(cacianalyst.org) Georgia’s parliamentary
elections on October 1, 2012, concluded in a clear victory for the
opposition Georgian Dream (GD) coalition. President Mikheil Saakashvili
conceded defeat for his United National Movement (UNM) in an election
approved as largely up to standard in preliminary assessments by
international monitors. This marks the first step toward a peaceful and
constitutional transfer of power in Georgia, which has not experienced
such a political development since independence. Yet challenges abound.
The election outcome forces the new parliamentary majority to cooperate
with the President in the formation of a new government and Georgia is
likely to see a chaotic process ahead, which could nevertheless hold
positive implications for Georgia’s political evolution.
BACKGROUND: As the vote tally in
Georgia’s parliamentary elections is about to conclude, it is becoming
clear that the GD, headed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, will form
Georgia’s new parliamentary majority and is therefore likely to form the
next government. While final results have yet to be released, GD is
likely to get at least 83 seats, with the UNM taking up to 67. The GD
lead is higher than expected, firstly because most polls conducted in
the weeks preceding the elections pointed to a UNM lead, and secondly
due to fears, not least expressed by the GD itself, that the UNM’s
superior access to administrative resources and broadcast media as well
as its alleged capability and will to manipulate the elections in its
favor would have a decisive outcome.
With the benefit of hindsight, those fears now
appear unfounded. The preliminary verdict of the OSCE/ODIHR
international observer mission notes several problems in the
pre-election process, including instances of intimidation,
disproportionate media reporting favoring the UNM and the selective
application of campaign finance legislation against GD. However, the
election process itself received a largely positive assessment with only
minor violations and the elections were termed “an important step in
consolidating the conduct of democratic elections in line with OSCE and
Council of Europe commitments, although certain key issues remain to be
addressed.”
The UNM’s defeat can be attributed to several
factors. First, the ruling party has been in power for eight consecutive
years, and a large part of the Georgian population apparently developed
a certain fatigue, making many willing to consider a credible
alternative. President Saakashvili’s often non-deliberative style of
governance may have contributed to this trend. Second, while the UNM’s
time in government has provided for significant improvements of Georgian
state functions as well as important aspects of the country’s economy,
such progress has failed to translate into jobs and improved living
standards for large parts of the population – unemployment and poverty
remain among the chief concerns among Georgian voters. That said, the
approval ratings of Saakashvili and leading UNM figures have been
relatively high, suggesting that these factors were not sufficient in
tilting the election.
Third, during these elections the UNM faced serious
competition for the first time since its advent to power. In spite of
representing a broad array of political parties ranging from liberal
Europeanists to nationalists, the GD managed to present a united front
to the electorate under Ivanishvili’s leadership. The GD’s success can
in large part be attributed to the capability of its portal figure to
match the UNM’s funding and access to administrative resources by
funding a comprehensive political campaign across the country and
securing access to nationwide media.
Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the release on
September 18 of video footage disclosing abuse and sexual assaults on
prisoners in a Tbilisi detention facility appears to have played a
decisive role in tilting public opinion in the opposition’s favor,
especially among undecided voters. The images became a graphic
illustration of the opposition’s narrative of the government’s allegedly
violent and authoritarian rule. The government’s attempts to repair the
damage by dismissing the ministers of interior and corrections, among
other measures, proved insufficient.
IMPLICATIONS: Georgia has
successfully conducted its first truly competitive elections and there
are few doubts that the outcome reflects the will of a majority of
Georgian voters. This is a significant political development in Georgia,
where the previous two transitions of power since independence, the
ouster of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in January 1992 and the Rose revolution in
2003, took place through a brief civil war in the first instance and a
peaceful but unconstitutional takeover of parliament in the second. The
fact that Saakashvili as leader of the losing party publicly conceded
defeat is another novel feature of the process – the tradition in
Georgia has otherwise been for unsuccessful candidates to focus on
bitter contestation of election results based on both distrust in the
legitimacy of the vote and a disregard for the political process.
While the elections themselves have frequently been
termed a litmus test for the capacity of Georgia’s political system to
consolidate and democratize, the country’s political institutions now
face an even greater test in managing the cleavage between two
significant forces in Georgian politics. The responsibility for
Georgia’s democratic deficit has frequently been placed on the Georgian
government, not unreasonably so considering its virtual monopolization
of power in the years since the Rose Revolution. Yet, this critique has
frequently obscured the deeper needs of Georgia’s political system: the
lack of sufficiently strong democratic institutions capable of
peacefully managing political conflict and exercising checks and
balances on political power, and a robust party system based on
ideologies and political programs rather than charismatic and popular
personalities.
While the virtually uncontested rule of the UNM has
so far been an obstacle to the evolution of institutions and a party
system, change is more likely to come about as an effect of genuine
political contestation and compromise than through top-down reforms. In
this perspective, the current political situation in Georgia certainly
holds some room for optimism. While the country now faces a time of
political uncertainty – the GD certainly has numerous questions to
address regarding domestic and foreign policy as well as the
restructuring of ministries and government agencies – Georgia now has
two broad and powerful factions in parliament.
Yet, it is still early to tell what this new
situation will imply. Assuming he becomes Prime Minister, Ivanishvili
will now embark on a cumbersome process to assign ministerial duties
among his coalition partners – while not necessarily being able to
assign key ministries such as Interior and Defense, which may remain
under the President’s prerogative. Ivanishvili has hinted that GD could
break up into several parliamentary factions, an indication that it may
prove difficult to hold the coalition together although Ivanishvili’s
personal wealth and the joint purpose of defeating the UNM has so far
provided a motivation for continued cooperation. The new government will
also be forced to cooperate with Saakashvili, who remains president
until the presidential elections next year. While this situation may
well hold positive implications as outlined above, there is also a
considerable risk of a Ukraine-scenario – a political stalemate stemming
from animosity and obstructionism between the President and Prime
Minister.
Georgia will hence face an uncertain and vulnerable
political situation in the coming year. It is of immense importance
that Georgia’s international partners, primarily the U.S. and EU, engage
closely with both sides in the post-election environment in order to
mediate in conflicts that will inevitably emerge, facilitate cooperation
and ensure that Georgia’s transition of power takes place within the
framework of the constitution and political institutions.
CONCLUSIONS: The stakes in the
months ahead should not be underestimated. The UNM’s electoral defeat
and Saakashvili’s concession give the lie to the oft-repeated
allegations of Georgia’s authoritarian nature, which have frequently
been used by skeptical forces in Europe and the U.S. to keep the country
at arm’s length. If Georgia’s leading politicians succeed in taking the
country forward in an orderly democratic process, it will be very
difficult for anyone to maintain roadblocks on Georgia’s path to
European integration. Should they fail, however, and Georgia descend
into Ukrainian-style chaos, the critics arguing that Georgia is an
immature country that does not really belong in Europe will have been
vindicated.
In this sense, while foes domestically, Saakashvili
and Ivanishvili are now joined at the hip since both now effectively
represent the official governing institutions of Georgia in its
interactions with the world. In at least some respects, their legacies
are now intertwined. If they succeed in achieving a modus vivendi with
one another, Georgia will succeed. If they fail to cooperate, it is not
just they but Georgia that will fail.
more to: Svante E. Cornell
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