire, played a central role in Russia's political evolution. Several studies (Tishkov, Hughes, Dunlop, Lieven, Evangelista) have shown how the Chechen war was linked with the collapse of the USSR and the reconfiguration of the political system and Russian federalism, but also the role played by that war in certain important Russian political events (Yeltsin's re-election in 1996, his resignation in 1999 in favour of Prime Minister Putin,whose popularity was on the rise thanks to the war).

Although estimates of the number of victims of the first (1994-96) and second wars (since 1999) remain a subject of debate (Cherkassov, Maksudov), as do the periodisations of these wars, studies by NGOs suggest tens of thousands of deaths in the two wars. Since 1999, those missing number in the thousands - testimony to the repressive system put in place to "fight against terrorism". The policy of systematic filtering of the population aimed particularly at men (Le Huérou, Regamey) was accompanied by numerous acts of violence (torture, rape, summary executions). The coming to power of Akhmad Kadyrov, succeeded on his death in May 2004 by his son Ramzan, meant a change in the rationales of violence and a "Chechenisation" of the conflict, which leads to the use of the notion of "civil war".

At the present time, the violence taking place in the whole of North Caucasus is analysed as a combination of a spread of war violence from Chechnya and of rationales proper to the Republics of North Caucasus (Merlin). The question of the spread of rationales of war violence into the whole of Russian society is also raised, there being so many Russian soldiers and officers today having gone through Chechnya, but policemen especially (Le Huérou, Sieca-Kozlowski). Bombings and hostage-takings linked to the Chechen conflict also aise the issue of Moscow's handling of terrorist acts (Dunlop).

Because Kadyrov was installed by Moscow in order for Chechnya to re-enter into Russia's fold, his power paradoxically raises the question of the degree of autonomy of a Republic whose leader claims to govern while not adhering to Russian laws (on women's rights in general), and Chechnya's place in today's Russia's political game (Malashenko, Lokshina). Another important element in Moscow-Grozny relations is the memory of the deportation of Chechens in 1944, the aim of an official mobilisation policy by pro-Russian Chechen authorities. Lastly, even if relative and truncated, the policy of amnesty for combatants suggests an "end of war" policy in which the issue of justice is not broached at any moment whatsoever.

It is the whole of these tendencies and rationales of violence at work that the conference will re-examine, drawing on deeply renewed research in war studies done in the past twenty years from the perspective of history, political science, anthropology, international relations, philosophy and law. Occasionally borrowing from anthropology (Audoin-Rouzeau, Ingrao), recent historical research has built up the concept of the culture of war (Becker, Horne), studying the war experience of combatants (Duclos, Reno, Debos) and suggesting several explanations for war violence. Putting forward the notion of trivialisation and brutalisation (Mosse, Bartov), examining issues such as consent (Audouin-Rouzeau, Becker, Browning) or the extent of constraint (Rousseau, Cazals), they also emphasize specific acts of violence, particularly torture and sexual violence (Branche, Virgili). Other research points to a need to pay particular attention to post-war moments (Cabanes, Capdevilia, Duclos, Jardin, Picketty), to the situation of former combatants (Delaporte, Edele, Prost, Oushakine) and to forms of transitional justice (Saada, Lefranc, Nadeau, Delpla, Rousso). Finally, we will address questions such as how conflicts fit into an international dimension and discuss the role of international actors and issues of labelling and qualifying a conflict (Lindemann).

Our objective in this conference - which will mainly focus on the history of Chechnya since the end of the Soviet period and the collapse of the USSR - is therefore not only to examine political, economic and social trends having marked the Republic, but to reflect on conditions determining the production of knowledge on this war from a comparative perspective, thanks to  specialists on other conflicts who will participate as discussants.

We will be interested in the most relevant tools, methods, questionings for furthering understanding and analysis of this conflict, and will pay particular attention to the various existing sources, to the way they are used by  different actors, as well as historians. We will pay attention to a precise chronology of the last twenty years, attempting to replace events in the context of the era, so as to avoid any anachronism or temptation to re-interpret the past in light of the present. Finally, though many research works emphasize the consequences of the conflict on how Russia has evolved, we will emphasize the consequences of this conflict on Chechnya and Chechen society.

The questions we wish to address can be grouped under four main themes:

How to work on this war?

This question, unavoidable for a conflict as contemporary as that of Chechnya, is in fact a dual one. As an ethical and political question, it is actual for all researchers in the domain of extreme violence (Sémelin, Zawadzki, Le Pape, Siméant, Vidal). If it is necessary that we discuss this war, which took place right in front of us, is it possible to produce knowledge which is purely academic and involves neither taking a stand nor action? How can we work without endangering, worsening the condition of persons who are the
object of extreme acts of violence, at the very time when these acts of violence are taking place?

Then there is the question of sources. The war in post-Soviet Chechnya began less than twenty years ago, and has given rise to a profusion of journalistic sources, humanitarian or human rights NGO reports, testimonies gathered by the latter which are extremely valuable sources (Lokshina, Sokirianskaia); numerous actors and witnesses can be questioned. At the same time, Chechnya was and has to a great extent remained inaccessible: in addition to the dangers inherent in any armed conflict were those of the chaotic period between the two wars marked by hostage-taking and assassinations, besides the entry prohibitions put in place by the Russian authorities as of 1999. Still today, Chechnya remains a dangerous region where the foreign visitor or researcher is under strict control. In this context, what do existing sources tell us and what sources are used by and are usable by researchers?

Political rationales of violence

Our aim here is to analyse acts of violence committed against civilians as well as their perpetrators, from the point of view of the military and police rationales at work in the conflict. In this case, two problems arise- the qualification and labelling of the conflict (war, anti-terrorism) and the consequences of this naming on the war terrain; what relationship is there between the naming of the enemy by the political power and the practice of acts of violence on the terrain?  Are there borrowings of anti-terrorist practices from other countries, as well as from Soviet counter-insurrection practices? In what way does the conduct of the war reflect the situation in the military, but also, in what way does it bring about reforms and  reorganisations? How to evaluate the role played by R. Kadyrov's armed forces in this violence? What are the relations between the boeviki, independentist and/or Islamist combatants and the civilian population? How to analyse the recourse to terrorism and its evolution during the war years? From the legal perspective, what links are there between the various stages of the conflict (jus ad bellum/ in bello/ post bellum) that enable us to speak of its breaking out, taking place, and of issues of after-war justice/reconciliation. Finally, how to record the Chechen war in the long history of wars and characterise it with the tools of "war studies"? Is the distinction between "old" and "new" war (Kaldor) operational in the case of this conflict?

War experiences and socio-cultural consequences of the war

We would like to examine the existing sources, testimonies, memoires, narrations and fictions to try to understand what was lived by those who went through the war. First of all by the civilian populations, whether they remained in Chechnya or fled the conflict. Whereas the Russian population living in Chechnya-Ingushetia during the Soviet era left the territory gradually, beginning in 1991, what were the effects of the war on Chechen society, and on the different peoples/persons living in Chechnya before the war? What were the economic consequences and issues brought on by the war? How to analyse the evolution of religion and religious practice, as well as the political mobilisations of religion? How did social cohesion evolve in its various forms and what role in these upheavals is played by the teïp, traditional organisation in clans (Sokiranskaia)? What specific forms of violence were women exposed to, how did their role evolve and, more generally, how did gender relations evolve during the war? Can we speak of a "re-traditionalisation" today, and if so, how can it be explained? What about the formation of a diaspora and of Chechen communities in exile, what type of social links connect those who left - and sometimes returned to Chechnya?

We will also examine the war experience of combatants, particularly in terms of "war trauma", but also in the translation of these reactions into resistance and disobedience movements. How the rationales of violence proper to police and military institutions play themselves out on the terrain, and how,  inversely, violence and the war experience influence the behaviour of policemen and the military once back in Russia, outside of Chechnya.

Phases of "non-war" and ends-of-war

Contrary to the temptation to see the history of Russian-Chechen relations only structured by war and confrontation, we will also examine times of "non war". First of all, the years between 1970-1980, a peaceful period, though not without tensions which remains to be re-explored. Second, the events of the beginning of the 1990s, after the fall of the USSR, the nature of the political relations between Moscow and Grozny and the modalities of negotiations or non-negotiations, as well as the role of the various actors involved. Finally, how to qualify the period between 1996-1999 ("interwar", "end-of-war") and the present period?

For all these periods, we will ask what legal relations were set up between Grozny and Moscow, how the status of Chechnya evolved and how the issue of recognition intervened in the process. What were the forms of political management of Chechnya by Moscow and what forms of government in Chechnya itself were given priority? How is Chechnya managed by Moscow from the viewpoint of the whole North Caucasus? How to analyse relations between Chechen and Russian elites, whether before and during the wars, and today, under Ramzan Kadyrov? How were economic relations with Moscow and the rest of Russia established, how did Chechnya fit into the networks and what role did it play in the circulation of various flows - economic and financial, legal and illegal? Finally, we will ask how, during these 20 years, issues of justice and impunity were addressed, in particular, the importance of internal justice mechanisms in comparison with the possibilities and limits of international justice; notably in the absence of Russia's ratification of the Rome statute founding the CPI.

The inter-disciplinary conference is open to the contributions of historians, sociologists, researchers in political science and international relations, cultural studies, literature and the cinema, as well as specialists in military questions. Although the conference will focus mainly on Chechnya since the fall of the USSR,
contributions on earlier periods are also welcome, as are proposals involving a comparison between the Chechen case and other conflicts.


Schedule

Persons wishing to participate should send to
chechnyaviolence@gmail.com a resume of 300 to500 words along with a short biographical note (no CV) for May 4th 2012.

Participants accepted will be informed by June 1st 2012.

Participants will be requested to provide an abstract of approximately 5-7 pages (3000-5000 words) for September 15th 2012.

Working languages: French, English, Russian (presentations are possible in these three languages, French-Russian and Russian-French translation only will be available).

Information:

http://russiaviolence.hypotheses.org
chechnyaviolence@gmail.com

This conference is organised by the research project Understanding Violence in Russia: War, Institutions, Society thanks to the support of the "Emergence(s)" Programme of the City Hall of Paris.

Organising Institutions: Centre d'étude des mondes russe, caucasien et centre-européen (CERCEC) (CNRS/EHESS); Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris; Université Libre de Bruxelles-; Centre d'études franco-russe, Moscow.

Organisation Committee: Françoise Daucé (University Blaise Pascal Clermont-Ferrand/ CERCEC(EHESS/CNRS)), Anne Le Huérou (CERCEC(EHESS/CNRS)), Aude Merlin (ULB-CEVIPOL, Brussels), Amandine Regamey (University Paris I/CERCEC(EHESS/CNRS)), Elisabeth
Sieca-Kozlowski (CERCEC (EHESS/CNRS), PIPSS.ORG)

Scientific Committee Alain Blum (CERCEC (EHESS/CNRS)), Raphaëlle Branche (University Paris-1, CHS, IUF), Marielle Debos (University Paris Ouest, ISP), Jean-Vincent Holeindre (Panthéon-Assas University (Paris 2), Centre Raymond-Aron (EHESS)), Mary Kaldor (London School of Economics), Julie Saada (Artois University), Aglaya Snetkova (Centre for Security Studies, ETH, Zurich), Katia Sokirianskaia (International Crisis Group, Moscow), Maïrbek Vachagaev (Association for Caucasian Studies, Paris), Vanessa Voisin (CEFR-IRICE)

PHOTOGRAPHIE: Tribute to Alexander Klimchuk (eurasianet.org)

Georgian photojournalist Alexander "Sasha" Klimchuk, 27, was killed on the evening of Aug. 8, 2008, in South Ossetia while covering the conflict for Russian news agency ITAR-TASS. Klimchuk, a frequent contributor to EurasiaNet, was killed along with fellow Georgian journalist Giga Chikhladze when South Ossetian militia fired on his car. Also wounded in the incident were U.S. journalist Winston Featherly and Georgian colleague Temuri Kiguradze. His images of every day life, features and hard news in Georgia were published by international news agencies, newspapers and magazines. He also co-founded his own photo agency, Caucasus Images.

The images presented here are a tribute to Alexander not only as a photojournalist, but as a person. To his energy and love of life, to his pluck and persistence. Thank you for all you gave of yourself, Alexander. You are missed.

more here >>>

BUCH: Benzinkönig. Von Wladimir Makanin (perlentaucher.de)

Aus dem Russischen von Annelore Nitschke. Der russische Major Schilin hat sich in den Tschetschenienkriegen eingerichtet: Er ist der "Benzinkönig", der Profiteur, der einen einträglichen Handel mit dem Benzin, das er eigentlich bewachen soll, installiert. Gegen Geld beliefert er jeden - auch den Feind. Aber er ist auch ein Garant von Zivilisation, von Verlässlichkeit, von Ordnung inmitten kriegerischer Anarchie. Am Leben und Sterben von Schilin entwirft der Altmeister der russischen Literatur ein gewaltiges Epos über die Menschlichkeit in unmenschlichen Zeiten.

BuchLink. In Kooperation mit den Verlagen (Info):
Wladimir Makanin: Der Benzinkönig - Leseprobe beim Luchterhand Verlag

Rezensionsnotiz zu Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21.07.2011
Als "Fortsetzung des Handels mit anderen Mitteln" wird der Krieg in Wladimir Makanins "Benzinkönig" dargestellt, schreibt Rezensent Urs Heftrich. Das Wesen des Tschetschenienkrieges jedenfalls, bei dem es letztlich auch ums Öl gehe und in dem "alles zur Ware geworden ist", ist laut Rezension mit dieser Formel treffend erfasst. Der Protagonist des Romans, der auf russischer Seite kämpfende Major Schilin, überlebt allein aufgrund seiner florierenden Benzingeschäfte mit Freund und Feind, wie wir erfahren. Blanker Zynismus sei dies, meint Heftrich, aber darin erschöpfe sich der Roman mitnichten. Seine "verblüffende Paradoxie" bestehe darin, dass Schilin mehr und mehr zum Lebensretter werde - ein Menschenfreund, der ein solcher eben nur unter der harten Schale des Zynikers zu werden vermag. Der Kritiker ist begeistert von diesem "klugen und differenzierten" Wurf Makanins. Und es ist nicht allein die "ingeniöse" Erzählweise, die Heftrich bewundert, sondern gleichfalls Makanins Bezugnahme auf zahlreiche Klassiker der russischen Literatur.

Quelle: perlentaucher.de

Deutschlandfunk: Die grausame Wahrheit des Krieges
Wladimir Makanin: "Benzinkönig". Luchterhand
Von Karla Hielscher
In seinem neuen Werk greift Wladimir Makanin, Jahrgang 1937, den Kaukasuskonflikt als Thema auf. In Anknüpfung an Tolstoi geht es dem russischen Schriftsteller nicht um reine faktische Darstellung, sondern um die "Tragödie des Menschen im Krieg überhaupt".

AmazonShop: Books, Maps, Videos, Music & Gifts About The Caucasus

FESTIVAL: Georgischer Beitrag bei Filmfestival „goEast“ ausgezeichnet

"August 2008“ zum besten Dokumentarfilm gekürt 10. April 2011 Beim diesjährigen „goEast“-Filmfestival in Wiesbaden wurde der georgische Beitrag „August 2008“ als bester Dokumentarfilm im Wettbewerb der Hochschulen ausgezeichnet. Der Preis ist mit insgesamt 1.000 Euro dotiert. Die georgische Regisseurin Anna Cherkezishvili rückt in ihrem Werk insbesondere das Schicksal der Menschen während der russischen Invasion Georgiens in den Mittelpunkt. Gegenwärtig studiert Cherkezishvili an der Tbilisi State University of Theatre and Cinema. Das „goEast“-Festival des mittel- und osteuropäischen Films feitere im Jahr 2001 Premiere und hat es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, einen kulturellen Dialog zwischen Filmschaffenden und Publikum zum Thema Osteuropa zu initiieren.

Quelle: Pressemitteilung des Filmfestivals „goEast“

PODCAST: Abchasien. Georgiens Umgang mit Flüchtlingen. Ein Beitrag von Gesine Dornblüth (wissen.dradio.de)

Anfang der 90er Jahre kamen rund 300.000 Flüchtlinge aus Abchasien nach Georgien. Viele von ihnen leben noch immer in Notunterkünften. Seit fast 20 Jahren warten sie nicht nur auf Wohnungen, sondern auch auf Entschädigungen.

Es ist nicht einfach, die alte Heimat aufzugeben. Viele Vertriebene verlassen ihr Zuhause, mit der Hoffnung irgendwann zurückzukehren. Darauf haben auch die Vertriebenen aus Abchasien gehofft. Anfang der 90er Jahre wurden etwa 250.000 Georgier aus der abtrünnigen georgischen Provinz Abchasien vertrieben. Rund 30.000 Tausend Menschen flüchteten zusätzlich nach Georgien. Sie glaubten höchstens für ein paar Monate im Exil zu bleiben.

Flüchtlinge werden ausgegrenzt Inzwischen leben die Vertriebenen aus Abchasien seit fast 20 Jahren in Georgien und immer noch hausen sie in Notunterkünften. Sie warten auf Wohnungen und auf Entschädigungen. Für die Integration hat die georgische Regierung nichts getan. Sie fühlen sich immer noch ausgegrenzt und alleine gelassen. Doch die Regierung hat versprochen, sich um ihre Probleme zu kümmern und ihnen zu helfen. Mit internationalen Geldern werden Wohnungen gebaut. Gesine Dornblüt berichtet über die Situation der Vertriebenen in Georgien.

Podcast: wissen.dradio.de/podcast
Quelle: wissen.dradio.de

BLOG: Palästinisierung des Kaukasus (grigorip.blogspot.com)

Die Ursprünge des russisch-georgischen Krieges liegen für die meisten Medienrezipienten im Dunkeln. Beobachtungen von wenigen unabhängigen Journalisten und Experten werden kaum zitiert. Nach einer ausgiebigen Recherche bin ich zu der Klarheit gekommen, die einen nicht unbedingt glücklich macht (Jüdische Zeitung, Oktober 2008).

Der ganze Text: grigorip.blogspot.com

BLOG: Georgia: Policeman fired after being identified on Facebook (theyounggeorgians.wordpress.com)

Also posted on Global Voices

More than dozen veterans of Georgia’s wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia began a hunger strike on December 27 demanding that the government address their social problems and restore their medical discounts. Camping out in front of a monument to fallen soldiers on Tbilisi’s Heroes Square, the ex-soldiers said that they would anyway leave on 6 January, the date of the Georgian Orthodox Christmas Eve.

full text with youtube-videos >>>

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US Ambassador expresses his concern over Heroes' Square events
source: georgiamediacentre.com

The US Ambassador to Georgia has said the police should not have used force against the protestors on 3 January when they violently broke up a peaceful and lawful protest by veterans of Georgia's wars of the 1990s' in Tbilisi's central Heroes' Square.
John Bass has proved to be rather more robust in his commentary on Georgian matters than his predecessor, John Tefft, but his words today were unusually strong - essentially saying the police's behaviour, which has been strongly defended by the Georgian government, was incompatible with any Georgian claim to be a democracy:
I want to respond to the events that took place on the heroes’ square that I’ve been observing for 2-3 days. I’m concerned that police used force against the protesters. Force must not be used against protesters. This must not be taking place in a democratic country. I’m glad Georgia’s public Defender released a statement and adequately assessed the happening. I hope it will be investigated and the present video material will be given a special attention
The video evidence (was attached - but the video has now been deleted from YouTube) appears to show leather jacketed young men - who we must assume are interior ministry employees - roughly handling and punching older men. Uniformed patrol policemen also handle them roughly but there is less evidence that they threw punches. The veterans were granted permission to hold their protest and had reportedly complied with requests to remove tents and bedding from the war memorial itself.
The veterans say they were attacked by the police shortly after President Saakashvili drove past the protest and the allegation is that the president personally ordered the unlawful assault.
Update: As the accuracy of IPN's report of the ambassador's statement has been questioned in the comments (below) we are pleased to note that the US embassy has issued it'sown statement. They quote the ambassador as saying:
I am disturbed by the reports of violence committed by the police against protesters. That type of violence does not have a place in democratic societies. I was pleased to see the Public Defenders' statement on those specific incidents and his concerns about the extent to which these actions were inconsistent with Georgian law. We hope for and expect there will be a full investigation of these allegations, including a close examination of what appears to be some good video evidence of potential police violence.
They further quote him as stating:
"All of our societies have places that are hallowed ground and there needs to be appropriate respect for that place and yet at the same time respect for freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, so that people have a legitimate right to protest and express opinions in appropriate places.
"In the United States, the freedom of assembly does not mean anyone can assemble anytime, anywhere and certainly within the scope of national monuments, respecting our war dead, people who sacrificed for our countries. We have restrictions on who can protest and where; those are clearly spelled out and I think part of the challenge here may be that it was not well understood and well publicized for all citizens of Georgia to understand necessarily what the rules were regarding the memorial at Heroes' Square."

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Storm over police attack on veterans protest continues to build